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PREFACE 1
Preface
Robert Rosner
Modern concerns about dual-use technologies emerged in concert with fears 
about the proliferation of nuclear weapons–related technologies in the early 
days of the Cold War. These concerns focused on obvious targets, such as spe-
cialty steels, high-precision computer-aided manufacturing tools and facilities, 
and high-performance software and hardware; that is, materials and tools that 
are readily adapted to nuclear weapons–related design and manufacturing. More 
recently, focus has shifted to nonnuclear technological contexts—including, 
most prominently, biological and information technology—in which ongoing 
research and development has dramatically advanced human social and eco-
nomic well-being, though at the cost of generating potential for these technol-
ogies to be harnessed for nefarious purposes.
Of course, the dual nature of technological advances—capable of elevating 
humanity and unleashing destruction upon it—long predates the total war and 
scientific breakthroughs of the twentieth century. For example, the chemical 
advancements underlying the use of fireworks in imperial China were adapted 
by the tenth century AD to produce “fire arrows” for use in battle.1 What has 
changed since is not the balance of dual-use technologies, but the ability of 
modern weaponry to kill on drastically greater scales, affecting vast portions of 
the earth’s surface—a dynamic captured in J. Robert Oppenheimer’s sobering 
allusion to the two-thousand-year-old Bhagavad-Gita: “I am become Death, 
the destroyer of worlds,” when describing the Trinity nuclear explosion.2 We 
are faced today with weaponry that is appropriately referred to as weapons of 
mass destruction.
Given these stakes, how can we create effective international and national 
governance structures that provide a legal framework for regulating the flow of 
powerful dual-use technologies, as well as provide for enforcement mechanisms 
ensuring compliance with it? Technological innovation consistently follows a 
course of “trickle-down” effects: what is high precision today is run-of-the-mill 
tomorrow; capabilities once considered rare and extraordinary, and thus condu-
1. One of the earliest recorded uses of such rockets in warfare was the defense of the Chinese 
city of Tzu T’ung in AD 994.
2. Oppenheimer quoted from Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, trans., Bhaga-
vad-Gita: The Song of God (Madras, India: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1945), ch. xi, v. 32. The line 
is elsewhere given as “I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds.”
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cive to control, evolve to become the ordinary, slipping outside any possibility of 
enforceable regulation. The most obvious example is the evolution of computer 
technologies: the Herculean effort of the analog computers of the Manhattan 
Project is today totally eclipsed by the computing power of any budget-model 
laptop loaded with freely available modeling software. Similarly, computer-aided 
design and manufacturing has evolved over the past two decades such that the 
tools for high-precision manufacturing have become commodity products: a 
complete CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided manufac-
turing) workshop, including extremely high-precision numerically controlled 
machining tools, can be assembled today at costs easily within the reach of 
well-funded terrorist groups.
In response to these challenges, the American Academy’s Global Nuclear 
Future Initiative, which I direct alongside Steven Miller and senior advisor Scott 
Sagan, decided to take a comprehensive look at the range of current efforts 
to constrain dual-use technologies—that is, efforts to create dual-use gover-
nance structures—with a particular focus on their effectiveness in controlling 
the spread of technologies that can have both beneficial and harmful conse-
quences. The modern touchstone of such efforts has, as stated above, been the 
control of technologies that enable the construction of nuclear weapons; thus, 
a significant component of our study is an examination of the similarities and 
differences between the strategies used in the nuclear realm and those proposed 
for biological and information technology.
We began with a series of small workshops in 2012 that sought to intro-
duce and explore the critical issues surrounding dual-use technologies; these 
workshops led to a larger meeting held at Stanford University in January 2013, 
from which we drew the conclusion that to reach a useful understanding of the 
dual-use issue, we needed to significantly narrow our focus. Ultimately, we orga-
nized our strategic approach around governance: What have we learned about 
the potential for dual-use technology control from the decades-long efforts to 
restrict the spread of technology related to nuclear and biological weapons and, 
more recently, cyber weapons? 
To this end, we were fortunate to enlist Elisa D. Harris to lead a follow-on 
effort focused on these questions (and to address the issue of biological tech-
nology), and to convince James Acton and Herbert Lin to offer their views 
on the governance issues in the nuclear and information technology domains, 
respectively. The authors prepared detailed background papers that were dis-
cussed extensively at a meeting held in Chicago in March 2015. This volume 
contains revised versions of the papers presented by James Acton, Herbert Lin, 
and Elisa Harris at that meeting, together with introductory and concluding 
chapters by Elisa Harris.
Three painful reminders of how challenging the issue of dual-use gover-
nance is emerged from our discussions. First was the realization—obvious in 
retrospect—of how distinct the governance challenges are in the three techno-
logical domains we have chosen to study. For example, while there is general 
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agreement internationally on the need to restrict access to the technologies 
enabling the development of nuclear weapons (with, of course, some consid-
erable disagreements about implementation), no such consensus exists in the 
biological and information technology domains. Indeed, with biotechnology 
research, there is considerable opposition from the biological science commu-
nity to any attempts to limit access to or dissemination of research findings, 
including information that could lead to great harm. And in the information 
technology arena, the Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have done to 
you—goes largely ignored: national adversaries (and, in some cases, allies) rou-
tinely infiltrate each other’s networks to gain intelligence and network informa-
tion (including the identification of vulnerabilities allowing future exploitation), 
to conduct economic espionage, or to cause damage directly. 
Second, models of effective governance presume the capability to identify 
and punish violators of its terms. While there is some degree of attribution 
possible in the nuclear realm—including, for example, limited means of finger-
printing radioactive materials to trace them back to their origins—attribution 
is far more complex in the bio domain and may be practically impossible in the 
case of information technology. Finally, the issue of enforcement bedevils even 
the best understood of the dual-use realms. Consider the recent challenges in 
negotiating the terms of an agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program, and the 
pronounced failure of internationally supported sanctions to curtail the nuclear 
ambitions of North Korea. 
Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that—even in light of these governance 
limitations—the number of major violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) remains very small. This, perhaps, offers hope that with further 
research, analysis, and vision like that presented in this volume, we will not end 
up with a nuclear, biotechnology, and cyber weapons free-for-all in the twenty- 
first century.
This Occasional Paper is part of the American Academy’s Global Nuclear 
Future Initiative, which is supported by generous grants from Carnegie Cor-
poration of New York, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The John 
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 
The Flora Family Foundation, and The Kavli Foundation. 
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Introduction
Elisa D. Harris
Since shortly after the first and, thus far, only use of atomic weapons, in 1945, 
scientists, policy analysts, and government officials have sought to identify mea-
sures to inhibit the further acquisition and use of the enormous destructive 
potential of nuclear technology. In the late 1960s, a similar group of stake-
holders initiated efforts to prevent the biological sciences from being used to 
develop weapons whose destructive effects against humans, animals, and plants 
could, in some circumstances, rival those of nuclear weapons. Today, questions 
are being raised about how to manage the potential threat posed by information 
technology, whose growth and spread some believe may position cyber weap-
ons alongside nuclear and biological weapons in the elite club of technologies 
capable of unleashing massive harm.
These technologies differ in their legal status and characteristics. But they 
also have one critically important similarity: each is what has come to be called 
dual-use. Over the years, this concept has been defined in various ways. The 
European Commission (EC), for example, defines dual-use goods as “items, 
including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military 
purposes.”1 The U.S. government’s Code of Federal Regulations takes a similar 
approach, describing “items that can be used both in military and other strategic 
uses . . . and commercial applications.”2 These definitions focus on the inherent 
characteristics of the technology and are consistent with how the term dual-use 
is used in discussions of nuclear technology.
Other definitions, however, focus more on what one analyst has called 
externalities, such as the context in which the technology is used, or the users 
themselves.3 This is reflected in the 2004 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which describes the dual-
use dilemma in biology as “when the same technologies can be used legitimately 
1. “Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of May 5, 2009,” Official Journal of the European 
Union (May 29, 2009): L134/3, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ 
:L:2009:134:0001:0269:en:PDF.
2. “Dual Use Exports,” Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, § 730.3 (2000), https://www.law 
.cornell.edu/cfr/text/15/730.3.
3. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, the Life Sciences 
and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007), 196–199.
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for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism.”4 An externally driven 
approach is also evident in the work of analysts at the Center for International 
and Security Studies at Maryland, whose proposal for oversight of dual-use 
biotechnology research extends to research that is intended for beneficial pur-
poses but can also cause harm, either inadvertently or as a result of deliberate 
malfeasance.5 This definition is even broader than that used by the NAS in that 
it includes not just deliberate misuse of dual-use technology but accidents and 
other unintended outcomes.
Whatever definition one uses, military measures such as deterrence, defense, 
and reprisal are clearly of limited value in preventing dual-use technologies 
that are widely available around the globe, such as biological and information 
technology, from being used for hostile purposes. In both of these areas, the 
difficulties associated with identifying the source of an attack, or what is called 
attribution, render deterrence and reprisal much less effective. The technology 
also favors the offense over defense; that is, a biological or cyberattack is gener-
ally easier to carry out than to defend against. The situation is different in the 
nuclear area, where the technology is not as broadly disseminated and where 
measures such as deterrence, defense, and reprisal have for almost seventy years 
played a major role in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. They also have 
helped convince at least some countries that their security does not require them 
to use their civilian nuclear technology to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
Today, the range of actors who could cause harm with these dual-use tech-
nologies includes not just state-level actors like national governments, but also 
nonstate actors such as terrorists or criminals. In the case of biological and 
information technology, private and commercial entities and even individuals 
must also be considered. Moreover, distinctions between these actors often are 
blurred, as in the case of biodefense research, which might be funded by a gov-
ernment agency but conducted at a private facility. The types of harm that can 
result from the misuse of these dual-use technologies are similarly wide ranging 
and include everything from mischief to loss of life to damage to commercial, 
macroeconomic, or national security interests.
Because of the complexities of the threat, a wide range of different gover-
nance measures have been developed to mitigate the risks from dual-use tech-
nologies. Like the term dual-use, the concept of governance has been defined 
in a variety of ways. Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, for example, describes it 
in terms of “government; exercise of authority; direction; control.”6 Political 
scientist Mark Bevir has more recently defined governance more broadly, as 
4. National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2004), 15.
5. John D. Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy M. Okutani, Controlling 
Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System (College Park: Center for Interna-
tional and Security Studies at Maryland, 2007).
6. Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), http://webstersdictionary 
1828.com/Dictionary/governance.
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“all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or 
network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or ter-
ritory and whether through laws, norms, power or language.”7 This definition 
describes some of the potential sources, targets, and forms of governance, but 
its descriptions are more illustrative than comprehensive.
Bevir’s definition omits two elements that are important to the governance 
of dual-use technology: the levels at which governance is undertaken and the 
objectives it seeks to achieve. Each level of society is in fact potentially relevant 
to governance—the international, national, local, and individual. As for the 
objectives of governance of dual-use technologies, these can be thought of in 
terms of general concepts like nonproliferation, security, and safety, or in terms 
of more-specific goals, including:
• preventing dual-use technologies from being developed and used for 
hostile purposes;
• controlling access to the materials, equipment, and information or 
knowledge associated with dual-use technologies; and
• promoting the safe and secure handling and use of materials, equipment, 
or information associated with dual-use technologies.
As the following chapters show, just as no single definition of dual-use or 
governance is relevant to all three of these technologies, no single governance 
approach can mitigate the risks posed by different dual-use technologies. Nev-
ertheless, the concept of dual-use technology is a useful organizing principle 
for examining governance efforts across different technology areas. This exam-
ination is especially important given the pace of technological developments 
and the continuing diffusion of dual-use materials, equipment, and information 
around the globe. These trends are playing out differently in each of the tech-
nology areas examined in this volume, but their potential consequences are the 
same: an increase in the risk that dual-use nuclear, biological, or information 
technology will cause harm, potentially on a massive scale.
Responding to this challenge requires a deeper understanding of how gov-
ernance efforts in each of these areas have evolved: What types of governance 
measures have been adopted? What objectives have they sought to achieve? 
How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance 
prospects? Who are the key stakeholders and what has been their role? What 
have been the primary obstacles to effective governance? What gaps exist in the 
current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? These 
are among the questions that the following chapters on nuclear, biological, and 
information technology seek to address.
The discussion in each of these chapters will lay the foundation for an 
analysis of governance arrangements across the three dual-use technology areas: 
What are the most important differences among the technologies, and to what 
7. Mark Bevir, Governance: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. 
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extent do they affect governance prospects? What are the most important simi-
larities in the governance measures being used in the different technology areas? 
What factors account for the limitations in the various governance measures that 
have been adopted to date? Are further governance measures feasible in any 
of these technology areas? Finally, what lessons can be learned about dual-use 
technology governance from the experience of these particular dual-use tech-
nologies? These questions will be the focus of the volume’s concluding chapter.
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Chapter 1
On the Regulation of  
Dual-Use Nuclear Technology
James M. Acton
INTRODUCTION
When General Electric acquired the rights to Silex laser enrichment technology 
in 2006, few people, even within the nuclear industry, took much notice. After 
decades of research, laser-based technologies appeared to be yet another in a 
long list of enrichment processes that were not commercially viable. In 1999, 
the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a private company origi-
nally created by the government to lead domestic enrichment efforts, had aban-
doned the U.S. indigenous laser enrichment program after twenty-seven years 
and more than $2 billion had been spent.1 At the time, USEC had a partnership 
agreement with Silex Systems, the Australian company that had developed its 
eponymous laser-based process. But in 2003, USEC decided the technology 
was too expensive to commercialize and turned its attention to the gas centri-
fuge, which then, as now, dominated the global market for enrichment. Silex 
looked dead in the water.
General Electric, which merged its nuclear operations with Hitachi in 2007 
to form GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, had more success with Silex, however, and 
proceeded with plans to commercialize it, albeit behind schedule.2 In 2009, it 
1. The history of U.S. efforts, as well as the differences between various laser enrichment pro-
cesses, are summarized in Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, “Laser Enrichment: Separa-
tion Anxiety,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (2) (March–April 2005): 16, http://www.cfr 
.org/content/thinktank/Ferguson_BAS_separation.pdf.
2. General Electric originally intended to submit the license application by December 2007. 
Luis A. Reyes, memorandum to the Commissioners, “Status of the Silex Project Proposed by 
General Electric Nuclear,” SECY-07-0031, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 9, 2007, 
2, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2007/secy2007-0031 
/2007-0031scy.pdf.
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submitted a license application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) for a commercial-scale facility. GE Hitachi indicated that a decision to 
build the facility would not be made until the results of further testing were 
known.3 But the prospect that the United States might license a first-of-its-kind 
laser enrichment facility marked an important potential juncture for both the 
nuclear industry and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The benefit of the technology was clear. If laser enrichment were cheaper 
than the centrifuge, GE Hitachi’s investment in a risky technology would reap 
considerable profits. (Consumer benefits, if any, would be much more modest, 
because the price of enrichment is set by the most expensive supplier on the 
market and because enrichment typically accounts for no more than 5 percent 
of the total cost of electricity.)4
The costs and risks of laser enrichment—including proliferation—were 
potentially significant but extremely hard to evaluate.5 One key issue was how 
the commercialization of laser enrichment by a U.S. company would affect its 
spread globally. Would the demonstration that laser enrichment was a profitable 
enterprise inspire other states to attempt to develop it for themselves? Could GE 
Hitachi keep classified details of the Silex process secret for decades, potentially 
against repeated attempts by foreign governments to acquire them? Even if it 
could, would other states or companies nonetheless succeed in developing this 
or another form of laser enrichment technology from scratch? Conversely, if 
the United States refused to license the plant, would Silex Systems attempt to 
transfer the technology to another state? If so, could the United States prevent 
the company from doing so?
A second issue was the consequences of the spread of laser enrichment 
technology. Did any technical barriers prevent Silex technology from being used 
to produce the highly enriched uranium (HEU) needed for a nuclear weapon?6 
GE Hitachi had boasted that a Silex facility would be smaller and use less energy 
than a centrifuge facility—but did that not also imply that a clandestine laser 
enrichment facility would be more difficult to detect? How effective would 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards be if applied to a laser 
enrichment facility?
3. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, “Global Laser Enrichment Submits License Application to Build First 
Commercial Uranium Enrichment Plant Using Laser Technology,” press release, June 30, 2009, 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090630006219/en/Global-Laser-Enrichment 
-Submits-License-Application-Build.
4. Geoffrey Rothwell, “Market Power in Uranium Enrichment,” Science & Global Security 17 (2009): 
136–138, http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/archive/17-2-3-Rothwell.pdf. 
5. For a short but trenchant discussion of the issues see R. Scott Kemp, “SILEX and Proliferation,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 30, 2012, http://thebulletin.org/silex-and-proliferation.
6. Although a definitive conclusion is impossible to reach without access to classified information, 
theoretical considerations suggest that molecular laser isotope separation processes, which include 
Silex, are considerably more suitable for HEU product than atomic vapor laser isotope separation. 
Allan S. Krass, Peter Boskma, Boelie Elzen, and Wim A. Smit, Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear 
Weapon Proliferation (London: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 165–166, 170–171, http://books.sipri 
.org/files/books/SIPRI83Krass/SIPRI83Krass.pdf.
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To this author at least, the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis of laser 
enrichment technology was not obvious. None of the important questions 
was straightforward. Answers to some of them required classified information, 
which was secret for good reason. Others hinged on difficult-to-make political 
judgments. A net assessment of Silex technology would have been a difficult 
and controversial exercise. The U.S. government, however, did not even try. 
The executive branch ignored the issue. The NRC argued that its nonprolif-
eration role extended no further than overseeing GE Hitachi’s procedures for 
handling classified information; everything else was, in the NRC’s opinion, the 
executive branch’s responsibility.7 While a few lawmakers did take an interest in 
the subject, Congress as a whole did not.
In September 2012, the NRC licensed the facility. In the three years the 
process had taken, nonproliferation considerations had essentially been ignored. 
Remarkably, the only entity with detailed knowledge of the Silex process that 
had attempted to analyze those considerations was GE Hitachi itself—and its 
assessment, which was not made public, was reportedly just seven pages long, 
three of which were the biographies of the authors.8
More than three years later, GE Hitachi has still not decided whether to 
build the facility. Nonetheless, its license application highlights issues—substan-
tive and procedural—that reoccur in domestic decisions about the development 
and deployment of nuclear technologies. The story also illustrates the role of 
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime—IAEA safeguards most notably—in 
trying to ensure that the nuclear technology that does spread is used only for 
peaceful purposes.
Scoping the Dual-Use Problem
Which technologies and materials are dual-use; that is, useful for both civilian 
and military ends? Separated plutonium and HEU are the two dual-use nuclear 
materials of greatest proliferation significance. Both have a few nonmilitary 
applications, most notably in reactor fuel, but can also be used as the fuel for 
a nuclear weapon. HEU is usually defined as uranium “enriched” to contain 
more than 20 percent of the isotope uranium-235 (natural uranium, by con-
trast, consists of 99.3 percent uranium-238 and only 0.7 percent uranium-235). 
Although uranium enriched to any level above 20 percent is capable of sus-
taining the uncontrolled chain reaction used to generate energy in a nuclear 
weapon, practical warhead-making considerations dictate the use of HEU with 
an enrichment level of at least 80 percent. Whether the plutonium contained 
in the spent fuel discharged from modern power reactors is suitable for weap-
7. Timothy C. Johnson, memorandum to Brian W. Smith, “May 10, 2012, Meeting Summary: 
General Electric-Hitachi Public Meeting on Safety Evaluation Report and Final Environmental 
Impact Statement,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 22, 2012, 5, http://pbadupws.nrc 
.gov/docs/ML1213/ML12138A098.pdf. See also Kemp, “SILEX and Proliferation.”
8. Elaine M. Grossman, “Closely Held Report Discounts Proliferation Risk of Lasers for Making 
Nuclear Fuel,” Global Security Newswire, May 24, 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/
closely-held-report-discounts-proliferation-risk-lasers-making-nuclear-fuel/.
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onization has been the subject of considerable debate (its isotopic composition 
is quite different from plutonium produced specifically for weapons).9 None-
theless, the IAEA treats almost all plutonium as weapon-usable.10 It regards 
twenty-five kilograms of uranium-235 in the form of HEU or eight kilograms 
of plutonium as the “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the 
possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”11 
This definition has been criticized by experts who argue that even a relatively 
unsophisticated proliferator could design its first nuclear weapon with less mate-
rial (a nation with experience in weapon design can certainly manufacture a 
warhead with less material, but the agency’s detection efforts are not focused 
on such states).12
Enrichment (concentrating uranium in the isotope uranium-235) and 
reprocessing (separating plutonium from spent fuel) are the most sensitive 
nuclear technologies, since they can produce weapon-grade materials. But 
enrichment is also vital to nuclear energy, since most power reactors in opera-
tion today use fuel made from low enriched uranium (LEU, which has a ura-
nium-235 content between that of natural uranium and HEU). By contrast, 
most states, with some notable exceptions—including France, Japan, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom—have chosen not to reprocess the spent fuel pro-
duced by their nuclear power programs.
Nuclear technologies other than enrichment and reprocessing (such as 
nuclear reactors) and nuclear materials other than plutonium and HEU (such as 
spent fuel and LEU) are less proliferation sensitive but are still dual-use because 
they can be involved in the production of weapon-grade materials.
Some materials and technologies that do not involve uranium or plutonium 
are also of proliferation concern. First and most important, nuclear facilities 
involve numerous nonnuclear components. Those that also have nonnuclear 
applications are often described, particularly in the world of export controls, 
as “dual-use.” This usage of the term is subtly but confusingly different from 
describing plutonium as dual-use because it has both civilian and military appli-
cations. In any case, certain types of pressure transducers, which can be used to 
monitor the operation of a gas-centrifuge enrichment plant and serve a similar 
function in other industrial processes, are but one example of equipment that 
has both nuclear and nonnuclear uses. Similarly, the nonnuclear technology 
9. For example, J. Carson Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Sci-
ence & Global Security 4 (1) (1993): 111–128, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/
sgs04mark.pdf; and Bruno Pellaud, “Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling,” Comptes 
Rendus Physique 3 (7–8) (2002): 1067–1079.
10. The only exception is plutonium consisting of more than 80 percent plutonium-238.
11. IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition, International Nuclear Verification Series 3 
(Vienna: IAEA, 2002), 23, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/
PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf.
12. Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-En-
riched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 1995).
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used in nuclear warhead manufacture can also be dual-use, even if its nonnuclear 
applications are often military. Technology for “shaping” high explosives, for 
example, is used in producing both antitank munitions and the explosives that 
are used to detonate a nuclear weapon.
Second, computer codes and other theoretical tools can have both military 
and civilian nuclear applications. For example, computer codes used to model 
the core of nuclear reactors or the behavior of plasma or the transport of radi-
ation under certain conditions may be adaptable for use in nuclear-weapon 
studies. Finally, fissile materials other than HEU or plutonium could also be 
used to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The most important such material is 
uranium-233. The United States has tested nuclear warheads incorporating this 
material and has a stockpile of it (which it is currently trying to dispose of).13 
Furthermore, the development of thorium breeder reactors, which India is pur-
suing, could lead to the large-scale production and separation of uranium-233. 
Other alternative fissile materials (most notably, neptunium-237) are of lesser 
concern since they have not been (and currently appear unlikely to be) separated 
on a significant scale—although this could change.
Efforts to manage these technologies and materials are generally divided 
into nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security. These terms have no univer-
sally accepted definitions.14 For the purposes of this chapter, nonproliferation 
is used to refer to the goal of preventing states that do not have nuclear weap-
ons from acquiring them. The aim of nuclear security efforts is to prevent the 
unauthorized possession of nuclear material or access to nuclear facilities under 
civilian control. In practice, most states’ nuclear security efforts are directed pri-
marily against nonstate actors, although state-based threats to nuclear security 
cannot be ignored.
These definitions reflect the focus of this chapter—the oversight of dual-use 
technology. In other contexts, nuclear security is often defined in a broader sense 
to include, for example, preventing unauthorized access to nuclear weapons or 
material under military control. This is clearly an important goal, but it falls out-
side the scope of this chapter, since nuclear weapons and military fissile materials 
are not dual-use. Likewise, preventing unauthorized access to radioactive but 
nonnuclear materials (which is sometimes considered to be part of nuclear secu-
rity) and preventing the unintended release of radiation from nuclear facilities 
(which is always considered within nuclear safety) are also important. However, 
both goals have significant differences—in terms of the potential approaches to 
risk mitigation, the challenges to their implementation, and the consequences of 
13. Robert Alvarez, “Managing the Uranium-233 Stockpile of the United States,” Science & 
Global Security 21 (1) (2013): 53–69, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21alvarez 
.pdf.
14. For a discussion of how the definition of nuclear security is evolving, see Nuclear Secu-
rity Governance Experts Group (NSGEG), Responsibility beyond Rules: Leadership for a Secure 
Nuclear Future (NSGEG, March 2013), 6–7, http://www.nsgeg.org/NSGEG_Responsibilty 
_Beyond_Rules_2013.pdf.
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failure—from nuclear security, as defined above. Finally, many analysts and offi-
cials, particularly from the Global South, would argue that nuclear nonprolifer-
ation should include not just preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
states (sometimes termed “horizontal proliferation”) but also preventing those 
states that have nuclear weapons from qualitatively or quantitatively enhancing 
their arsenals (“vertical proliferation”). While a narrower definition has been 
adopted here for the sake of conceptual clarity, the extent to which enhancing 
nonproliferation efforts is made more difficult by a perceived lack of progress 
on disarmament is discussed below.
A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF REGULATION
At the beginning of 1942, the practical applications of the newly emerging field 
of nuclear science still lay in the future. However, the promise of one potential 
application—the Bomb—had just sparked the creation of what came to be called 
the Manhattan Project. Within two years, the United States would become the 
first nation to operate a nuclear reactor, to separate plutonium from spent fuel, 
and to enrich uranium. Only after the war were these technologies used for 
more peaceful ends. From a historical perspective, therefore, nuclear technol-
ogy is not a civilian enterprise that happens to have military applications, but a 
military technology that also has peaceful uses.
To manage the risks associated with this technology, an extraordinarily 
complex system has emerged: legally binding and politically binding agree-
ments; norms; patterns of interstate cooperation; intergovernmental, nongov-
ernmental, and domestic institutions; and national laws and practices (along 
with a bewildering number of acronyms). In fact, two largely separate systems 
have emerged: one for nonproliferation and one for nuclear security.
In the broadest of terms, the nuclear nonproliferation regime consists of 
three key interrelated elements:
• National decisions about whether to develop or use a particular dual-use 
nuclear technology.
• National laws and international agreements about whether to permit 
the sale of dual-use nuclear technologies and materials and, if so, under 
what conditions.
• International oversight mechanisms to detect and deter attempts by 
states to acquire nuclear weapons using these technologies and materials.
The importance of these three elements stems from the characteristics of nuclear 
technology and the way it has been developed.
First, national governments have been—and remain—absolutely central to 
the development and operation of nuclear technology. States or state-owned 
companies operate many, if not most, of the nuclear facilities around the world 
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today. Even nuclear facilities that are operated by genuinely private entities, 
such as some utilities in the United States, are dependent on governments. At 
the very least, a nuclear facility must be licensed. While the primary function of 
licensing is ensuring safety, the process requires a government to have made a 
policy decision in favor of permitting (or at least not prohibiting) the activity in 
question. In most cases, however, governments do much more than merely tol-
erate a nuclear activity. For example, the development of American light water 
reactor technology (which has now been incorporated into Chinese, French, 
Japanese, and South Korean designs) was originally sponsored by the U.S. 
government for use in submarine propulsion. Meanwhile, efforts to encour-
age the construction of nuclear power reactors invariably require government 
intervention, even in states without centrally planned economies. The United 
Kingdom, for example, has guaranteed the price of electricity generated by new 
nuclear reactors, whereas the United States offers loan guarantees to subsidize 
their construction. Silex laser enrichment technology is another case in point. 
Although efforts to develop it appear to have started as a purely private enter-
prise, commercialization has involved a U.S.-Australian treaty permitting its 
transfer to the United States (which was seeking, as a matter of national policy, 
to acquire an alternative enrichment process to gaseous diffusion), followed by 
financial assistance from USEC.
There are, of course, some exceptions—particularly where less sensitive 
activities are concerned. Some suppliers of nonnuclear components for nuclear 
facilities are private companies that did not benefit from government assistance. 
But, overall, governments occupy a central place in the process of developing 
and deploying nuclear technologies.
As a result of the centrality of governments, their internal decision-making 
processes about acquiring dual-use nuclear technologies assume tremendous 
importance in influencing the prospects for managing such technologies. To 
be sure, if a government wants nuclear technology because it is embarking on 
a campaign to develop nuclear weapons, internal oversight mechanisms are 
unlikely to prevent it from proliferating. However, internal processes should be 
important in helping a state ascertain how its domestic programs might affect 
the behavior of others and hence influence global proliferation dynamics—
although, in practice, as the licensing process for GE Hitachi’s laser enrichment 
plant exemplifies, states generally fail to capitalize on this opportunity because 
they do not have such procedures in place.
A second important characteristic of nuclear technology is that its spread—
so far—has been relatively limited. About 110 states are estimated to have some 
capability in the manufacture of the dual-use, nonnuclear components used 
in nuclear facilities.15 Seventy-one states and Taiwan conduct what the IAEA 
terms “significant nuclear activities,” which means that they possess more than 
15. Mark Hibbs, The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2011), 23, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/future_nsg.pdf.
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a certain amount of nuclear material.16 Meanwhile, just nine states operate 
both enrichment plants and reprocessing plants, five operate enrichment plants 
(but do not reprocess), and one operates a reprocessing plant (but does not 
enrich).17 Moreover, the group of intellectual property holders is more limited 
still. Enrichment plants in the United States and France both use centrifuges 
designed by the Anglo-Dutch-German consortium Urenco, supplied under a 
“black box” arrangement that prevents the operator from learning classified 
design details. France supplied Japan with an industrial-scale reprocessing plant 
and is considering whether to supply one to China. The international market for 
nuclear power reactors currently consists of vendors from just seven countries 
(Canada, China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States).18
Nuclear technology may well diffuse much more widely in the future. 
Nonetheless, the small number of technology holders is an important feature 
of today’s world. In consequence, nuclear trade between the “haves” and “have-
nots” has an important influence on proliferation dynamics. Therefore, decisions 
by states about whether, and under what conditions, to trade in nuclear technol-
ogies and materials, as well as various international export control arrangements, 
constitute a second important element in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Of course, trade is not the only way a state can acquire nuclear technology. 
Information can be stolen. Three of the states that operate enrichment plants 
today—Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea—use centrifuges based on technology 
illicitly acquired from Urenco, and Brazil and India may do so too.19 States can 
also develop technology indigenously—and an increasing number are likely to 
have the capability to do so in the future.20 The regulation of trade nonetheless 
continues to play an important role in nonproliferation efforts because the 
financial and technical barriers to entering the nuclear technology field are still 
relatively high. Developing the technology to enrich uranium on a meaningful 
scale, whether accomplished entirely indigenously or by using illicitly acquired 
information and components, is likely to cost at least a few hundred million 
16. As of June 2013. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2012–
13 (Canberra: Australian Government, 2013), 39, http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/ 
international-relations/australian-safeguards-non-proliferation-office-annual-report-2012 
-2013/pdf/dfat_asno_annual_report_1213.pdf.
17. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increas-
ing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament 
(Princeton, NJ: IPFM, 2013), 24–25, http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr13.pdf.
18. In addition, a few countries, such as North Korea and India, have domestic suppliers.
19. On Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear 
Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment (Lon-
don: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), chaps. 2–3. On India, see Joshua Pol-
lack, “The Secret Treachery of A.Q. Khan,” Playboy (January/February 2012), http://carnegie 
endowment.org/files/the_secret%20treachery%20of%20aq%20khan.pdf. On Brazil, see Mark 
Hibbs, “Ex-MAN Gas Centrifuge Expert Said Higher-Ups Helped Iraq,” Nuclear Fuel 23 (6) 
(March 23, 1998): 5.
20. Scott R. Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes,” International Security 
38 (4) (April 2014): 39–78, http://dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/89182.
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dollars.21 Where reactor technology is concerned, the incentives for legal trade 
include not simply reduced costs but huge advantages in safety and reliability.
Against this background, advanced nuclear nations have adopted three basic 
strategies toward the development and trade of new nuclear technologies:22
• Develop and deny. A state chooses to develop a technology but refuses 
to transfer it. The United States applied this strategy to all nuclear tech-
nology between the passage of the MacMahon Act in 1946 and the 
passage of Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
• Develop and disseminate. A state develops a technology and then sells 
it subject to conditions (such as international monitoring) designed 
to prevent it from being used for proliferation. The United States has 
applied this strategy to light water reactors since they were first com-
mercialized in the 1950s.
• Desist and discourage. A state refrains from developing a specific sensi-
tive nuclear technology and encourages others to adopt similar restraint. 
The United States has adopted this strategy with regard to reprocessing 
for most of the period since 1976, when President Gerald Ford first 
announced a temporary moratorium on domestic reprocessing, which 
was extended indefinitely by President Jimmy Carter the following year.
As the examples illustrate, states do not necessarily apply the same strategy 
to different technologies. Moreover, these strategies are “ideal” types; in prac-
tice, the lines between them may be blurred. For example, although the United 
States has a policy against reprocessing, it nonetheless conducts basic research 
in this area. The Urenco states, meanwhile, have a general policy against selling 
enrichment technology but have made exceptions for the United States and 
France, while Russia, which has a similar basic policy, made an exception for 
China.
A third critical component of dual-use controls is the international over-
sight of domestic nuclear activities—known as safeguards—to detect and deter 
their use for military purposes. Safeguards, which in most cases are administered 
by the IAEA, are integral to the effectiveness of a develop-and-disseminate strat-
egy but may also be needed under a develop-and-deny strategy if the developer 
has pledged not to develop nuclear weapons (centrifuge programs in Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Japan are examples of this latter case).
One characteristic of uranium or plutonium that facilitates safeguards is 
that their quantity (more properly, the mass of any given isotope) is conserved 
21. For a somewhat dated cost estimate of Iran’s enrichment program (which is scaled to military 
ends), see Thomas W. Wood, Matthew D. Milazzo, Barbara A. Reichmuth, and Jeffrey Bedell, 
“The Economics of Energy Independence for Iran,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (1) (March 
2007): 92, http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/141wood.pdf.
22. James M. Acton, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament and Technological Restraint,” Survival 51 
(4) (August–September 2009): 105–108, 111–115.
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except in a nuclear reactor.23 For example, in an enrichment plant, the quantity 
of uranium-235 in the feedstock must be equal to the sum of the quantities 
in the product and waste streams. This property permits an oversight process 
termed “material accountancy” in which inspectors take periodic inventories 
of declared nuclear materials, while also verifying declared transfers into and 
out of a facility. In theory, any discrepancy between the amount of material 
that is present and the amount that ought to be present indicates that the state 
has diverted nuclear material. In practice, this process is complicated by both 
unavoidable uncertainties in measurement and the practical impossibility of 
verifying all declared nuclear materials in most states, thus forcing inspectors 
to rely on sampling techniques to verify only some fraction of it. As a result, 
inspectors can provide only statistical, and not absolute, confidence in nondi-
version.24 For decades, material accountancy and IAEA safeguards were virtually 
synonymous. Although safeguards have now expanded significantly in scope, 
material accountancy still occupies a central role.
Neither material accountancy nor any of the other safeguards activities that 
now complement it can, however, physically prevent a state from using nuclear 
material or facilities in the development of nuclear weapons (only military force 
creates even the possibility of achieving that). Rather, the primary purpose of 
safeguards is deterrence by threatening to expose would-be proliferators as early 
as possible (as such, safeguards are often compared to burglar alarms rather than 
to door locks).25 Whether this strategy is likely to be successful depends on both 
the perceived probability of being caught and the expected consequences. For 
this reason, the capability and willingness of not only the international commu-
nity as a whole but of individual members to impose costs on states that violate 
their nonproliferation obligations is integral to the ultimate effectiveness of 
international oversight efforts.
At a conceptual level (if not an operational level), nuclear security efforts 
are significantly simpler than nonproliferation for two basic reasons. First, much 
of the complexity of nuclear nonproliferation stems from efforts to allow states 
access to inherently sensitive technology but to restrict the purposes for which it 
can be employed—a problem that does not arise with nuclear security, where the 
goal is to deny unauthorized use entirely. Second, nonstate actors, the primary 
“target” of nuclear security efforts, are significantly less capable than states. 
23. Nuclear materials are radioactive and decay, but the relevant timescale is typically so long that 
decay can be ignored. Moreover, predicting how much of a bulk sample will decay in any given 
period of time is straightforward, with no meaningful uncertainty.
24. The IAEA’s safeguards goals are given in IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 24. For a more 
comprehensive discussion, see Rudolf Avenhaus and Morton John Canty, Compliance Quantified: 
An Introduction to Data Verification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 7.
25. The IAEA’s Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement explicitly states that “the objective 
of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of . . . nuclear material . . . and deterrence of such 
diversion by the risk of early detection.” IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between 
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1972), para. 28, http://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf.
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Academics have extensively debated whether nonstate actors could build a viable 
nuclear weapon if they acquired sufficient weapon-usable nuclear material.26 
However, most would agree that nonstate actors lack the capacity to manufac-
ture fissile material themselves.
Accordingly, nuclear security is focused on preventing nonstate actors from 
acquiring nuclear material. (Keeping information or equipment that could be 
used to manufacture fissile material, such as components for enrichment facil-
ities, out of the hands of nonstate actors is also important, although the aim 
here is largely to prevent such information and equipment from then being 
sold to states. As such, this tends to be classed as a nonproliferation measure.) 
Physical protection measures—to deny unauthorized access to nuclear mate-
rial and facilities—are the most important nuclear security measures. However, 
because of the potential consequences of failures in physical security, best prac-
tice demands multiple layers of protection, an approach known as “defense 
in depth.” Other layers include efforts to detect the theft of material (such as 
material accountancy) and strategies for locating and recovering stolen material 
rapidly. Nuclear forensics, which can help determine the origin of recovered 
nuclear material, can expose security breaches and thus provides an incentive 
for states to secure nuclear materials properly. Deterrence may play a second-
ary role to prevention insofar as nonstate actors may be deterred from even 
attempting to acquire nuclear material if they believe failure is sufficiently likely. 
Threats to punish those involved in nuclear terrorism may also play some role, 
albeit probably only a marginal one (especially if the would-be terrorists are 
suicidal). Potential financers of a terrorist organization, for example, may have 
“something to lose” and so can perhaps be deterred from providing assistance 
by the threat of punishment.27 Preventing terrorist organizations from gaining 
access to nuclear material is, however, unquestionably preferable to relying on 
deterrence or attempting to recover stolen material.
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security are not only conceptually dis-
tinct; the international systems to promote them are largely separate. Almost 
all relevant international institutions and agreements are concerned with one or 
the other but not both. The IAEA is the exception that proves the rule, since 
its nonproliferation and nuclear security functions have a “firewall” between 
26. See, for example, John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al 
Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 172–176; and Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. 
Zimmerman, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent,” Survival 48 (2) (Summer 2006): 
55–69.
27. Lewis A. Dunn, Can Al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons? Occasional Paper 
3 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense 
University, July 2005), 8, http://wmdcenter.dodlive.mil/files/2005/07/03_Alqaeda_Nuclear 
_Weapons.pdf.
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them. Inspectors, for example, may not officially report on any weaknesses in 
nuclear security they observe during safeguards inspections.28 Moreover, the 
two systems are structured very differently. The nonproliferation regime is a 
relatively comprehensive system based largely on legally binding agreements. 
By contrast, the nuclear security architecture—even the term “regime” seems 
inappropriate—is a patchwork of arrangements, most of which are not legally 
binding, containing many omissions. One important consequence of this dif-
ference is that domestic nonproliferation requirements tend to vary much less 
between states than domestic nuclear security requirements.
These structural differences reflect differences in where states believe the 
responsibility for nonproliferation and nuclear security should lie. For decades, 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has widely been seen as an interna-
tional task. Even if states disagree intensely about how to go about this task, 
the very fact that it is viewed as a collective responsibility has facilitated the 
creation of a comprehensive and legally binding system. By contrast, nuclear 
security was originally seen as an exclusively domestic matter and even today 
is still largely seen in those terms. As a result, the nuclear security architecture 
has been accreted over time, resulting in a patchwork. One indication of the 
difference is that the United States and its partners are regularly criticized for 
failing to show sufficient deference to international institutions on nonprolifer-
ation, whereas they are criticized for being too heavy handed in interfering with 
sovereign affairs where nuclear security is concerned.
Why the international community takes such different approaches to nuclear 
nonproliferation and nuclear security is not at all obvious—or rather, it is not 
obvious why nuclear security is not regarded as a matter for a comprehensive and 
legally binding international oversight regime. After all, internationally, nuclear 
security is less controversial than nonproliferation, and all states would probably 
agree that it is a global public good (even if many developing states would also 
argue that the threat from nuclear terrorism has been exaggerated). The answer 
may be, in part, historical. The nonproliferation regime originated in the Cold 
War, and its creation was made possible by the existence of two superpowers and 
their willingness to cooperate, not least by strong-arming recalcitrant allies into 
pledging not to acquire nuclear weapons. At the time, nuclear proliferation was 
(rightly, in my opinion) viewed as a much greater threat than nuclear terrorism, 
which presumably explains why the superpowers chose to focus on it. Moreover, 
a natural quid pro quo could be made: under the terms of the 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), non-nuclear-weapon states 
(defined as those that had not exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 
1967) promised not to acquire nuclear weapons in return for a commitment—
by all states—to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. By contrast, a 
comprehensive nuclear security treaty would probably have required the United 
28. Wyn Q. Bowen, Matthew Cottee, and Christopher Hobbs, “Multilateral Cooperation and 
the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism: Pragmatism over Idealism,” International Affairs 88 (2) 
(2012): 349.
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States and the Soviet Union to accept international oversight of their domestic 
nuclear activities, an outcome they would have found far more disagreeable than 
the NPT’s disarmament promise, which was described at the time by a U.S. offi-
cial, who later became head of the Arms Control Association, as “an essentially 
hortatory statement” that “presents no problems.”29
Although concern about nuclear terrorism occasionally surfaced during the 
Cold War, not until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was the issue 
firmly placed on the international agenda. However, international consensus 
on the severity of the threat has been hard to come by. Many non-Western 
states worry much more about being subject to burdensome regulations and 
being denied access to nuclear technology than they do about nuclear terror-
ism.30 Moreover, the end of the bipolar international system and changes in 
U.S. domestic politics that make treaty ratification much more difficult have 
severely complicated the negotiation and implementation of international trea-
ties. Collectively, these factors have militated against the “internationalization” 
of nuclear security.
The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The seeds of the nuclear nonproliferation regime were sown in 1953 when 
President Dwight Eisenhower announced in his “Atoms for Peace” speech at 
the United Nations (UN) that the United States was willing to share nuclear 
materials and technology (in the terminology of this article, he announced a 
switch from a develop-and-deny strategy to a develop-and-disseminate strat-
egy), and proposed the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Eisenhower originally conceived the IAEA’s primary function as receiv-
ing and allocating military-origin fissile materials donated by nuclear-armed 
states—a task it did not end up fulfilling. But, the IAEA Statute (the treaty, con-
cluded in 1956, that created the agency and governs its operations) entrusted 
it with applying safeguards to bilateral nuclear trade agreements at the request 
of the contracting parties—the origin of its safeguards role. Today, such “item- 
specific” safeguards (also known as INFCIRC/66 safeguards after the IAEA 
information circular setting out their terms) are in force for nuclear facilities 
acquired by trade in three of the states that never signed the NPT: India, Israel, 
and Pakistan.
Eisenhower’s approach marked a change of course for the United States, 
which seven years earlier had explicitly rejected the whole idea of safeguards. 
In 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal report, which informed the first American 
29. Spurgeon Keeny, memorandum for Henry Kissinger, “Provisions of the NPT and Associated 
Problems,” January 24, 1969, 5, in U.S. Department of State Archive, http://2001-2009.state 
.gov/documents/organization/90727.pdf.
30. Bowen, Cottee, and Hobbs, “Multilateral Cooperation and the Prevention of Nuclear Ter-
rorism,” 354–356; and Jack Boureston and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Seeking Nuclear Security 
through Greater International Coordination” (working paper, Council on Foreign Relations, 
March 2010), 13–14, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_Working 
Paper_1_NuclearSecurity.pdf.
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proposal for the control of atomic energy, the Baruch Plan, had concluded that 
“there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of interna-
tional agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which 
relies on inspection and similar police-like methods.”31 The subsequent volte-
face seems to have had much more to do with Cold War grand strategy than any 
fundamental reassessment of the report’s conclusions. Although extraordinarily 
prescient, the report had its weaknesses. Most notably, its authors focused only 
on the impossibility of using “inspection and similar police-like methods” to 
prevent proliferation and not on the possibility that they might be able to deter 
it—which was odd because the report did argue that deterrence would help 
enforce its preferred solution, an agreement to internationalize the fuel cycle.32
The conclusion of NPT in 1968 marked the next key moment in the devel-
opment of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. To try to stem proliferation 
while allowing states access to dual-use nuclear technology, the NPT requires 
all non-nuclear-weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear 
activities. To compensate for the inequality of the resulting two-tier system of 
nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the treaty also contains 
a disarmament commitment (in article VI) along with a separate commitment 
(in article IV) that requires “the fullest possible exchange” of nuclear materials, 
equipment, and knowledge between states.
IAEA safeguards, which were subsequently elaborated in INFCIRC/153, 
also known as the Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, are primarily 
focused on detecting the diversion of nuclear material (plutonium, enriched ura-
nium, or uranium-233) from declared facilities.33 To this end, states are required 
to submit comprehensive reports on their holdings of nuclear materials, which 
the IAEA then verifies through material accountancy. INFCIRC/153 places no 
limits on what nuclear activities states are permitted to conduct, so long as all 
nuclear materials are declared and inspected. (Most states would argue that the 
NPT’s only restriction on non-nuclear-weapon states is its prohibition against 
the “manufacture” of nuclear weapons—an injunction of unclear meaning—
and that they have an “inalienable right” to conduct any other nuclear activity, 
31. Chester I. Barnard, J. R. Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, and David E. 
Lilienthal, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, March 1946), 4, available from http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/
LWText.Acheson-Lilienthal.html.
32. Ibid., 61.
33. A voluntary reporting scheme for separated neptunium and americium was established in 
1999 but is apparently barely used.
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however sensitive.34 The U.S. government and some U.S. scholars take a more 
restrictive view.35)
Although INFCIRC/153 requires states to safeguard all their nuclear 
activities—and hence gives the IAEA the legal right to investigate undeclared 
activities—it does not provide the agency with sufficient tools to draw credi-
ble conclusions in that regard, presumably because, at the time the document 
was drafted, fissile material production was believed to be such a large-scale 
enterprise that it could not be successfully hidden. This assumption was shown 
(rather spectacularly) to be false in 1991 when, following the Gulf War, Iraq’s 
clandestine nuclear weapons program was discovered.
In response the IAEA sought both to use its existing legal powers more 
fully (by, for example, making use of open-source information) and to develop 
an enhanced safeguards document with new legal powers, the Model Addi-
tional Protocol, INFCIRC/540.36 This document, which was endorsed by the 
IAEA’s Board of Governors in 1997, contains some “housekeeping” items, 
such as requiring states to provide inspectors with multiple-entry visas, but its 
key provisions are (1) expanded declarations by states, including about activities 
not involving nuclear material; and (2) much greater access rights for the IAEA, 
including outside of declared nuclear facilities and at short notice. In states 
with an additional protocol in force, the IAEA attempts to draw a “broader 
conclusion” that not only has no declared nuclear material been diverted but 
also that no undeclared material exists in the state. In 2014, 118 out of the 184 
non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT had an additional protocol in force 
(as does Taiwan), and the broader conclusion had been drawn in sixty-five of 
them.37 Of the sixty-five without an additional protocol in force, eleven con-
duct significant nuclear activities.38 Two of these states, Iran and Syria, were in 
noncompliance with their safeguards agreements (though Iran has subsequently 
returned to compliance), while a number of the others, including Algeria and 
Egypt, are regarded as potential proliferators.
In addition to legal reform, a separate—and more controversial—wave of 
on-going organizational and conceptual reform is underway. Traditionally, the 
34. On the meaning of the prohibition against manufacturing nuclear weapons, see James Acton 
with Carter Newman, IAEA Verification of Military Research and Development, Verification Mat-
ters 5 (London: VERTIC, 2006), 13–14, http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Publications/
VM5.pdf.
35. For example, Christopher Ford, “Statement to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty 
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, New York,” May 18, 2005, in U.S. 
Department of State Archive, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/46604.htm.
36. For a discussion of the IAEA’s legal authority, see IAEA, The Safeguards System of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: IAEA, n.d.), 4–6, http://web.archive.org/
web/20140104152301/http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf.
37. IAEA, IAEA Annual Report 2014 (Vienna: IAEA, 2015), 100, https://www.iaea.org/sites/
default/files/gc59-7_en.pdf.
38. These are Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Serbia, Syria, Thailand, 
and Venezuela. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2012–13, 106.
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IAEA has looked at each facility in a state as an isolated entity and attempted 
to verify that no diversion from it has occurred. Then, in the early 2000s, the 
agency started to implement the “state-level approach,” in which it holistically 
examines “all nuclear material, nuclear installations and nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities” in a state to try to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared 
activities.39 It initially focused on implementing this approach in those states 
with an additional protocol in force, but now does so in some states with-
out one. In a closely related (some would say, inseparable) development, the 
IAEA has also moved to diversify the range of information sources available to 
it, under an approach termed “information-driven safeguards.” In addition to 
information supplied by states in declarations and obtained by inspectors, the 
agency now makes regular use of open-source information, commercial satellite 
imagery, and intelligence information supplied by member states. The IAEA has 
also sought to effect a change in organizational culture from an inspectorate of 
(nuclear material) accountants to one made up of detectives.
These changes proved controversial, although some aspects were simply the 
institutionalization of existing practice.40 The IAEA’s first publicly known use 
of intelligence information, for example, appears to have been in 1991 during 
its investigation of Iraq’s nuclear program, when the United States supplied 
photographs from a military reconnaissance satellite, thus also marking the 
IAEA’s first-known use of satellite imagery (albeit on a noncommercial basis). 
Open-source information was approved for use a few years later and was cited 
by the IAEA in its investigations into safeguards irregularities in South Korea 
in 2004 and Egypt in 2005. The agency also regularly referenced open-source 
information during its decade-long investigation into Iranian noncompliance.
In spite of this history, the debate over the state-level approach and infor-
mation-driven safeguards has recently become much more acrimonious. Since 
2012, Russia and other states, mostly from the Non-Aligned Movement (a 
grouping, originating in the Cold War, of states that were not aligned with 
either superpower), have started to question the state-level approach vocif-
erously and to argue that it needs political approval from the IAEA Board 
of Governors.41 One worry is that, under the state-level approach, the choice 
of safeguards measures for a state depends on “state-specific factors” such as 
39. IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 19.
40. A summary of the use of open-source information, satellite imagery, and intelligence infor-
mation by the IAEA is provided in James M. Acton, “International Verification and Intelligence,” 
Intelligence and National Security 29 (3) (2014): 345–346, 348–350.
41. Mark Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
November 20, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/20/plan-for-iaea-safeguards/
ekyb#.
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the “state’s legal framework for implementing safeguards obligations.”42 The 
agency argues that this approach allows “differentiation without discrimina-
tion,” whereas critics appear to worry that differentiation automatically con-
stitutes discrimination.43 Moreover, given that the agency’s ultimate goal is 
to apply the state-level approach (or at least some elements of it) in all states, 
concerns have been raised, in particular by Brazil and Argentina, that the IAEA 
is attempting to force states that have not adopted an additional protocol into 
implementing some of its provisions.
Russia, meanwhile, has led the charge against the use of intelligence infor-
mation. The agency’s reports on Iran incorporated such information, which was 
provided largely—if not exclusively—by a small number of Western states, to 
an unprecedented degree. Moscow worries that this practice could enable the 
suppliers—the United States, in particular—to deliberately mislead the agency 
and justify military action.44 The IAEA counters this objection by arguing that 
information supplied by member states is used only where it can be corrobo-
rated by other sources and represents just a small fraction of the total available 
information. However, given U.S. and British intelligence failures in the run-up 
to the Iraq War in 2003, the Russian argument has struck a chord interna-
tionally. Russian concerns also tie into a broader “fairness narrative” about 
the undemocratic way the agenda of international institutions is set by a small 
number of rich nations.
Western and other like-minded nations are not particularly satisfied with the 
status quo either, but their discontent stems from weaknesses in the safeguards 
system. In spite of the considerable improvement in safeguards since 1991, the 
intrinsically difficult task of detecting undeclared facilities—particularly small 
gas-centrifuge enrichment plants—almost certainly remains the agency’s big-
gest technical challenge (although material accountancy in large, bulk handling 
facilities is also difficult). While no silver bullet has been found for this or any 
other problem, plenty of ideas for improving the effectiveness of safeguards 
have been proposed. Few of them have been implemented recently, however, 
because most meaningful improvements to safeguards require the approval of 
the thirty-five-member IAEA Board of Governors, which is rarely forthcoming. 
To give but one example, the Model Additional Protocol requires adherents 
to report on exports and imports of specified types of equipment and nonnu-
clear materials. To facilitate updates, the list setting out which transfers must 
be reported was included in an annex to the Model Additional Protocol that 
can be amended by the Board of Governors and without the consent of every 
42. Jill N. Cooley, “Progress in Evolving the State-Level Concept” (paper presented at the 7th 
INMM/ESARDA Joint Workshop on Future Directions for Nuclear Safeguards and Verification, 
Aix-en-Provence, France, October 17–20, 2011), 4, http://www.inmm.org/AM/Template 
.cfm?Section=Evolving_the_IAEA_State_Level_Concept&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay 
.cfm&ContentID=2965.
43. Ibid., 3.
44. Hibbs, “The Plan for IAEA Safeguards.”
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signatory. To date, however, the board has not even considered proposals to 
update the annex.
An almost inevitable corollary to the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s 
greatest strengths—its legally binding nature and near universality—is that 
reform is slow and difficult, since permission from so many participants is 
required. States opposed to reform offer a variety of objections. Some are 
technical, such as a desire to protect commercially sensitive information or the 
concern that enhanced safeguards might interfere with the smooth running of 
nuclear facilities. However, the most commonly heard objection, offered in par-
ticular by states in the Non-Aligned Movement, is that nuclear-weapon states, 
by not disarming, have failed to live up to their side of the NPT bargain and 
that, until they do disarm, a focus on further enhancing the nonproliferation 
regime is unfair.
That said, for all the challenges facing the international nonproliferation 
regime today, IAEA safeguards still represent a remarkable innovation. The use 
of intrusive international inspections at highly sensitive facilities to monitor 
dual-use technology was unprecedented. In fact, the very idea of safeguards 
runs counter to traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty and was dis-
missed on realist grounds by the otherwise decidedly idealistic framers of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report. Even today, only one directly comparable arrange-
ment is in force: inspections and monitoring pursuant to the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention to ensure that chemical production facilities are not used 
to produce prohibited agents. (Onsite inspections have also been facilitated by 
various arms limitation treaties—including those that are currently taking place 
under the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START—
but the goal there is to verify limits on military capabilities, not to detect the 
employment of dual-use facilities for military ends.)
Overall, it is difficult to argue that IAEA safeguards have not played an 
important role in ensuring that the spread of nuclear weapons has been much 
slower than the spread in nuclear technology. To be sure, the IAEA’s failure 
to detect Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program prior to 1991 was a profound 
embarrassment—but, to be fair, the IAEA never claimed the inspection author-
ity it had at the time would allow it to uncover such a program. Moreover, as 
the Acheson-Lilienthal report predicted, states have sometimes denied access 
to inspectors, lied to them, or otherwise inhibited their operation. However, 
poor cooperation in Iran, North Korea, and Syria did not prevent inspectors 
from presenting enough evidence that these states had violated their safeguards 
agreements so that the Board of Governors could make a formal finding of 
noncompliance.
Each of those findings provided meaningful warning of a real prolifera-
tion risk—even if the international community subsequently failed to use this 
warning effectively. Although the agency’s investigation into Syria began only 
after its plutonium-production reactor had been destroyed by Israel in 2007, 
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it did highlight the risk that other undeclared facilities might remain.45 North 
Korea was first found in noncompliance in 1994, and Iran in 2005, before either 
had developed a nuclear weapon. None of these cases has been satisfactorily 
resolved. Syria has still not provided access to the suspect facilities, and North 
Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. More positively, an agreement 
with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the 
“Iran nuclear deal,” was reached in July 2015 and entered into force in October 
2015. Whether this agreement will prove successful is not yet clear (though, 
as of this writing in March 2016, implementation has proceeded smoothly). 
The deal requires Iran to accept stringent restrictions on its nuclear pro-
gram, most of which last for ten or fifteen years, as well as enhanced IAEA 
safeguards, in return for sanctions relief. The restrictions include a requirement 
to redesign the partially built heavy water reactor at Arak in order to curtail its 
ability to produce weapon-grade plutonium; limits on centrifuge numbers and 
types; limits on stockpiles of LEU; and limits on the level to which Iran can 
enrich uranium. At least some of the provisions represent genuine firsts in the 
management of dual-use nuclear technology, even if they have attracted less 
attention. For example, the deal extends IAEA monitoring, for the first time, 
to uranium mines and to the production and storage of centrifuge components. 
It obliges Iran to seek approval before importing specified dual-use equipment 
and materials. And it prohibits Iran from conducting specified activities that 
would be useful for designing or manufacturing a nuclear warhead. In all, this 
agreement offers a genuine prospect of resolving the Iran nuclear standoff. Full 
implementation will, however, take decades and is likely to prove difficult, not 
least because of potential domestic spoilers in both Tehran and Washington.
The failure to respond effectively to North Korean and Syrian noncompli-
ance and the time required to find a credible pathway to resolving the Iranian 
crisis suggest that the biggest challenge facing the nonproliferation regime is not 
detecting violations but responding to them—or, as Fred Iklé once stated, “after 
detection—what?”46 Even agreeing that a state has violated its nonproliferation 
commitments can be highly controversial. On at least two occasions, states that 
committed significant safeguards violations were “let off” without even a non-
compliance finding: South Korea in 2004 and Egypt in 2005.47 In the former 
case, which was more serious, the United States worked hard to shield its close 
ally. Initially at least, even finding Iran in noncompliance was met with opposi-
45. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
GOV/2011/30 (Vienna: IAEA, May 24, 2011), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
gov2011-30.pdf.
46. Fred Charles Iklé, “After Detection—What?” Foreign Affairs 39 (2) (January 1961): 208–220.
47. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
GOV/2005/9 (Vienna: IAEA, February 14, 2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/report/2005/egypt_iaea_gov-2005-9_14feb2005.pdf; and IAEA, Implementation of the 
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84 (Vienna: IAEA, Novem-
ber 11, 2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/rok-gov-2004-84 
_iaea_11nov04.pdf.
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tion. The IAEA had collected sufficient evidence by November 2003 to merit 
a noncompliance finding, but the process was delayed for two years because of 
concerns that it would disrupt negotiations and provide a justification for U.S. 
military action.
The NPT, the IAEA Statute, and the various safeguards agreements do not 
give any indication about how to respond to cases of noncompliance beyond 
stating that the IAEA Board of Governors should refer them to the UN Secu-
rity Council, which achieved its greatest nonproliferation success following the 
1991 Gulf War when it authorized and subsequently provided political backing 
for an exceptionally intrusive investigation into Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons programs. Since then, however, the Security Council has 
been largely ineffectual, as the North Korean and Syrian cases demonstrate—
although the Iranian case gives more cause for optimism. A discussion of what 
the Security Council could have done differently to facilitate resolution of these 
“hard cases” is beyond the scope of this paper. However, few would disagree 
that its effectiveness is currently limited by the inability of its members—partic-
ularly the veto-wielding states—to agree quickly on whether a case of noncom-
pliance is a real problem and, if it is, what they should do about it.
Strategic trade or export controls are an important complement to IAEA 
safeguards. In fact, the safeguards system itself has some provisions related to 
international trade. INFCIRC/153 requires reporting of imports or exports of 
nuclear material, and the Model Additional Protocol requires states to inform 
the IAEA about transfers of certain types of equipment and nonnuclear material. 
These requirements are, however, not really controls, as they do not impose 
actual limitations.
Two multilateral arrangements—the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group—go further and place some restrictions on transfers. Article 
III.2 of the NPT prohibits international transfers of nuclear material or “equip-
ment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or 
production of” nuclear material, unless safeguards are applied. To facilitate the 
implementation of this article, the Zangger Committee, an informal coalition 
that first met in 1971 and currently consists of thirty-eight states, has produced 
a “trigger” list of materials and equipment that participants agree the article 
covers.48 Participating states agree that the supply of trigger list items should be 
subject to a set of minimal conditions that reflect the NPT’s requirements, such 
as the application of IAEA safeguards and a pledge from the recipient not to use 
the material or equipment for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was formed after India’s “peaceful 
nuclear explosion” in 1974 and today has forty-six participating governments, 
is more ambitious than the Zangger Committee in two respects. First, it pub-
48. The trigger list is circulated by the IAEA as INFCIRC/209. The most recent version is 
IAEA, Communication of 29 May 2014 Received from the Permanent Mission of Canada Regard-
ing the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material, 
INFCIRC/209/Rev.3 (Vienna: IAEA, June 19, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/
files/infcirc209r3.pdf.
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lishes not only its own trigger list but a separate list of dual-use items (equip-
ment that has both nuclear and nonnuclear applications).49 Second, the group’s 
guidelines impose somewhat more stringent conditions on transfers than the 
Zangger Committee. For example, the former requires recipients (except for 
nuclear-weapon states) to apply appropriate physical protection measures and 
to have safeguards on all their nuclear activities—although the United States 
persuaded the group to waive this latter requirement for India following the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal. Participating governments have also agreed to consider 
recipients’ nuclear nonproliferation credentials before agreeing to transfers, and 
to exercise a “policy of restraint” toward transfers of enrichment and reprocess-
ing technology.
Strategic trade controls, like others facets of the international nonprolif-
eration regime, were revitalized following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine 
nuclear program in 1991 and, in particular, by the embarrassing revelation that 
it had sourced components for its centrifuges from Western companies. The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had not met since 1978, subsequently became 
much more active and progressively tightened its guidelines. Its efforts, coupled 
to improved national export control programs, have almost certainly helped to 
slow the clandestine nuclear programs that have been discovered more recently. 
Moreover, since the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540 in 2004, all 
states have been legally bound to implement export controls. Today, however, 
strategic trade controls face both technical and political challenges.50
A number of technical developments are conspiring to undermine the 
(already limited) effectiveness of trade controls and to complicate their imple-
mentation. Trade patterns are becoming more complex and increasingly involve 
middlemen, brokers, and transshipments, making them more difficult to moni-
tor. An increasing number of states outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group are also 
involved (an estimated 110 states can now manufacture items on the group’s 
dual-use list). Meanwhile, illicit trade has been facilitated by nonstate actors, 
most notably the network run by the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Kahn, which is 
believed to have been only partially dismantled. Perhaps most fundamentally, as 
Scott Kemp argues, would-be proliferators are increasingly able to get by with-
out foreign assistance since “the technologies needed to make nuclear weapons 
have remained static, whereas the indigenous capabilities of states have steadily 
grown over the last half century.”51
49. The trigger list and dual-use list are circulated by the IAEA as, respectively, parts 1 and 2 
of INFCIRC/254. For the most recent versions see IAEA, Communication Received from the 
Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding 
Certain Member States’ Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, 
INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 2 (Vienna: IAEA, November 
13, 2013), http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/
infcirc254r12p1.pdf and http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/
infcircs/1978/infcirc254r9p2.pdf.
50. Hibbs, Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
51. Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes,” 40.
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The Nuclear Suppliers Group, in particular, also faces political challenges 
from within and from the outside. Its rules are nonbinding and have been 
violated, most notably by China in two recent agreements to supply Pakistan 
with reactors.52 Decision-making is slow due to a need for consensus. Reaching 
agreement on tightening the rules for transfers of enrichment and reprocess-
ing technology took more than seven years (and even then led to a distinctly 
unsatisfactory outcome).53 Today, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has begun what 
promises to be a long and acrimonious process to decide on whether to admit 
India. Finally, what Mark Hibbs terms “the rise of international nuclear equity 
issues” has led to criticism of the group by non-nuclear-weapon states worried 
about becoming victims of export denials—a matter of importance not least 
because, while most of these states do not have nuclear power programs, some 
can manufacture sensitive components.54
The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee might be 
described as “coalitions of the willing” that are multilateral but not truly inter-
national and impose politically but not legally binding rules on participants. 
Other such nonproliferation initiatives include the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive and the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct.
The Proliferation Security Initiative, which was launched in 2003 by the 
United States in cooperation with ten close allies, “aims to stop trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction . . . their delivery systems, and related materials to 
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern” by interdicting 
dangerous cargoes in transit.55 Initially, it proved highly controversial, not least 
because many states appeared to have the impression (contrary to what was actu-
ally written in the “Statement of Interdiction Principles”) that it would involve 
illegally boarding ships on the high seas. Concerns have, however, gradually 
abated as, in practice, the initiative has focused on capacity building (includ-
ing through exercises) and streamlining procedures for sharing information to 
help states enforce existing laws more effectively. Meanwhile, the United States 
has negotiated bilateral boarding agreements with eleven flag states in which 
52. Mark Hibbs, “Power Loop: China Provides Nuclear Reactors to Pakistan,” Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review, January 2014, 52–53, http://carnegieendowment.org/email/DC_Comms/img/
JIR1401%20F3%20ChinaPak.pdf.
53. Fred McGoldrick, with Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, and William H. Tobey, Limiting 
Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Har-
vard Kennedy School, May 2011), 13–17, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG 
-report-color.pdf; and Mark Hibbs, “New Global Rules for Sensitive Nuclear Trade,” Nuclear Energy 
Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 28, 2011, http://carnegieendowment 
.org/2011/07/28/new-global-rules-for-sensitive-nuclear-trade#.
54. Hibbs, Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 11.
55. U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” n.d., http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/c10390.htm.
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over 55 percent of the world’s shipping (by tonnage) is registered.56 A further 
22 percent is registered with other initiative participants. Today, 102 states 
have endorsed the “Interdiction Principles,” which is the only requirement 
for “membership”— although how many of these states participate actively is 
unclear.57 Indeed, the effectiveness of the initiative is hard to assess, not least 
because participating states reveal little information about its activities.58
The Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct is a corporate 
and social responsibility code for nuclear reactor exporters and has been adopted 
by all the world’s major vendors outside of China.59 The Principles of Conduct 
are the most important example of a code of ethics for nuclear nonproliferation, 
albeit among corporations rather than individuals. They also cover more than 
nonproliferation; indeed, their most significant provisions relate to other issues, 
most notably safety. In large part, participants’ nonproliferation commitments 
extend no further than abiding by existing national and international rules and 
assisting reactor recipients to meet their obligations, although vendors also 
commit, for example, to “promote proliferation-resistant [reactor] designs” and 
to inform national authorities “in a timely manner . . . of any serious nonpro-
liferation concerns.”60 The Principles of Conduct illustrate a general difficulty 
of codes of conduct in the nuclear field: because there is so much national and 
international nonproliferation regulation, individuals and organizations tend to 
see their ethical responsibility purely in terms of complying with existing rules.
International Nuclear Security Efforts
Although promoting nuclear security, alongside safety and safeguards would 
have been a natural fit for the IAEA, the subject was not discussed during 
negotiations over the agency’s founding and is not mentioned in its statute.61 
Not until 1972 did the agency carve out a role for itself in nuclear security by 
issuing—against initial opposition from a number of Western states—a set of 
nonbinding guidelines on nuclear security, INFCIRC/225, which has since 
56. U.S. Department of State, “Ship Boarding Agreements,” n.d., http://www.state.gov/t/isn/
c27733.htm; and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime 
Transport 2014 (New York: United Nations, 2014), 44–45, http://unctad.org/en/Publications 
Library/rmt2014_en.pdf.
57. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” 2015, http://www.nti.org/
treaties-and-regimes/proliferation-security-initiative-psi/.
58. James R. Holmes and Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative,” in Nathan 
E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of 
International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 148–150. 
Holmes and Winner also observe that even defining success is highly problematic.
59. Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct, “Participants,” n.d., http://nuclear 
principles.org/participants/.
60. Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct, March 6, 2014, 8, http://nuclearprinciples 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PrinciplesofConduct_March2014.pdf.
61. David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (Vienna: 
IAEA, 1997), 229–230, http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf.
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been revised five times.62 Later in the decade, the agency took a leading role in 
preparing the first binding treaty on nuclear security, the 1980 Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). This agreement focuses 
almost exclusively on materials in international transport and, like later nuclear 
security agreements, sets out steps that states must take to protect materials 
covered by the convention (by, for example, applying appropriate physical pro-
tection measures and criminalizing certain kinds of offenses). In contrast to 
the NPT, which assigns the IAEA a critical verification function, the only roles 
assigned to the agency by the CPPNM are purely administrative (for example, 
in sharing information about national points of contact, states may make use of 
the agency, though they are not required to do so). In a signal of the impor-
tance—or lack thereof—that states placed on nuclear security, seven years passed 
before the treaty garnered the twenty-one ratifications required for entry into 
force. Today 153 states are party to the CPPNM.63
In the 1990s, the IAEA acquired two other important nuclear security 
functions. First, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, detection of 
the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials rose dramatically. The IAEA 
assisted in efforts to curtail such smuggling, most notably by creating the Illicit 
Trafficking Database in 1995 (although the agency had begun to collect media 
reports as early as 1992).64 The agency also created the International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service to conduct peer review of states’ nuclear security 
practices. These missions, which are initiated only at the request of states, have 
taken place since 1996.
Perhaps the most consequential international efforts prior to 2001, at least 
in terms of demonstrable results, were Soviet/Russian and, particularly, Amer-
ican bilateral programs with foreign partners. These efforts were initiated to 
mitigate a threat that the United States and Soviet Union had exported research 
reactors fueled with HEU.65 In 1978, the United States launched the Reduced 
Enrichment Research and Test Reactor program to develop alternative LEU 
fuels for HEU-fueled research reactors and to undertake conversion of for-
eign reactors (the Soviet Union had an equivalent program). American nuclear 
security cooperation was dramatically stepped up in the early 1990s, facilitated 
in large part by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The 
62. The most recent version is IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series no. 13, INFCIRC/225/
Revision 5 (Vienna: IAEA, 2011), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
Pub1481_web.pdf.
63. As of September 15, 2015. IAEA, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Mate-
rial (Vienna: IAEA, September 15, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf.
64. Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 120–122.
65. A slightly dated but comprehensive overview of efforts to mitigate this problem can be found 
in Frank von Hippel, “A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination of Highly-Enriched-Uranium 
from All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles,” Science & Global Security 12 (2004): 137–164, http://
scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs12vonhippel.pdf.
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scope of these efforts—which began with programs to reduce the risk from 
military and civilian nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and were 
subsequently extended to include both chemical and biological threats, as well 
as other states—was vast. Two of the programs that originated at that time and 
are still ongoing are of particular note. First, the United States began efforts to 
take back both fresh and spent HEU fuel for U.S.-origin research reactors and 
worked with Russia to enable it to do the same for Soviet-supplied reactors. 
Second, in 1994, Washington set up the International Materials Protection and 
Cooperation program to help other states better secure nuclear materials and 
combat nuclear trafficking.
Since 2001, nuclear security initiatives have proliferated, even absent a 
broad consensus on the severity of the threat. Many of these efforts are not 
legally binding. In part, this reflects states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty on 
nuclear security. However, it also reflects the proclivities of the administration 
of President George W. Bush, which had a visceral dislike of both legally bind-
ing international agreements and the slow pace of the diplomacy needed to 
negotiate them. Even the exceptions to this general state of affairs are revealing. 
Two of the legally binding instruments negotiated since 2001 are UN Security 
Council resolutions. Because these resolutions are negotiated among only fif-
teen states (of which just five have vetoes), they bypass many of the complexities 
of a truly international process. The administration of President Barack Obama 
has continued in largely the same vein, even though it is much more sympathetic 
to internationalism, in large part because the Bush administration’s views are 
still alive and well in the Senate, which must provide its advice and consent to 
the ratification of treaties.
The measures that have originated since 2001 can be classified into five 
types: binding international law, nonbinding initiatives to facilitate cooperation, 
institutional reform, enhanced U.S. cooperation programs, and the sui generis 
Nuclear Security Summit process. The brief description that follows cannot 
do justice to the complexities and full scope of these multifaceted initiatives, 
activities, agreements, and organizations, and I unapologetically refer interested 
readers to a number of sources that provide the missing detail.66
Binding international law. Four legally binding instruments have been 
created since 2001. With the partial exception of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), all focus nearly 
exclusively on the national implementation of measures to enhance nuclear 
security (as opposed, say, to mandating international cooperation):
66. For example, Boureston and Ogilvie-White, “Seeking Nuclear Security through Greater 
International Coordination”; Bowen, Cottee, and Hobbs, “Multilateral Cooperation and 
the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism”; Centre for Science and Security Studies, King’s Col-
lege London, Nuclear Security Briefing Book: 2014 Edition (London: Centre for Science and 
Security Studies, King’s College London, 2014), http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/
warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/NSBB---Full-final.pdf; and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
Nuclear Security Primer: The Existing System (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, Sep-
tember 2014), http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Nuclear_Security_Primer_September_2014 
.pdf?_=1413920986.
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• UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 (2001) requires mea-
sures to suppress all forms of terrorism.
• UNSCR 1540 (2004) requires measures to prevent nonstate actors 
from acquiring or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or 
their means of delivery (further resolutions have prolonged its mandate).
• The 2005 amendment to the CPPNM extends the treaty’s jurisdiction 
to domestic nuclear materials.
• The 2005 ICSANT requires national legislation and international coop-
eration to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism.
Voluntary initiatives to facilitate cooperation. Various “coalitions of the 
willing” have also been created to enable enhanced international cooperation 
on nuclear security:
• The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials 
of Mass Destruction, created in 2002, funds projects to reduce the risk 
of nonstate actors acquiring nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
material in both the former Soviet Union and, more recently, elsewhere.
• The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, established in 2006, 
aims to promote best practice and strengthen international cooperation 
to deter, prevent, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism.
• The Proliferation Security Initiative is unusual in serving both a nuclear 
security and nonproliferation role.
Institutional Reform. Greater support for national efforts to counter 
nuclear terrorism is now available through both new and existing institutions:
• The IAEA has enhanced its capacity to assist states with nuclear secu-
rity by establishing the Office of Nuclear Security, which was recently 
upgraded to the Division of Nuclear Security. The agency also estab-
lished a Nuclear Security Plan to guide its efforts and a Nuclear Security 
Fund to finance them through voluntary contributions.
• INTERPOL has improved its capacity to help prevent nuclear and radio-
logical terrorism, including by enhanced cooperation with the IAEA.
• The World Institute for Nuclear Security has been established to pro-
mote best practice.
• Centers of excellence to provide training in nuclear security on a national 
and regional level have also been established by various countries.
Enhanced U.S. cooperation programs. The United States has also 
stepped-up its bilateral cooperation programs. Perhaps most important, in 2004 
the Bush administration launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to 
convert both research reactors and the targets used in radioisotope produc-
tion to enable their use of LEU rather than HEU; to remove excess nuclear 
and radiological materials; and to enhance the physical security of vulnerable 
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materials. (The initiative represented a consolidation and expansion of existing 
efforts.) This program was given a major boost in 2009 when Obama, during 
his Prague speech, articulated the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear mate-
rials within four years. Although this target was not met, U.S. efforts were 
accelerated and have resulted so far in the removal or disposition, in some 
cases in cooperation with Russia, of nearly three thousand kilograms of HEU 
and plutonium from foreign states—more than doubling the total amount of 
material the United States has secured in this way.67 As part of these efforts, the 
United States also imported, for the first time, both separated plutonium and 
non-U.S.-origin spent fuel.68
The Nuclear Security Summits. In his Prague speech, Obama also 
announced the first Nuclear Security Summit, which took place in Washington, 
DC, in 2010. Follow-up meetings were held in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague 
in 2014. A fourth, and almost certainly final, summit will be held in the United 
States in 2016. Although the summits do issue communiqués, their most 
important deliverables have been unilateral commitments, known colloquially 
as “house gifts” (a promise to facilitate the removal of HEU or plutonium to 
the United States or Russia is the diplomatic equivalent of a bouquet of flowers 
at these events). Such commitments are not actually negotiated by the heads 
of state at the summit—but the fact of the summit does force bureaucracies 
to make nuclear security a priority and to overcome long-standing barriers to 
progress, precisely so that their leaders can declare success at the meeting. The 
summits have also raised awareness of the issue, among both national leaders 
and (to a lesser extent) the general public.
Looking forward, perhaps the biggest question facing the nuclear security 
agenda is whether the momentum that has built up behind it is sustainable. 
With a few exceptions (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative in its early 
days), the nuclear security agenda is not all that controversial, at least in com-
parison to nuclear nonproliferation. In contrast, say, to adopting an additional 
protocol, few states evince a principled objection to ratifying the amendment to 
the CPPNM. Moreover, a few of the challenges to further progress in nuclear 
security are technical, including the need to develop new fuel designs so that 
reactors that still use HEU can be converted to use LEU. There is no reason to 
suppose these technical challenges will not eventually be overcome.
That being said, neither is there much sense of urgency, except from the 
United States and a few close partners. Almost ten years after being opened for 
signature, for example, the amendment to the CPPNM has still not entered into 
67. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, The Four-Year Effort: 
Contributions of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to Secure the World’s Most Vulnerable Nuclear 
Material by December 2013, YGG 13-0337 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
2013), 4, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/12-13-inlinefiles/2013-12-12%204 
%20Year%20Effort.pdf.
68. Ibid., 5.
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force.69 In large part, the lack of urgency reflects the lack of shared perception 
of the threat. Moreover, simmering discontent from many non-nuclear-weapon 
states about the emphasis being placed on preventing nuclear terrorism—as 
opposed to, say, nuclear disarmament or technical assistance—has not dissipated 
and may have been increased by the high-level attention nuclear security has 
garnered.70 All these factors raise doubts about sustainability.
To make matters worse, the nuclear security agenda can easily be derailed by 
unrelated political disputes. Russia, for example, has generally been supportive 
of nuclear security efforts. However, U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear secu-
rity has now become a victim of the Ukraine crisis. In October 2014, Moscow 
informed Washington that it was not planning to attend the 2016 Nuclear Secu-
rity Summit (preferring, it said, to support IAEA efforts).71 More serious still, 
in December 2014, Moscow terminated cooperation with the United States 
on all nuclear security projects in Russia (though it has said it will continue 
cooperation focused on third countries).72
Moreover, U.S. leadership, which has often been instrumental to progress 
in nuclear security, should not be regarded as a given. While nuclear security 
is a “motherhood and apple pie” issue that no American politician opposes 
per se, it has little resonance with the public and is not generally seen as such 
a transcendently important issue that it should be immune from either bud-
get cutbacks or partisanship. For a variety of reasons, including sequestration, 
the Obama administration has been gradually reducing its budget requests for 
nuclear security since fiscal year 2012.73 In 2016, the Republican majorities in 
both the Senate and, particularly, the House of Representatives are likely to try 
to reduce actual spending yet further. Implementing legislation for ICSANT 
and the amendment to the CPPNM was, for a number of years, held hostage 
to an arcane and politicized domestic dispute over the death penalty and wire-
tapping (until such legislation is passed, the United States cannot deposit its 
69. As of February 10, 2016, the amendment had been ratified by ninety-two states. For entry 
into force, two-thirds of states party to the treaty must ratify it. The current target is, therefore, 
102—but this figure is liable to increase as more states ratify the convention. IAEA, Amendment to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna: IAEA, February 10, 2016), 
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf.
70. Although slightly dated, this is highlighted throughout Boureston and Ogilvie-White, “Seek-
ing Nuclear Security through Greater International Coordination.”
71. Arshad Mohammed and Lidia Kelly, “Russia Told U.S. It Will Not Attend 2016 Nuclear Secu-
rity Summit,” Reuters, November 5, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/
us-nuclear-security-usa-russia-idUSKBN0IP24K20141105.
72. Bryan Bender, “Russia Ends U.S. Nuclear Security Alliance,” Boston Globe, January 19, 2015, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01/19/after-two-decades-russia-nuclear 
-security-cooperation-becomes-casualty-deteriorating-relations/5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL/
story.html.
73. Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, Cutting Too Deep: The Obama Admin-
istration’s Proposals for Nuclear Security Spending Reductions (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on 
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School, July 2014), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/budgetpaper%20WEB.pdf.
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instruments of ratification).74 Meanwhile, the next U.S. president—whichever 
party he or she comes from—is unlikely to give nearly as much personal atten-
tion or time to the issue as Obama has, or continue the Nuclear Security Summit 
process (probably to the relief of many world leaders).
Sustainability matters both to avoid backsliding on the progress that has 
been made so far and to further enhance the nuclear security architecture, which 
currently has at least five key weaknesses.
First, it does not cover all nuclear materials—or even a majority of the 
most sensitive. About 85 percent of the HEU and separated plutonium in the 
world is military, and, now that U.S.-Russian cooperation on these materials has 
ended, they appear to be entirely exempt from the existing architecture, except 
for recognition in the communiqué from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit 
of “the fundamental responsibility of States . . . to maintain at all times effective 
security of all nuclear . . . materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear 
weapons.”75 What is more important for the present discussion, however, is that, 
while broad consensus exists on the desirability of minimizing civilian HEU use, 
no such agreement has been reached on civilian plutonium.76
Second, the standards mandated—or, in many cases, suggested—by exist-
ing agreements are often weak and, in some cases, ambiguous.77 Such “watering 
down” is often necessary to ensure agreement among participating states.
Third, many initiatives are voluntary—in both senses of the word: states 
do not have to sign onto them, and the standards imposed are often not legally 
binding. The only legally binding measures that apply to all states are UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions. All other binding instruments have limited participa-
tion. Meanwhile, no IAEA guidance on nuclear security is binding (although, 
at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, thirty-five nations did agree to abide by 
various agency recommendations).78 Meanwhile, of the twenty-five states with 
74. Matthew Bunn, “U.S. Failure to Ratify Key Nuclear Security Conventions,” Nuclear Secu-
rity Matters, March 12, 2014, http://nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/blog/us-failure 
-ratify-key-conventions.
75. “Non-paper: Building International Confidence in the Security of Military Materials,” 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 17, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/non-paper 
-building-international-confidence-security-military-materials/; and The Hague Nuclear Security 
Summit Communiqué, The Hague, March 25, 2014, para. 4, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/237002.pdf.
76. The communiqué from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit went no further than to “encour-
age States . . . to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level . . . as consistent 
with national requirements.” The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, para. 21.
77. Various examples are given in Boureston and Ogilvie-White, “Seeking Nuclear Security 
through Greater International Coordination,” 2–9.
78. Algeria et al., Joint Statement, March 25, 2014, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140326012847/https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/downloads/strengthening 
_nuclear_security_implementation.pdf.
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weapon-usable nuclear material, six have never invited a peer review of their 
security standards (and another has not done so within the past five years).79
Fourth, no nuclear security agreement has created a formal verification 
regime, and only a few have informal transparency provisions to enable states 
to demonstrate their compliance—and even those that do have met with only 
partial success. The most notable transparency arrangement was a requirement 
in UNSCR 1540 for states to submit reports, within six months of the reso-
lution’s adoption, detailing practices and plans for national implementation. 
Only fifty-one states met this deadline.80 And by the time of the December 
2014 annual review, twenty states had still failed to fulfill the requirement.81 
Moreover, among those reports that have been submitted, quality and com-
prehensiveness vary widely.
Fifth, the quality of national implementation of nuclear security measures 
appears to have been highly variable—although, in many cases, the available 
information is insufficient to enable an assessment.
In practice, correcting all these weaknesses simultaneously is probably 
impossible since the solutions to different problems can sometimes counteract 
one another. For example, if states tried to negotiate a verified, legally binding 
agreement on some aspect of nuclear security, they would probably end up with 
a document that was less demanding than existing voluntary standards (notably 
INFCIRC/225) and attracted a relatively limited number of signatories. A key 
question facing the nuclear security regime is, therefore, one of priorities; given 
the likely impossibility of making progress on all fronts simultaneously, on which 
of the weaknesses should energy be focused?
More broadly, one of the benefits of analyzing nuclear nonproliferation and 
nuclear security side by side is that it enables their strengths and weaknesses to 
be contrasted. The nonproliferation regime is comprehensive, nearly univer-
sal, and legally binding. However, changes are highly contested and, precisely 
because it is nearly universal, reform is painfully slow (absent crises, at least). 
By contrast, the nuclear security architecture is much more flexible. Some states 
choose to go faster than the pack and take on additional commitments (which 
is extremely unusual in nonproliferation). As a corollary, however, states that 
want to go slower are under relatively little pressure to do more. This compar-
ison demonstrates that making the nuclear security regime more like the non-
proliferation regime would not be a panacea. Comprehensiveness, universality, 
79. Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a Framework for 
Assurance, Accountability, and Action, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
January 2014), 14, http://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014-NTI-Index 
-Report.pdf.
80. Lars Olberg, Reporting to the 1540 Committee—A Snapshot (New York: Lawyers Committee 
on Nuclear Policy, November 2005), 4, http://lcnp.org/disarmament/1540-olberg.pdf.
81. Oh Joon, “Letter Dated 31 December 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Commit-
tee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council,” S/2014/958, United Nations Security Council, December 31, 2014, para. III.B.6, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/958.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S38
legally binding standards, and verification could solve some problems, but at 
the expense of introducing others. The trade-offs involved are almost certainly 
relevant to other technologies.
U.S. DOMESTIC OVERSIGHT
The range of domestic nonproliferation and nuclear security oversight activities 
in the United States is vast. Major elements include:
• Licensing of civilian nuclear facilities and nuclear materials by the NRC. 
Although the primary function of licensing is ensuring safety, license 
conditions include requirements pertaining to physical security and the 
control and accountancy of nuclear materials.
• Domestic nuclear security. Licensees are responsible for implement-
ing the security measures required by the NRC, which also verifies 
compliance.
• Border security to detect the illicit transport of nuclear material into 
the United States. These efforts, run by the Department of Homeland 
Security, include radiation detectors at U.S. ports of entry, as well as a 
program, the Container Security Initiative, to scan cargo bound for the 
United States at foreign ports.82
• Voluntary IAEA safeguards on nonmilitary facilities. Nuclear-weapon 
states party to the NPT are not required to accept IAEA safeguards. 
In 1977, however, the United States concluded a “voluntary offer” 
arrangement with the IAEA, under which it makes certain facilities avail-
able for safeguards. The U.S. “Eligible Facilities List” includes almost all 
facilities licensed by the NRC—GE Hitachi’s pilot-scale laser enrichment 
facility is a notable exception—as well as about thirty Department of 
Energy facilities.83 In practice, because of resource constraints, the IAEA 
has chosen to safeguard only a small number of these facilities and since 
1994 has focused exclusively on storage facilities for materials declared 
to be in excess of military requirements.84 Currently, just one facility, the 
82. These programs are likely to be significantly more effective at detecting the smuggling of 
radioactive material, which is another of their goals.
83. The most up-to-date version of the NRC’s portion of the Eligible Facilities List is available 
from NRC, “International Safeguards,” last updated March 26, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/
about-nrc/ip/intl-safeguards.html. The Department of Energy does not make its list public. 
However, it does state that, in total, the United States makes “nearly 300” facilities available. 
Given that the most recent NRC list (from 2013) includes 261 facilities, the Department of 
Energy list must include about thirty facilities. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration, “NPT Compliance,” n.d., http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managing 
thestockpile/nptcompliance.
84. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2007 (Princeton, NJ: IPFM, 2007), 72, http://fissile 
materials.org/library/gfmr07.pdf. 
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K Area Material Storage Vault at Savannah River National Laboratory, 
is under IAEA safeguards.85 The United States also has an additional 
protocol in force that contains the same provisions as the Model Addi-
tional Protocol except for a national security exemption. The NRC and 
the Department of Energy are primarily responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of these agreements, including by jointly operating a 
system for tracking U.S. nuclear materials.86
• Domestic risk reduction efforts, led by the Department of Energy, 
include the management and disposition of excess military fissile 
materials.
• Nuclear cooperation agreements, negotiated by the Department of 
State, permit international trade in nuclear materials and facilities.
• Export controls to prevent U.S. technology, material, and equipment 
from being obtained by non-U.S. entities that might misuse them. 
Licenses for nonmilitary nuclear exports are granted by three agencies: 
the NRC (nuclear materials, reactors, and certain key reactor compo-
nents), the Department of Commerce (“outside the core” equipment 
for nuclear reactors), and the Department of Energy (nuclear technol-
ogy).87 Other departments, including the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense, are involved in reviewing applications. Several 
bodies, including the NRC, the Department of Commerce, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the federal 
courts are involved in enforcement.
The legal basis for these efforts is diverse and includes legislation, regula-
tions promulgated by agencies such as the NRC, executive orders, and interna-
tional agreements. In addition to being bound by treaties such as the CPPNM, 
the United States has, as a matter of policy, also undertaken to abide by various 
nonbinding international agreements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
guidelines, as well as codes of best practice, such as IAEA recommendations 
on nuclear security.
This description is far from exhaustive; it includes neither the oversight of 
military nuclear activities, which by definition are not dual-use, nor U.S. gov-
ernment activities to negotiate and implement international nonproliferation 
and nuclear security activities.
Rather than attempt to provide a more detailed description of the whole of 
the domestic oversight regime, this article focuses on two contested elements that 
highlight some of the fundamental challenges associated with managing dual-use 
85. NRC, “International Safeguards.”
86. The Department of Commerce also has a role in collecting information from private industry 
for the United States’ additional protocol declarations.
87. Ian F. Fergusson and Paul K. Kerr, The U.S. Export Control System and the President’s Reform 
Initiative, CRS Report for Congress, R41916 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Ser-
vice, January 13, 2014), 7, 26–27, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf.
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nuclear technologies: (1) the absence of a regularized procedure for assessing the 
nonproliferation consequences of domestic decisions; and (2) the nonprolifera-
tion and nuclear security conditions for international nuclear cooperation.
As exemplified by the licensing of GE Hitachi’s laser enrichment plant, 
the United States has no formalized process for assessing the nonproliferation 
implications of domestic decisions to develop or use new nuclear technologies. 
A nonproliferation assessment is required when the United States concludes 
an agreement with another country to permit the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial or equipment. As such, one was conducted when the United States and 
Australia reached an agreement (which was considered an addendum to their 
existing nuclear cooperation agreement) to transfer Silex technology from Aus-
tralia to the United States. However, this assessment focused purely on the 
nonproliferation implications of the transfer and not on the implications of 
commercialization.
The NRC does not license fuel-cycle technologies per se. Rather, it licenses 
facilities, and the only nonproliferation implication it considers in doing so is the 
applicant’s ability to protect classified information. However, the commission 
appears to have the necessary authority to require a much broader assessment. 
In March 2012, the Congressional Research Service concluded that, given the 
NRC’s statutory responsibility to promote the “common defense and security,” 
it “could reasonably conclude that it has sufficient existing authority to pro-
mulgate a regulation requiring that applicants provide the Commission with 
a proliferation risk assessment as part of the license application process.”88 A 
petition to require such an assessment for all new enrichment or reprocessing 
facilities was submitted by the American Physical Society but rejected by the 
NRC in June 2013. The NRC did not deny that new technologies might pose 
a proliferation risk but argued that Congress or the president was responsible 
for considering them.89
As a result of this decision, every part of the U.S. government has now 
eschewed responsibility for assessing the nonproliferation implications of 
domestic projects to develop new nuclear technologies or construct new facili-
ties. Historically, the U.S. government has been more sensitive to the interna-
tional implications of such decisions—although it has generally done so only 
where public funding was involved (which was not the case with GE Hitachi’s 
laser enrichment plant). Most notable, nonproliferation was the main factor 
behind the U.S. moratorium on reprocessing (although contrary to what is 
often asserted, particularly by proponents of reprocessing, the Ford administra-
tion’s initial decision was also a reflection of the need for the U.S. government 
88. Todd Garvey, memorandum to Jeff Fortenberry, “Authority of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to Require a Proliferation Risk Assessment as Part of a Uranium Enrichment Facility 
License Application,” Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2012, 4, http://www.princeton 
.edu/~rskemp/CRS-opinion-on-NRC-authority.pdf.
89. R. W. Borchardt, “Denial of Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-70-9)—American Physical Soci-
ety,” SECY-12-0145, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 25, 2012, 4, 20, http://www 
.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2012/2012-0145scy.pdf.
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to subsidize the project).90 The George W. Bush administration drafted but did 
not finalize a nonproliferation impact assessment for its Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership program (which envisaged domestic reprocessing in the United 
States and potentially also in a small number of other states that already had 
access to the technology).91 Even the NRC has historically assigned a bigger 
nonproliferation role to itself; for example, in 1976 it postponed the licensing 
of fuel exports to a U.S.-supplied nuclear reactor in India, following that state’s 
1974 nuclear test.92 The export of fuel to India was not a purely domestic action 
(like building an enrichment or reprocessing facility), but it does demonstrate 
that the NRC has interpreted its mandate more broadly in the past than it does 
now. Ultimately, however, all of these initiatives were ad hoc. Only when key 
actors have had an interest in nonproliferation—or were forced to take one—has 
it been factored into domestic decisions.
The U.S. export control system, as Congressional Research Service ana-
lysts Ian Fergusson and Paul Kerr note, has “long been criticized by exporters, 
nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigor-
ous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combi-
nation of these descriptions.”93 The 1954 Atomic Energy Act, as amended by 
the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, provides two separate legal bases for 
international nuclear cooperation. Pursuant to section 123 of the act, “signifi-
cant nuclear exports” (transfers of nuclear material, reactors, or certain reactor 
components) require an intergovernmental agreement, generally known as a 
“123 agreement.”94 Even with such an agreement in place, each individual 
export of equipment or material still requires a separate license, which is issued 
by the NRC. Separately, section 57.b of the Atomic Energy Act empowers the 
secretary of energy to authorize “technology transfers and technical assistance,” 
provided that they “will not be inimical” to U.S. interests.95 The procedures for 
authorizing such transfers are set out in title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, part 810, and are generally known as “810 agreements.” Finally, nuclear 
technology and commodities that are not covered by the Atomic Energy Act—
such as equipment that has both nuclear and nonnuclear applications—may still 
90. Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-proliferation: The Remaking of U.S. Policy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 100–113.
91. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonpro-
liferation and International Security, Draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: National Nuclear 
Security Administration, December 2008), http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/
inlinefiles/GNEP_NPIA.pdf.
92. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-proliferation, 84–88.
93. Fergusson and Kerr, U.S. Export Control System and the President’s Reform Initiative, 1.
94. This phrase and its definition, which is an interpretation of the act, is from “123 Agreements,” 
Export.gov, December 3, 2010, https://build.export.gov/main/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.
95. This phrase, which is an interpretation of the act, is from “810 Authorization,” Export.gov, 
February 9, 2011, https://build.export.gov/main/civilnuclear/eg_main_022094.
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be controlled through the 1979 Export Administration Act.96 This act requires 
Department of Commerce authorization for the transfer of technologies and 
items that appear on the Commerce Control List (which includes but is much 
broader than dual-use nuclear technology).
Although a high-profile effort to simplify the U.S. export control system 
is currently underway, it will not affect nuclear exports conducted pursuant 
to either 123 or 810 agreements.97 Instead, the Obama administration has 
undertaken a separate effort to revamp 810 agreements while trying to head 
off congressional efforts designed to make 123 agreements more restrictive.
The existing regulations for 810 agreements define a set of “generally 
authorized” activities that have received prior approval from the secretary 
of energy and can therefore be conducted abroad without “specific authori-
zation.” However, the regulations also contain a list of states for which this 
exemption does not apply and for which specific authorization is required on 
an activity-by-activity basis. With the most significant of its proposed changes, 
the Obama administration seeks to reverse this approach by specifying those 
states for which general authorization does apply. The Nuclear Energy Institute, 
which lobbies on behalf of the nuclear industry, has opposed this approach on 
various grounds, including that it would increase, by seventy-seven, the number 
of states requiring specific authorization.98 In response, the Obama administra-
tion has argued that the number of transfers to these states is so small that the 
security benefits of the change would outweigh the costs.
Efforts to revise the requirements for 123 agreements have been more con-
troversial. In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates concluded 
a nuclear cooperation agreement under which the latter made a legally binding 
commitment not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology. Inevita-
bly, this agreement raised the question of whether the United States would 
require other states to make a similar promise—termed the “gold standard” 
by the Obama administration (though it subsequently walked away from this 
term). Following a prolonged series of internal reviews, which were eventually 
concluded in late 2013, the administration announced a policy of deciding 
on a “case-by-case” approach whether to insist upon the would-be partner’s 
renouncing enrichment and reprocessing.99 Since then the administration has 
concluded an agreement with Taiwan, which did make a binding undertaking 
not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology, and one with Vietnam, 
96. This act is currently expired but enforced through a presidential declaration of a national emer-
gency. Fergusson and Kerr, U.S. Export Control System and the President’s Reform Initiative, 2–3. 
97. Ibid., 11.
98. For a discussion of the nuclear industry’s objections and the administration’s responses, 
see Mark Hibbs, “New and Balanced Rules for U.S. Nuclear Technology Exports,” Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, September 30, 2013, http://carnegieendowment 
.org/2013/09/30/new-and-balanced-rules-for-u.s.-nuclear-technology-exports/hf9f.
99. Daniel Horner, “U.S. Policy on Nuclear Pacts Detailed,” Arms Control Today 44 (Janu-
ary/February 2014), http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_01-02/US-Policy-on-Nuclear 
-Pacts-Detailed.
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which did not—although Hanoi did express its intent, in nonbinding language, 
“to rely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services, rather than 
acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies.”100
An effort to try to force the administration into incorporating the “gold 
standard” into future 123 agreements has, however, gained some traction in 
Congress. Legislation has been introduced that would add a legally binding 
commitment not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology to the list of 
requirements that qualifies a 123 agreement for expedited review.101 An eligible 
agreement enters into force ninety days of “continuous session” after it has been 
presented to Congress, unless legislative action is taken to block it. By contrast, 
an agreement that does not meet all the requirements must secure congressional 
approval before it becomes operative. The effect of the proposed legislation 
would, therefore, be to make it extremely difficult for a 123 agreement to enter 
into force unless the partner foreswore enrichment and reprocessing.
The fundamental debate here is (or, perhaps, ought to be) over the value of 
a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States at a time when states 
that want to acquire nuclear power reactors can choose from a growing list of 
vendors. For much of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were essentially the only two suppliers of nuclear reactors—meaning that many 
states effectively had no choice. Today, there are commercial suppliers from 
seven states, and there is little reason to suppose this number will not grow 
slowly over time.102 The Obama administration has argued (fairly persuasively 
in my opinion) that if it were to demand that potential buyers renounce enrich-
ment and reprocessing they would simply go elsewhere, resulting in a loss for 
both U.S. industry and nonproliferation, since other supplier states impose 
less-rigorous nonproliferation requirements than the United States.103 Propo-
nents of the “gold standard” do not tend to refute this argument directly so 
much as urge the United States not to be complicit in aiding states to develop 
nuclear power programs that could, in the future, be used to advance military 
100. Quoted in Daniel Horner, “Vietnam Nuclear Pact Sent to Congress,” Arms Control Today 
44 (June 2014), http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_06/News_Briefs/Vietnam-Nuclear 
-Pact-Sent-to-Congress.
101. For a more comprehensive summary of the most recent legislation, see Paul K. Kerr and 
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, CRS Report for 
Congress, RS22937 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2015), 
9, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22937.pdf.
102. One complication here is that a number of non-U.S. reactor designs use U.S. technology 
and so can only be purchased by a buyer with a 123 agreement in force. Exactly which reactors 
fall into this category is unclear, but the list is likely to shrink over time.
103. Thomas M. Countryman, Testimony of Assistant Secretary Thomas M. Countryman on 
Administration Policy Related to Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agree-
ments), January 30, 2014, 3–4, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Countryman 
_Testimony2.pdf.
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goals. This debate is not unique to nuclear technology; the possibility that rais-
ing the requirements for exports could be counterproductive if not all suppliers 
agree to do so is a dilemma in any form of sensitive technology trade where 
multiple potential sellers are in competition with one another.
CURRENT STATE OF DOMESTIC OVERSIGHT  
IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Nuclear Nonproliferation Oversight
Five nuclear-weapon states are recognized by the NPT. Like the United States, 
each has a “voluntary offer” arrangement with the IAEA and has an additional 
protocol in force—although the scope of these agreements is highly variable.104 
In practice, the IAEA chooses to safeguard few of the eligible facilities. Most 
of the facilities that are safeguarded were selected because they use foreign 
technology or process foreign material, and the application of safeguards was 
a condition of supply. For example, a Russian-supplied centrifuge enrichment 
plant in China is under safeguards.
Four nuclear-armed states are not party to the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan, 
and North Korea.105 Israel and Pakistan never joined the treaty but agreed 
to IAEA safeguards on a few foreign-supplied facilities as a condition of sup-
ply. India also did not join the treaty but, pursuant to the U.S.-India nuclear 
deal, agreed to separate its military and civilian nuclear sectors and safeguard 
the whole of the latter (which includes domestically manufactured power reac-
tors).106 North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and currently does not 
allow any IAEA safeguards, including on foreign-supplied facilities.
The biggest category of states that are party to the NPT consists of those 
that do not possess nuclear weapons and are required to accept IAEA safeguards 
on all of their nuclear activities. The extent of these safeguards depends on 
whether the state has accepted an additional protocol and whether the amount 
of nuclear material it possesses is so small that it qualifies for a so-called small 
quantities protocol (which holds most of the requirements of a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement in abeyance to reduce the burden on the state).
In non-nuclear-weapon states, the primary nonproliferation role of domes-
tic regulatory agencies is to cooperate with the IAEA to allow the implementa-
104. IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2007, 67–81. 
105. South Sudan, which was founded only in 2011 and is not known to conduct any nuclear 
activities, has also not acceded to the treaty but is expected to do so in the not-too-distant future.
106. Problematically, the decision about which facilities were civilian and which were military was 
an exclusively Indian one. For a critique of the plan, see Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, 
and M. V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, 
Research Report no. 1 (Princeton, NJ: IPFM, September 2006), 16–24, http://fissilematerials 
.org/library/rr01.pdf. 
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tion of safeguards. All non-nuclear-weapon states are required to have a “state 
system of accounting and control” to track nuclear materials and provide data 
to the IAEA (though such a system can also play an important role in nuclear 
security by detecting any unauthorized removal of nuclear material). These sys-
tems vary in effectiveness. For example, in 2004, the Egyptian Atomic Energy 
Authority (which operates that country’s system of accounting and control) was 
reportedly forced to inform the IAEA that “it did not have the authority neces-
sary for it to exercise effective control of all nuclear material and activities in the 
State.”107 Less dramatic problems with safeguards implementation are routine. 
For example, a leaked IAEA document reveals that, in 2012, seventy-one states, 
most of which are developing, routinely missed reporting deadlines. A few 
more-developed states operating research or power reactors, including Brazil, 
China, Mexico, and Poland, sometimes did so too.108
In many non-nuclear-weapon states, constitutional provisions, laws, or fat-
was forbid the development of nuclear weapons. While these may play a role in 
nonproliferation—by encouraging whistle-blowing or empowering domestic 
opponents of nuclear-weapon development, for example—there is an obvious 
tension in self-regulation; that is, in a government overseeing the implementa-
tion of its own nonproliferation commitments. For this reason, domestic non-
proliferation oversight of dual-use nuclear activities is very much secondary to 
international oversight.
In theory, domestic processes could play an important role in helping states 
to consider the international implications of domestic nuclear energy decisions. 
To the best of this author’s knowledge, however, no state currently has a formal-
ized process for factoring proliferation implications into domestic licensing deci-
sions—although, like the United States, some states have occasionally created 
one-off processes. In the United Kingdom, for example, a judicial inquiry was 
held in 1977 into a hugely controversial plan to construct a new reprocessing 
plant. Proliferation was extensively discussed during this inquiry—although the 
presiding judge reached the somewhat unexpected conclusion that the con-
struction of THORP, as the facility was called, would advance nonproliferation 
ends since foreign states would be able to separate plutonium in the United 
Kingdom and so would not need to construct their own facilities.109 (For the 
record, the United Kingdom’s most important foreign client, Japan, did even-
tually build its own domestic facility anyway, which should have surprised no 
one since that was Tokyo’s stated long-term policy at the time of the inquiry.) 
107. Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Reports on Egypt: Reluctantly?” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, June 2, 2009, http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/02/iaea 
-reports-on-egypt-reluctantly/1ztv.
108. Mark Hibbs, “Safeguards in the Spotlight,” Arms Control Wonk (blog), June 9, 2013, 
http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1878/safeguards-in-the-spotlight.
109. For a trenchant critique of the process, see William Walker, Nuclear Entrapment: THORP 
and the Politics of Commitment (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1999), 13–27.
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If nothing else, this experience demonstrates just how difficult and controversial 
proliferation assessments can be.
Domestic processes play a more important role in export controls. The two 
international nuclear export control arrangements—the Zangger Committee 
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group—seek to harmonize standards. However, their 
effectiveness in this regard is limited, both because they are not universal and 
because their guidelines are designed to permit some significant differences in 
procedures and policy between participating governments.110 For example, the 
complexity of the U.S. export control system—its three-way split of responsi-
bility for regulating nonmilitary exports, in particular—appears to be unparal-
leled. By contrast, in some states, including Japan and Russia, all nuclear-related 
exports are licensed by a single agency.
Differences in policy are more interesting. The United States requires 
other states to seek prior consent before reprocessing U.S.-origin spent fuel 
(which includes any fuel that has “passed through” U.S. technology, including 
in fuel fabrication facilities and reactors). Japan has followed this model in all 
of its nuclear cooperation agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states except 
Kazakhstan. By contrast, France, Russia, and South Korea have not included 
such a provision in their nuclear cooperation agreements (with the exception of 
the South Korea–UAE agreement).111 These states’ policies toward retransfers 
also differ (in practice, the only item involved in nuclear power generation that 
could conceivably be retransferred is spent fuel sent for reprocessing or storage 
abroad).112 France, Japan, South Korea, and the United States generally require 
importers to seek their permission before reexporting controlled items. Russia, 
however, generally demands only that the retransfer has the same conditions 
attached as the original transfer (although it does require prior consent for the 
retransfer of particularly sensitive items, such as separated plutonium or HEU).
Although the United States generally does insist on more demanding con-
ditions for nuclear cooperation than do other states, there are exceptions—as 
highlighted, for example, by nuclear cooperation with India. All major nuclear 
exporters have now concluded cooperation agreements with New Delhi except 
for Tokyo, which is seeking a unique provision allowing it to terminate cooper-
110. The differences highlighted in the following paragraphs are drawn from James A. Glasgow, 
Elina Teplinsky, and Stephen L. Markus, Nuclear Export Controls: A Comparative Analysis of 
National Regimes for the Control of Nuclear Materials, Components and Technology (Washington, 
D.C.: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, October 2012), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/
siteFiles/Publications/NuclearExportControls.pdf. This study was commissioned by the Nuclear 
Energy Institute, a lobbying organization for the nuclear industry, to highlight ways in which 
U.S. export controls are more burdensome than the export controls of American competitors. 
Although no evidence is presented to substantiate its assertions about potential buyers’ concerns 
about the U.S. export control system, its purely factual analysis of the differences between states 
appears to be reliable and carefully researched.
111. Ibid., 51.
112. Ibid.
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ation should India conduct another nuclear test, as well as verification require-
ments that go beyond IAEA safeguards.113
Controlling exports of equipment with both nuclear and nonnuclear uses 
is, however, probably more challenging than regulating exports of reactor fuel 
and components, both because the former are much more difficult to track and 
because far more states are involved in their production and transshipment. The 
A. Q. Kahn network, for example, manufactured many centrifuge components 
in Malaysia and used the United Arab Emirates as a key transshipment node. 
Neither state was—or is—a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. At the 
time, the absence of any meaningful export controls was the norm for such 
states (even for states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, export controls often 
left a lot to be desired).
Reporting pursuant to UNSCR 1540, which mandates the creation and 
enforcement of export controls, gives some sense of the current state of play. 
A survey of thirty-eight states’ reports from 2008 revealed large disparities in 
implementation, with less-developed states having generally instituted fewer of 
the resolution’s requirements.114 The most neglected requirements related to 
so-called deemed exports (in-country transfers of intangible commodities to 
foreign nationals) and controls over both proliferation financing and transpor-
tation services.115 In these areas, 16–42 percent of the states surveyed had leg-
islation in force that provided for some type of control. Moreover, enforcement 
lagged behind the creation of a legal framework in most of the areas in which 
the resolution requires states to act.
Nuclear Security
Domestic nuclear security is similar to export controls in that national require-
ments and the quality of implementation vary widely (even if all states can 
agree on the goal of preventing unauthorized access to nuclear materials and 
facilities). By far the most comprehensive survey of nuclear security standards is 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Index.116 This index 
scores states on nineteen indicators grouped in five categories. Two of these 
categories—“quantities and sites” (comprising indicators such as the quantity 
of nuclear material in a state, how many sites the material is stored at, and how 
frequently it is transported) and “risk environment” (comprising indicators such 
as political stability and the pervasiveness of corruption)—are made up of fac-
113. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Japan Visit May Not Seal Civil 
Nuclear Deal,” Economic Times, August 30, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes 
.com/2014-08-30/news/53387773_1_india-and-japan-india-japan-japan-visit.
114. Peter Crail, “Measuring Nuclear Export Controls in Nuclear-Powered Nations and Nuclear 
Aspirants,” in A Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, ed. Mark Jansson 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 80–87, available from 
http://csis.org/publication/collection-papers-2010-nuclear-scholars-initiative.
115. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Deemed Exports,” n.d., 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/deemed-exports.
116. Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index.
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tors that a regulator cannot reasonably be expected to affect. The remaining 
three categories, comprising twelve indicators, rate a state’s legal infrastructure 
and the general nuclear security requirements it imposes, its involvement in 
international agreements and initiatives, and the extent to which international 
undertakings have actually been enshrined in domestic legislation. The index 
does not examine the specifics of security arrangements at individual sites, which 
generally are (and indeed should be) secret. That said, in a number of states, 
even information about general nuclear security requirements is not available.
To help identify, in a crude sense, where states’ nuclear security standards 
differ most from one another, the following list shows the twelve indicators of 
regulatory effectiveness in order of decreasing variance among states (i.e., states’ 
scores are most widely spread in item 1 and least widely spread in item 12; only 
scores from the twenty-five states with at least one kilogram of weapon-usable 
nuclear material are included).117
1. Physical security during transport
2. Independent regulatory agency
3. Control and accounting procedures
4. Domestic nuclear materials security legislation
5. International assurances
6. International legal commitments
7. Voluntary commitments
8. UNSCR 1540 implementation
9. Safeguards adherence and compliance
10. Insider threat prevention
11. On-site physical protection
12. Response capabilities
The biggest differences among the twenty-five states lie in their standards 
for physical security during transport, whether they have an independent regu-
lator, and in their control and accounting procedures. Ten states (including the 
United States) have regulations consistent with the IAEA’s most recent nuclear 
security guidance, INFCIRC/225/rev.5; ten (including China, Japan, and Rus-
sia) have guidance consistent with a slightly older version, INFCIRC/225/
rev.4, which places less of an emphasis on testing security systems, including 
with “force-on-force” exercises; and five (Argentina, India, Pakistan, South 
Africa, and Uzbekistan) have still lower or no published standards. Separately, 
the states’ scores on the regulatory independence indicator are widely spread 
because three of the twenty-five (India, Iran, and North Korea) lack an indepen-
117. Author’s calculations based on data from Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Materials 
Security Index.
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dent regulator.118 Finally, states’ scores for control and accounting procedures 
differ widely, principally because of varying rules for access controls (requir-
ing identity checks for people entering sensitive areas and keeping appropriate 
records). Overall, the Nuclear Materials Security Index contains some surprises 
about which states perform well and poorly. Belarus, for example, achieves per-
fect scores for its physical security standards, the independence of its regulator, 
and its control and accounting procedures. By contrast, Belgium’s requirements 
for physical protection during transport and access controls fall short of inter-
nationally recognized best practice.
One problem with the Nuclear Materials Security Index is that it does not 
consider enforcement. Russia and the United States (along with Kazakhstan) 
are the top-ranked nations for preventing insider threats. However, even if 
Russian regulations are consistent with best practice, evidence suggests that 
implementation has been lacking.119 For example, Matt Bunn, a former U.S. 
government official, recalls visiting a Russian nuclear facility in the mid-2000s 
and seeing two portal monitors to detect radiation, one American and one Rus-
sian. When he asked why there were two monitors, he was told that the U.S. 
monitor was deactivated on Thursdays, when plant activities tended to set it 
off accidentally, and the less sensitive Russian monitor was used instead.120 He 
notes that because “every insider was aware of this practice, and would know 
to plan an attempted theft for a Thursday,” this procedure rendered the U.S. 
system “largely pointless.”
Another example of an implementation challenge concerns assessments 
of the security threats that facilities are designed to withstand. Best practice 
requires the development of—and regular updates to—so-called design basis 
threats. Not only does the Nuclear Materials Security Index not give Japan 
credit in this category, apparently because Japanese regulations impose no 
requirement for regular updates, but most, if not all, Japanese facilities are not 
designed to withstand attack by armed terrorists.121 U.S. visitors to Japanese 
nuclear facilities are generally surprised by the lack of armed guards (which is 
in part a consequence of legal restrictions on the use of guns by private security 
firms). While Japanese officials have insisted, with some justification, that armed 
terrorism is unlikely in Japan, the fact that the country has been the victim of 
118. Although only three states lack an independent regulator, the spread of scores is large 
because this indicator is a binary variable. Whether this should be considered a bug or a feature 
of this approach is up for debate.
119. Togzhan Kassenova, From Antagonism to Partnership: The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2007), 178, 189, 209; and Matthew 
Bunn and Scott D. Sagan, A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes 
(Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2014), 9, 11, 14, https://www 
.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/publications/researchpapersmonographs/insiderThreats.pdf.
120. Bunn and Sagan, A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats, 11.
121. Douglas Birch, R. Jeffrey Smith, and Jake Adelstein, “Japan Could Be Building an Irresist-
ible Terrorist Target, Experts Say,” Center for Public Integrity, March 11, 2014, http://www 
.publicintegrity.org/2014/03/11/14366/japan-could-be-building-irresistible-terrorist 
-target-experts-say.
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chemical attacks by an apocalyptic cult suggests that armed attacks on nuclear 
facilities should not be considered impossible. To be fair, Japan’s nuclear secu-
rity system does seem to be improving, and armed police are now present at its 
most sensitive facility, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant—but progress appears 
to be slow. The Japanese experience also raises the question of the extent to 
which nuclear security measures can safely be adapted to local cultural norms 
and laws (such as restrictions on private gun ownership).
OTHER MODELS FOR MANAGING THE RISK FROM  
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
Today any ambition to reform the nuclear nonproliferation regime is markedly 
lacking. Almost all governmental and nongovernmental efforts to bolster the 
regime as a whole (as opposed to those focused on country-specific challenges, 
most notably from Iran) aim to achieve incremental change.122 In some part at 
least, this emphasis on gradual evolution is the result of the failure, last decade, 
of two ambitious—perhaps revolutionary—“big ideas.”
In 2004, George W. Bush identified what he termed a “loophole” in the 
NPT that allows states “to produce nuclear material that can be used to build 
bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.”123 In response, he called 
upon “the world’s leading nuclear exporters” to provide reliable nuclear fuel 
supplies to states that renounced enrichment and reprocessing, and he called 
upon the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ban the transfer of these technologies to 
states that did not already possess them.
These proposals met with considerable opposition from such states, includ-
ing close U.S. allies such as Australia and Canada. Some states that did have 
the technology opposed them too. In the event, the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
took more than seven years to agree on a relatively permissive and distinctly 
ambiguous set of criteria under which exports of enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities would be permitted.124 Today, the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s partici-
pating governments show little appetite to reopen the debate.
Bush’s call for reliable fuel assurances also contributed to a debate, started 
by then IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei the previous year, about 
the internationalization or multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle. The idea 
of taking sensitive nuclear activities out of the hands of individual states has 
been periodically revisited since it was first proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal 
122. The one possible exception is Obama’s renewed focus on nuclear disarmament. However, 
this initiative seeks to enhance the nonproliferation regime indirectly, by using disarmament to 
motivate a coalition willing to strengthen nonproliferation rules. Besides, it has now been largely 
abandoned by the White House.
123. George W. Bush, remarks, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, http://2001-2009.state 
.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/29290.htm.
124. For a critique of the new rules, see Hibbs, “New Global Rules for Sensitive Nuclear Trade.”
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report, which suggested that all such activities be conducted by an international 
organization. Moreover, multilateral (but not truly international) coalitions 
have been set up for enrichment, including Urenco, which was created by the 
British, Dutch, and German governments to develop and operate centrifuge 
technology, and Eurodif, under which France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain (and, 
at various times, Sweden and Iran) owned a gaseous diffusion plant in France 
that has recently been shut down.125
ElBaradei reawakened this debate in 2003 when he proposed that enrich-
ment and reprocessing should take place only in “facilities under multinational 
control.”126 This suggestion, combined with Bush’s call for reliable fuel assur-
ances, sparked a plethora of proposals from governments and nongovernmental 
organizations.127 Some of the proposals merely sought to reinforce existing 
market mechanisms. Others were extremely ambitious and involved complex 
international ventures. The German contribution, for example, proposed that 
the IAEA should own a new enrichment facility in an extraterritorial area (i.e., 
an area outside the control of any nation-state). Most of these proposals did not 
incorporate Bush’s suggestion that fuel supply assurances be extended only to 
governments that renounced enrichment and reprocessing (even the U.S. gov-
ernment eventually dropped this requirement from its proposals). Nonetheless, 
because of their complexity and, more important, a lack of interest from gov-
ernments, all of the more-ambitious proposals quickly fell by the wayside—and 
seem unlikely to be revived in the short term. Three modest initiatives did make 
it off the ground. However, the only one that can be described as multinational 
is the International Uranium Enrichment Center, a Russian venture owned 
jointly with Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine that has access to some of the 
output from a Russian centrifuge facility.128
Domestic nuclear nonproliferation policy is, in theory at least, more sus-
ceptible to faster change since the buy-in of only one state is required. States 
could, for example, require themselves to conduct an assessment of the non-
125. The centrifuge technology Urenco developed is now owned by the Enrichment Technol-
ogy Corporation, which since 2006 has been jointly owned by the British, Dutch, and German 
governments and France’s Areva.
126. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” Economist, October 16, 2003, http://www.
economist.com/node/2137602.
127. For a summary of some of these proposals, see Mary Beth Nikitin, Anthony Andrews, and 
Mark Holt, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access 
to Nuclear Power, CRS Report for Congress, RL34234 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, October 19, 2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34234.pdf; and Yury 
Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals (Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2009), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/ 
pdfs/multilateralization-of-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle-assessing-the-existing-proposals-345.pdf.
128. The other initiatives that are being or have been implemented are “fuel banks” (actually 
uranium hexafluoride banks) to cater to states that suffer a politically motivated disruption of 
fuel supply. One has been set up by Russia, which pays for and operates this facility, but the 
responsibility for releasing material lies with the IAEA. Second, the IAEA has approved and is in 
the process of establishing a similar facility in Kazakhstan. Much of the funding for this facility 
came from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the U.S. government.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S52
proliferation implications of domestic licensing decisions. Yet the effort in the 
United States to petition the NRC to do just that has failed, and no discussion 
of the idea appears to be ongoing elsewhere. That said, another aspect of nuclear 
regulation—safety—does provide a clear precedent for such an assessment. Spe-
cifically, a basic principle of radiation safety is that “facilities and activities that 
give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall benefit.”129 This principle has 
led to a formal requirement for all European Union states to “ensure that all 
new classes or types of practice resulting in exposure to ionizing radiation are 
justified in advance of being first adopted or first approved by their economic, 
social or other benefits in relation to the health detriment they may cause.”130 
If the word health is changed to proliferation, this requirement nicely captures 
the goal of a nonproliferation assessment.
In contrast to nuclear nonproliferation, one big idea is under discussion 
for nuclear security: the creation of a universal, comprehensive, legally binding 
nuclear security regime that requires states to take steps to demonstrate their 
compliance. Several variations on this central theme have been proposed. One 
idea is to develop a framework agreement for nuclear security—similar to, say, 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—that would set out basic 
nuclear security principles and “allow for the negotiation of supplementary pro-
tocols that require more detailed nuclear security actions.”131 Another idea is for 
states to agree to give the IAEA (or another international body) “the authority 
to define, review, and monitor national nuclear security standards and to eval-
uate compliance.”132 These ideas have, so far at least, largely been championed 
by nongovernmental experts seeking to ensure that the momentum generated 
by the Nuclear Security Summit process is not lost after the 2016 meeting, 
which is expected to be the last. So far, none of the states participating in the 
process have endorsed the idea of a comprehensive and legally binding nuclear 
security treaty because they worry it would be too bureaucratic, unwieldy, and 
difficult to negotiate. That said, their initially negative reactions do appear to 
have softened somewhat.
129. IAEA, Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Fundamentals SF-1 (Vienna: IAEA, 2006), 10, 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1273_web.pdf.
130. European Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM, May 13, 1996, title IV, chap. I, art. 6, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01996L0029-20000513 
&from=EN.
131. NSGEG, Responsibility beyond Rules, 14.
132. Boureston and Ogilvie-White, “Seeking Nuclear Security through Greater International 
Coordination,” 11.
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OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES: STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE
Given the relatively limited role of individual scientists, the key actors in both 
domestic and international debates over the regulation of dual-use nuclear tech-
nology are governments and the nuclear industry—which are often one and 
the same. Two main fault lines traverse the international politics of nuclear 
regulation: between the states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do 
not; and between the states that possess nuclear technology and those that do 
not. Although the nuclear-armed states largely overlap the technology hold-
ers, the two groups are not identical. Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, 
for example, all possess sensitive nuclear technology but do not have nuclear 
weapons. And the two fault-lines, although not perfectly predictive of states’ 
positions—Western European countries without nuclear weapons, for example, 
tend to side with the nuclear-weapon states on a number of issues—are probably 
the most important determinant.
States without a particular type of nuclear technology—whether nuclear 
reactors, enrichment, or reprocessing—are often concerned about protecting, 
both legally and practically, their ability to acquire that technology in the future, 
even if they have no plans to do so. The United Arab Emirates and Taiwan 
are, for example, likely to prove fairly unusual in being willing to renounce 
enrichment and reprocessing. Vietnam’s position—to insist on preserving what 
it sees as a right, even though it appears to have little interest in exercising 
it—is much more common. The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines on the 
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology took so long to negotiate 
because a number of states without such technology, including Canada, South 
Korea, and Turkey, wanted to keep open the option of acquiring it.133 Their 
position was even shared by some states with enrichment facilities, including 
Brazil and Argentina, which appear to have been taking a “principled” stance 
against technology denial, as well as protecting their ability to acquire new forms 
of enrichment and reprocessing technology in the future. One example of how 
deep concern about technology denial among some of these state runs is that 
when Brazil and Turkey negotiated a (never implemented) fuel swap with Iran 
in 2010, to try to help diffuse the crisis, they stated in their joint declaration 
that “Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran’s . . . constructive role in pursuing the 
realization of nuclear rights of [the NPT’s] Member States.”134
Even proposals that do not explicitly involve restrictions on technology are 
often treated with skepticism by the “have-nots” out of concern for a hidden 
agenda. The clumsy rollout of U.S. nonproliferation proposals in 2004, when 
Bush did explicitly condition U.S. fuel supply assurances on states’ renounc-
ing enrichment and reprocessing technology, did a lot to feed this fear—and 
it has persisted long after Washington ceased to talk about technology denial. 
133. McGoldrick et al., Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology, 13–17.
134. Manucher Mottaki, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Celso Amorim, Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey 
and Brazil, May 17, 2010, para. 10, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/joint-decl.pdf.
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Discussions about multilateralizing or internationalizing the fuel cycle during 
the late 2000s were, for example, made much more difficult by “the common 
misconception that any multilateral mechanism necessarily implies the depriva-
tion of the [NPT] Article IV right of [non-nuclear-weapon states] to peaceful 
nuclear technology.”135 Fear of technology denial affected progress in nuclear 
security too. In 2009, for example, the U.S. and UK governments pushed the 
idea of making nuclear security a fourth “pillar” of the NPT to stand alongside 
the existing three of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. Many states, particularly within the Non-Aligned Movement, 
viewed this as an attempt to create additional obligations that would interfere 
with their “inalienable right” to use nuclear energy.136 The British and Amer-
ican governments rapidly dropped the idea. If the United States and other 
like-minded governments were to back the idea of a comprehensive and legally 
binding nuclear security treaty, many states might interpret it as another attempt 
at technology denial. Disagreements over the severity of the threat from nuclear 
terrorism would serve only to exacerbate their suspicion.
Discussions about strengthening nonproliferation and nuclear security also 
bring out the tensions between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon 
states over disarmament. Although non-nuclear-weapon states have expressed 
dissatisfaction that the Obama administration’s push on nuclear security has 
come at the expense of disarmament, the issue of nonproliferation is where 
the acrimony really comes to the fore.137 Almost any proposal to strengthen 
the nonproliferation regime is opposed by many non-nuclear-weapon states, 
especially within the Non-Aligned Movement, on the grounds that the nuclear- 
weapon states have failed to live up to their disarmament commitments (which, 
among non-nuclear-weapon states, increasingly seems to mean negotiating a 
time-bound treaty to abolish nuclear weapons).
Whether the lack of progress on disarmament is a genuine reason or a 
convenient excuse for those non-nuclear-weapon states that oppose strength-
ening the nonproliferation regime has been the subject of much debate.138 This 
author has come to the conclusion that many non-nuclear-weapon states do 
feel genuine frustration at what they see as the nuclear-weapon states’ failure to 
live up to the disarmament bargain, and do seek to leverage nonproliferation to 
135. Yury Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Need to Build Trust (Geneva: 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010), 10–11, http://www.unidir.org/files/
publications/pdfs/multilateralization-of-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle-the-need-to-build-trust-132.pdf.
136. Bowen, Cottee, and Hobbs, “Multilateral Cooperation and the Prevention of Nuclear 
Terrorism,” 357. The phrase “inalienable right” is from article IV of the NPT.
137. Deepti Choubey, Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable? (Washington, D.C.: Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/new 
_nuclear_bargains.pdf.
138. Although slightly dated, a trenchant discussion with a useful agenda for moving forward 
is Christopher F. Chyba, “Time for a Systematic Analysis: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear 
Proliferation,” Arms Control Today 38 (December 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2008_12/Chyba.
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achieve their disarmament goals. However, rarely is disarmament the only reason 
why key non-nuclear-weapon states oppose any given nonproliferation measure. 
For example, Togzhan Kassenova, a scholar of Brazil’s nuclear program, con-
cludes that Brasilia’s objections to the additional protocol are multifaceted and 
include, for example, a desire not to compromise sensitive information related 
to its nuclear submarine or centrifuge programs, as well as frustration over the 
pace of disarmament.139 In public, however, it is much easier for Brazil to justify 
its position by simply blaming the nuclear-weapon states. Strengthening the 
nonproliferation regime is likely to prove difficult if many non-nuclear-weapon 
states’ opposition is overdetermined in this way; specifically, progress toward 
disarmament may be a necessary condition, but it is unlikely to prove sufficient.
The nuclear industry also tries to influence nonproliferation and nuclear 
security policy. The industry can sometimes be a direct participant in debates, 
particularly domestic ones. At other times, it is an indirect participant, seek-
ing to influence the position that its national government carries into interna-
tional discussions. That said, because so much of the global nuclear industry is 
state-owned, it is probably more accurate not to think of the nuclear industry 
as an independent actor in many states but to characterize national debates 
over nuclear policy as bureaucratic processes, internal to government, in which 
nuclear industrial considerations are an important factor.
That said, the nuclear industry is really two separate industries: operators 
and vendors (particularly of nuclear reactors and reactor components). The 
former has a general and somewhat visceral predisposition to oppose additional 
regulation and generally tries to deny any link between nuclear power and pro-
liferation. Moreover, operators sometimes object to additional nonproliferation 
or nuclear security measures on more concrete grounds. Brazil’s centrifuge 
operators, for example, are opposed to the additional protocol. “Grumblings 
about the cost and perceived unfair safeguards burden” are often heard from 
diplomats representing states, including Canada, Germany, and Japan, that have 
large nuclear industries.140 Despite their concerns, operators, for at least three 
reasons, are probably not a major barrier to improvements in nonproliferation 
and security. First, because so few nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon states 
are safeguarded, a major source of potential opposition is effectively nullified. 
Second, particularly where nuclear security is concerned, many operators recog-
nize how damaging an incident could be to the health of the nuclear industry 
as a whole. Third, the cost of safeguards and nuclear security is relatively small 
(especially when compared to safety).
Vendors, by contrast, have a bigger influence on policy. Within the United 
States, reactor and component vendors, which are not state-owned, constitute 
139. Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 60–62, http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/brazil_nuclear_kaleidoscope_lo_res.pdf.
140. Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Energy and Global Governance: Ensuring Safety, Security and 
Non-proliferation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 145.
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a powerful lobby that has opposed (on relatively solid grounds) congressional 
efforts to tighten the conditions under which 123 agreements can be concluded 
and (with much flimsier arguments) administration efforts to revamp the rules 
for 810 agreements. Meanwhile, although the policy-formation process is much 
more opaque, industrial considerations almost certainly play a major role in 
influencing the policies of the states that own major exporters, including France 
and Russia.
That does not mean raising revenue is the only purpose of reactor sales; they 
are also a tool of foreign policy. For example, the provision of a nuclear power 
plant, with generous financing arrangements, was integral to achieving a package 
of energy agreements that Russia struck with Turkey in 2010.141 A government’s 
desire for flexibility, so that nuclear power plant sales can be used to further other 
foreign policy goals, adds yet another layer of opposition to tightening rules 
for exports. A desire to facilitate “strategic” reactor sales can even lead govern-
ments to undermine those nuclear nonproliferation rules that are in place. The 
U.S.-India nuclear deal—under which the United States sought an exemption 
from Nuclear Suppliers Group rules to enable reactor sales to India—was, from 
the U.S. perspective at least, primarily motivated by the goal of forging a stra-
tegic partnership with India, particularly against China.142 Similarly, furthering 
a strategic partnership appears to have been one important motivation behind 
China’s decision to supply reactors to Pakistan. A cliché within the nuclear pol-
icy community is that nonproliferation goals almost always lose out when they 
conflict with efforts to strengthen a bilateral relationship.
***
“The exceptional nature of nuclear weapons,” the political scientist William 
Walker wrote in 2007, “calls for an exceptional kind of cooperative politics.”143 
The use of nuclear weapons represents the highest level of violence to which 
humanity can resort. Even a single weapon could lead to hundreds of thou-
sands, or even millions, of deaths, appalling suffering of the survivors, the 
extensive destruction of property, and widespread radioactive contamination. 
To be sure, deterrence may continue to prevent use. However, deterrence is 
likely to become riskier as more states acquire nuclear weapons and to become 
particularly unreliable should nonstate actors do so. Moreover, states worry 
141. For details of the package, see Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey’s Pact with Russia Will Give It 
Nuclear Plant,” New York Times, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/
world/europe/13turkey.html. For the background, see Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, and Institute of Oriental Studies of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Economic and Energy Dimensions—
Proceedings of an International Workshop, Ankara, March 29, 2012 (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 9, http://csis.org/files/publication/120529_Turkey 
_Russia_Iran_Nexus_Ankara_Workshop_Proceedings.pdf.
142. For the case that the deal was indeed bad for nonproliferation, see George Perkovich, 
“Global Implications of the U.S.-India Deal,” Dædalus 139 (1) (Winter 2010): 20–31.
143. William Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,” International 
Affairs 83 (3) (May 2007): 433.
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that the spread of nuclear weapons—even if they are not used—will undermine 
their national security in other ways. Their fears are often visceral but include 
falling victim to nuclear blackmail (i.e., being forced to make concessions under 
threat of nuclear attack) and adversaries’ becoming emboldened after acquiring 
nuclear weapons.
The system for managing dual-use nuclear technology—as complex and 
multifaceted as it is—is focused narrowly on mitigating these “high-end” harms 
as they are posed by two potential agents: states that do not possess nuclear 
weapons; and sophisticated, well-funded, malevolent terrorist groups.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime, which aims to prevent further prolif-
eration to states, represents Walker’s “exceptional kind of cooperative politics.” 
While non-nuclear-weapon states were not willing to forsake the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, they did agree to construct a legally binding and 
nearly universal regime to reduce the risk that dual-use nuclear technology 
would be used in the development of nuclear weapons. This regime—for all its 
flaws and risks—represents humankind’s most comprehensive attempt to man-
age any dual-use technology. It is essentially a transparency regime: states are 
permitted to conduct any nuclear activity, except the “manufacture” of nuclear 
weapons, provided they declare it and permit verification by the IAEA. Such 
verification is facilitated by both the relatively small number of weapon-usable 
fissile materials and the existence of inspection procedures that permit the diver-
sion of declared nuclear materials to be detected reasonably reliably.
Restrictions on the trade in nuclear technology, materials, and equipment 
are a second component of the nonproliferation regime (although their effec-
tiveness is gradually diminishing). They include unilateral and multilateral 
policies setting out the circumstances under which controlled knowledge or 
items can be exported, as well as unilateral and multilateral efforts, such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, to detect and interdict illicit transfers. Export 
controls and safeguards are connected: one purpose of the former is to provide 
the IAEA with information helpful to implementing the latter.
As exceptional as the nuclear nonproliferation regime is—in both its 
uniqueness and its success—it faces many serious stresses, including technical 
challenges such as detecting clandestine facilities and political challenges such 
as enforcement in the event a violation is detected. Few of these problems have 
easy answers, and there are many barriers to change. These include technical 
barriers, such as the inherent limitations of technology to detect secret nuclear 
activities; commercial barriers resulting from the potentially lucrative nature of 
nuclear exports; and political barriers, including the acrimony between nuclear- 
weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as between technology 
holders and would-be recipients. These barriers make even incremental change 
difficult. Changes that would be more revolutionary—for example, rules to 
prevent the further spread of fuel-cycle technologies or an agreement to place all 
fuel-cycle facilities under multilateral or international control—are nonstarters. 
For the time being, the best opportunity for enhancing the nuclear nonprolifer-
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ation regime, in this author’s opinion, is for advanced states to develop internal 
procedures to assess how their domestic decisions to develop or use new nuclear 
technologies might affect proliferation dynamics globally.
While the nuclear nonproliferation regime developed from the top down—
the passage of international agreements required national legislation and imple-
mentation—the nuclear security architecture developed from the bottom up. 
Efforts to prevent terrorist organizations or other unauthorized personnel from 
gaining access to nuclear facilities or acquiring nuclear material were originally a 
purely sovereign responsibility. Best practices include the development and peri-
odic updating of design basis threats, physical protection to prevent unautho-
rized access, material control and accountancy to detect unauthorized removal, 
and effective response capabilities to recover material that has been removed.
Gradually, a patchwork of international measures has been developed to 
improve both national standards and the quality of implementation. These 
measures can be divided into four categories. First, a few legally binding instru-
ments, such as the CPPNM and its amendment, as well as UNSCR 1540, 
impose legally binding standards in some areas. Second, best practice guides, 
such as INFCIRC/225, are an important but nonbinding way of plugging 
some of the remaining gaps. Third, various international assistance programs are 
also on offer, serving a wide variety of functions. The IAEA, through its Interna-
tional Physical Protection Advisory Service, provides peer reviews comparing a 
state’s nuclear security system to internationally accepted best practice. National 
and regional centers of excellence are being set up to provide services such 
as training. Direct assistance with enhancing physical protection and material 
control procedures, removing high-risk materials, and converting HEU-fuelled 
research reactors to use LEU fuel is also available from multilateral coalitions 
and on a bilateral basis, most notably from the United States. Fourth, informa-
tion-sharing initiatives, including the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database, have 
been created to warn states of potential threats. Information sharing is also a 
major purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Inspired, no doubt, by the nonproliferation regime, many nuclear secu-
rity advocates are championing the idea of a comprehensive, legally binding, 
universal nuclear security treaty. Such a treaty would be a heavy diplomatic lift. 
The lack of a shared threat perception and fears that a nuclear security treaty 
would ultimately lead to technology denial would make garnering the support 
of many developing states difficult. Meanwhile, many developed states, worried 
that negotiations would be extremely difficult and carry a low chance of success, 
feel that their diplomatic capital might be better spent trying to effect more-in-
cremental change. They are probably right. Because of the inevitable trade-off 
between high standards and universality, any treaty that was acceptable to a 
majority of states would, in all probability, lack the teeth necessary to combat 
the very real nuclear security problems that do exist.
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In fact, the nuclear nonproliferation regime offers something of a false lead 
for nuclear security. Nonproliferation politics have become much more fractious 
since the NPT was concluded in 1968. While a majority of states still support 
the treaty, few feel that most others have acted in good faith. Most vociferously, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, while expressing concern about technology denial, 
argues that the nuclear-weapon states have failed to live up to their disarmament 
commitments. Meanwhile, although their public comments tend to be more 
measured, the United States and its partners are equally frustrated over the fail-
ure of many non-nuclear-weapon states to support efforts to bolster the nonpro-
liferation regime. This acrimony has infected discussions of nuclear security; as 
desirable as isolating nuclear security from nonproliferation politically might be, 
doing so is simply not possible. Given this political reality, it is far from clear that 
fashioning a nuclear security regime in the mold of the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime is possible or that trying to do so would be constructive.
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Chapter 2
Dual-Use Threats: The Case 
of Biological Technology
Elisa D. Harris
INTRODUCTION
In February 2001, the Journal of Virology published the results of a scientific 
experiment in which Australian researchers exploring contraceptive alternatives 
to pesticides for controlling the mouse population unexpectedly produced a 
lethal mousepox virus and, in the process, demonstrated how a new, highly 
virulent pathogen might be constructed.1 This work might well have gone 
unnoticed by most people, other than interested scientists, had it not been for 
the fact that seven months later, terrorist attacks were carried out on the U.S. 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon and a series of letters containing high-
grade anthrax spores were sent to selected U.S. media outlets and members 
of Congress. The latter events, which killed five and injured seventeen others, 
unleashed an epidemic of fear that terrorists would attack America again, only 
this time the weapon of choice would not be a commercial airliner but a bio-
logical agent that would cause death on a massive scale. Government officials 
and commentators alike warned that it was not a matter of whether bioterrorists 
would strike but of when.
Prior to September 11 and the anthrax letters, biological threats were seen 
largely through the lens of biosafety or nonproliferation—that is, ensuring that 
scientists’ use of hazardous biological materials did not threaten human health 
or the environment, or preventing government-led programs aimed at devel-
oping and producing biological weapons. By the end of 2001, a new threat 
had been added to these traditional concerns: terrorist acquisition or use of 
1. Ronald J. Jackson et al., “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia 
Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mouse-
pox,” Journal of Virology 75 (3) (February 2001): 1205–1210.
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biological agents. Efforts to counter the theft, diversion, or malicious use of 
dangerous pathogens and toxins by terrorists came to be known as biosecurity.2
Over the past half century, many different governance measures have 
been adopted and still others proposed to prevent both accidental and delib-
erate releases of biological agents and the corresponding damage, human and 
financial, this would cause. These measures span multiple levels: international, 
national, local, and individual. They also take many forms: legally binding trea-
ties, United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, and intergovernmen-
tal decisions; national laws and regulations; like-minded government policies; 
national and departmental policies; guidelines and standards; and scientific 
codes. Taken together, they help to form what some have called a “web of 
prevention.” 3 But, like any web, there are gaps.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of why governance of biological 
materials, equipment, and information is so inherently difficult. It then consid-
ers some of the most important governance measures that have been adopted 
at the international level, in the United States, and in other countries. These 
measures are grouped by their primary objectives: preventing the development 
and possession of biological warfare agents or weapons; controlling access to 
dual-use biological materials, equipment, or associated information that could 
be used for hostile purposes; promoting the safe and secure handling of patho-
gens and toxins inside and outside the laboratory; and ensuring that the risks 
from the most consequential types of biological research are properly identified, 
assessed, and mitigated before the work is carried out. The chapter then looks 
at two other types of governance measures that have been prominent in the 
dual-use biological technology debate, and concludes with a discussion of the 
key challenges confronting further efforts to mitigate dual-use risks in this area.
GOVERNANCE OF BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGY
As other studies have pointed out, governance of biological technology is inher-
ently difficult.4 First, most biological agents, such as bacteria and viruses, are 
living organisms that replicate, so policies that focus on inventory controls and 
accountability, especially monitoring the quantity of materials being stored, are 
problematic, as small seed stocks can later be used to produce large amounts 
of biological agent. Most biological agents can also be found in nature—in 
diseased soil or animals in the case of pathogens and in other living organisms 
in the case of toxins. While technical proficiency is required to obtain biological 
2. Jonathan Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Stan-
dards,” Arms Control Today 33 (5) (June 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/
tucker_june03.
3. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences 
and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007).
4. See, for example, Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens.”
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materials from these natural sources, the fact that it can be done means that 
policies aimed at controlling access to dangerous pathogens or toxins can also 
be evaded.
Second, advances in science and technology are increasing the number of 
biological agents of potential concern, expanding the types of equipment rele-
vant to their development and production, and broadening the range of facilities 
in which work with biological agents is occurring. During the Cold War, fewer 
than two dozen biological agents were developed and accepted into national 
biological weapons programs. However, advances in genetic sequencing and in 
synthetic biology are now making it possible to create an almost unlimited num-
ber of modified organisms, some of which may be more dangerous than existing 
biological agents, harder to detect, or capable of evading existing therapeutics.
Until a decade ago, efforts to control the acquisition of equipment that 
could be used to make biological agents focused on items such as high con-
tainment facilities, fermenters, specialized separators and filtration equipment, 
and aerosol test chambers, most of which were available in a relatively small 
number of countries. Today, modified organisms are being created more quickly 
and cheaply using sophisticated gene synthesis machines and reagents that are 
widely available. This work is being carried out in many countries and in diverse 
settings—in academic institutions, in industry and other private sector facilities, 
in government laboratories, and, in some cases, at sites where amateur scientists 
work without any institutional affiliation.
Third, governance of biological technology must also grapple with intan-
gible technology—specifically, information or knowledge. This includes, for 
example, technical data necessary for the development or production of bio-
logical agents; it also includes the DNA sequence databases and design software 
available on the Internet that are central to the synthesis of modified or novel 
agents. And it includes the methods and results of research that are disseminated 
in multiple ways—in conversations among scientists, in email exchanges, in post-
ers or presentations at scientific conferences, and in peer-reviewed publications.
Finally, each of these items—the biological materials, equipment, and 
related information—is used for legitimate purposes but can also cause harm, 
either accidentally or deliberately. Pathogens being studied for human or animal 
vaccines can escape from laboratories and sicken those they were designed to 
protect. Equipment used to understand the underlying biological properties of 
existing pathogens can also be directed toward enhancing the transmissibility 
or virulence of those pathogens for hostile applications. Information on the 
synthesis of an extinct pathogen like the 1918 Spanish flu virus can be used to 
bolster disease surveillance as well as to resurrect and disseminate this once-le-
thal threat. These characteristics have had a profound impact on efforts at every 
level to govern dual-use biological technology.
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CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Many efforts have been undertaken at the international level to try to man-
age biological threats (see Table 1). These include treaty restrictions on the 
development and possession of biological weapons; multilateral initiatives aimed 
at preventing dual-use biological material, equipment, and information from 
being acquired for hostile purposes; and international guidelines and policies to 
ensure that pathogens and toxins are handled safely and securely. 
Treaty Restrictions on Biological Weapons Development and Possession
During the 1960s, controversy over the use of herbicides and riot control agents 
by U.S. forces in Vietnam helped stimulate international interest in banning 
chemical and biological weapons. This ultimately led in 1972 to the conclusion 
of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty 
outlawing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. From the outset, the 
BWC’s terms acknowledged the dual-use nature of biological agents: instead 
of prohibiting biological weapons specifically, it committed parties never to 
“develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other 
biological agents, or toxins . . . of types and in quantities that have no justifica-
tion for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,” as well as “weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes.”5 This language also ensured that the BWC’s fundamental prohibi-
tions would apply to all future scientific and technological developments in the 
life sciences and related fields, including in the nascent field of biotechnology. 
BWC parties have reaffirmed this view regarding the scope of application of the 
BWC at each successive review conference since the convention entered into 
force in 1975.
In addition to prohibiting the development and possession of biological 
weapons, the BWC also obligates its parties not to transfer to others and not to 
assist any state in producing or acquiring biological agents or toxins (as well as 
weapons, equipment, or delivery means) for other than peaceful purposes. At 
the same time, the convention commits its parties to facilitate the fullest possible 
exchange of materials, equipment, and information for using biological agents 
and toxins for peaceful purposes and to avoid hampering international coop-
eration in such activities. This tension between the nonproliferation and assis-
tance provisions of the BWC has been a major source of controversy between 
developed and developing countries since the earliest days of the convention.
The biggest weakness of the BWC, however, is the absence of meaning-
ful mechanisms for ensuring that countries comply with their obligations. The 
implications of this failure became apparent in the late 1980s as reports began to 
emerge from Soviet biological weapons scientists who had defected to the West. 
5. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteri-
ological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (1972), http://www.opbw 
.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdf; emphasis added.
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These scientists revealed that Moscow had not only maintained its biological 
weapons program after the conclusion of the BWC but had expanded it into 
the largest and most sophisticated program in the world. At its peak, the Soviet 
program involved some 65,000 scientists, technicians, and other workers hidden 
in dozens of facilities operated by the KGB, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 
the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, and the Ministries of Defense, Agri-
culture, Health, and Chemical Industry. Much of this illegal biological weapons 
program was hidden in plain sight in facilities conducting research and develop-
ment (R&D) for pharmaceutical, industrial, and other civilian purposes. The real 
mission of the facilities operated by Biopreparat, as the civilian side of the Soviet 
biological weapons program was called, was R&D on human pathogens, par-
ticularly the development of antibiotic- and vaccine-resistant biological agents.6
The Soviet Union was not, however, the only country believed to have a 
biological weapons program. In the late 1980s, U.S. officials began to speak 
publicly about a broader proliferation problem, claiming that the number of 
countries with biological weapons programs had increased from four to ten in 
the years since the BWC had been completed. In addition to the Soviet Union, 
the other countries that were identified as having biological weapons programs 
were China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, South Africa, Syria, and 
Taiwan, almost all of which had either signed or ratified the convention.7 Bio-
logical weapons proliferation became an even more salient issue in the run-up to 
the 1991 Gulf War because of fears that Saddam Hussein would authorize the 
use of biological (or chemical) weapons against the coalition of military forces 
that had been assembled to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Although this did 
not come to pass, UN inspectors confirmed in the years after the war that Iraq 
had developed and produced biological weapons during the 1980s and that 
biological materials and equipment from Western companies had facilitated the 
Iraqi program.
In the face of mounting concerns about the proliferation of biological 
weapons, BWC parties agreed in 1991 to study potential verification mea-
sures for the convention and in 1994 created an ad hoc group with a carefully 
defined mandate: to consider appropriate measures, including possible verifi-
cation measures, to be included as appropriate in a legally binding protocol 
to strengthen the BWC. The debate over the mandate foreshadowed the 
positions taken by the parties in the protocol negotiations: the European 
Union (EU) and moderate nonaligned countries supported a variety of data 
declaration and on-site inspection requirements; China and the radical non-
aligned countries pressed for commitments on technical assistance for devel-
oping countries and the elimination of export controls; and Russia tried to 
6. For the most authoritative study on the Soviet program, see Milton Leitenberg and Raymond 
A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
7. See Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat (Carlisle, Pa: 
U.S. Army War College, 2005).
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narrow the scope of the BWC’s prohibitions and thus widen the definition of 
permitted activities. The U.S. government was divided: the White House was 
supportive of legally binding transparency measures to increase the risk and 
cost of cheating, whereas government departments were determined to limit 
the protocol’s impact on sensitive biodefense and threat assessment activities 
and on the U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. In July 2001, 
the new George W. Bush administration, whose officials had an antipathy 
to arms control in general and to BWC verification in particular, officially 
rejected the draft protocol that had been negotiated.
Following the September 11 attacks and the anthrax letters, the United 
States proposed, as an alternative to continuing the protocol negotiations, that 
state parties hold short intersessional meetings each year to exchange infor-
mation on biosecurity and global health security issues, including controls on 
dangerous pathogens, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, and disease surveil-
lance. Discussions on these and related issues have continued for more than a 
decade, with few tangible results. Currently 173 states are party to the BWC 
(i.e., have both signed and ratified the convention). Nine, including Egypt and 
Syria, are signatories only, and fifteen, including Israel, have neither signed nor 
ratified the convention.
Multilateral Efforts to Control Access to Biological Material, Equipment,  
and Information
Since the early 1990s, a variety of international initiatives have been under-
taken to try to prevent dual-use biological material, equipment, and informa-
tion from being acquired for hostile purposes. Some of these initiatives have 
been truly international in scope, though most have been what more accu-
rately could be called “multilateral,” since they have involved smaller groups 
of like-minded countries.
The first of these initiatives was the harmonization of national controls 
on biological-related exports by the Australia Group (AG), an informal export 
control coordinating body that was organized by the Australian government 
after Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. In December 1992, 
the twenty-two members of the AG agreed to control the export of fifty-three 
human and animal pathogens, ten toxins, and seven types of equipment that 
could be diverted to the production of biological weapons.8 Since that time, 
the AG’s membership has expanded to forty-two countries (plus the European 
Commission), its control list for human and animal pathogens has increased to 
ninety microorganisms and nineteen toxins, and its equipment list has grown 
to include nine categories of items. The AG also has added a plant pathogens 
control list that as of early 2016 comprised eighteen microorganisms. Genetic 
elements and genetically modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences 
associated with the pathogenicity of any of the listed agents are included under 
8. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Australia Group, Occasional Paper (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 1993).
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the AG controls. Items not specifically on the AG control lists but for which 
there is information that they may be used for biological weapons purposes 
also are to be controlled by member states. In addition to implementing these 
“catch-all” controls, AG members also have agreed that if one member denies a 
specific export license, the others will consult with that member before deciding 
whether to approve the same transaction.9
After September 11 and the anthrax letters, international as well as multi-
lateral efforts to prevent the spread of biological weapons capabilities focused 
largely on terrorists and other nonstate actors. Following the 2001 attacks, 
the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolu-
tion (UNSCR) 1373, which, among other things, obligated all UN member 
states to enhance information sharing on illegal transfers of biological and other 
potentially deadly materials that could be used by terrorists groups. No modal-
ities were provided, however, for implementing this commitment. Three years 
later, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1540, committing 
all UN member states to enact and enforce laws and other measures against the 
spread of biological and other weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, 
including controls on related materials, equipment, and technology, to terrorists 
or other nonstate actors. Under this resolution, UN members are required to 
report to a dedicated UN committee on the measures they have taken or intend 
to take to implement these obligations. As of December 2014, 173 member 
states had submitted implementation reports; however, most of the measures 
reported were in the nuclear or chemical fields.10
Another initiative targeted against terrorist acquisition of biological and 
other weapons is the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this program, which was created in June 
2002, the G8 industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) committed to raise up to 
$20 billion over ten years to fund activities aimed at preventing terrorists or the 
states that support them from gaining access to weapons, material, and infor-
mation that could be used in biological or other weapons of mass destruction. 
Much of the Global Partnership’s initial work was focused on the former Soviet 
Union, where it funded over four thousand research projects and related activ-
ities aimed at redirecting former Soviet scientists, including biological weapons 
9. Although the AG’s focus remains national chemical and biological weapons programs, in 2014 
it acknowledged the risk of diversion to nonstate actors, agreeing that members should consider 
the possibility of terrorist acquisition prior to approving the export of any AG-controlled item. 
See “The Australia Group,” 2007, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html.
10. For the most recent implementation report, see Oh Joon, “Letter Dated 31 December 2014 
from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 
(2004) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2014/958, United Nations Secu-
rity Council, December 31, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol 
=S/2014/958.
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scientists, toward sustainable civilian activities.11 In May 2011, partly because of 
delays in meeting its original financial goal, the G8 decided to extend the Global 
Partnership beyond its original ten-year mandate. The G8 also agreed to expand 
membership in the initiative and to broaden efforts in certain priority areas, 
including redirecting former biological and other weapons scientists, assisting in 
implementation of UNSCR 1540, and working to secure dangerous pathogens 
and improve laboratory biosafety. Although Russia was ousted from the G8 fol-
lowing its annexation of Crimea in 2014, the twenty-eight remaining members 
of the Global Partnership appear committed to pursuing this broader agenda.12
In the years immediately after September 11, the United States and ten 
other countries also launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which 
seeks to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery means, 
and related dual-use material to both state and nonstate actors of proliferation 
concern. Although countries like China, Iran, and North Korea view the PSI as 
a violation of international law protecting freedom of the seas, 103 countries, 
including Russia, the Republic of Korea, and many major international shipping 
nations, have endorsed the PSI and committed to abide by its founding princi-
ples: not to transfer proliferation-related items to countries of concern; to coop-
erate in searches of suspected cargoes on their own vessels or aircraft or on other 
vessels passing through their territory; and to share information quickly on 
suspicious activities that might require interdiction. Participants are expected to 
put in place the necessary legal authorities and operational capabilities to meet 
these commitments. Although the PSI has no implementing body, twenty-one 
of the most active PSI members exchange information and coordinate activities 
through an operational experts group. In May 2013, on the tenth anniversary 
of the founding of the initiative, seventy-two PSI participants held a high-level 
political meeting where they pledged to hold PSI interdiction exercises on a 
more regular basis, promote treaties criminalizing the illegal trade in weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD)–related items; cooperate in enhancing interdiction 
capabilities; and expand the PSI’s global outreach to other countries.13 Infor-
mation is not available, however, about the PSI’s effect on the illegal trade in 
biological or other weapons-related materials.
11. G8 Global Partnership, “Assessment and Options for Future Programming: G8 Sum-
mit, May 26–27, 2011, Deauville, France,” Partnership for Global Security, http://www 
.partnershipforglobalsecurity-archive.org/Official%20Documents/G-8%20Global%20 
Partnership/620201181141AM.html.
12. Bonnie D. Jenkins, “The Future Role of the G-8 Global Partnership: Combatting Weapons 
of Mass Destruction,” Policy Analysis Brief, Stanley Foundation, June 2010; “The United States 
Chairmanship of the Global Partnership in 2012,” U.S. Department of State, n.d., http://
www.state.gov/t/isn/gp2013/; and United Kingdom, “2010 to 2015 Government Pol-
icy: Weapons Proliferation,” May 8, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
2010-to-2015-government-policy-weapons-proliferation/2010-to-2015-government 
-policy-weapons-proliferation#appendix-5-global-partnership.
13. Arms Control Association, “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a Glance,” updated 
June 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.
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INTERPOL, the 190-member-country international police organization, 
also became active on bioterrorism after the September 11 terrorist attacks 
and anthrax letters. INTERPOL’s initial work focused largely on assisting 
member states to prepare for and respond to a possible bioterrorist attack. In 
2006, however, under the auspices of its Bioterrorism Prevention Program, 
the organization launched a new project aimed at helping countries assess, 
strengthen, and enforce their criminal and administrative laws in order to pro-
hibit the acquisition, transfer, and use of biological materials for hostile pur-
poses. Little is known, however, about the impact of this effort or of a more 
recent INTERPOL project known as Operation S3OMMET. Under this 2014 
initiative, INTERPOL announced it would work with relevant regional and 
international partners to raise awareness among law enforcement and public 
health officials, biosafety officers, and research scientists in key regions on how 
to improve the safety and security of dual-use biological materials and related 
emerging technologies so as to prevent unauthorized access to them by those 
who would do harm.14
Governments have not been the only actors pursuing initiatives to address 
bioterrorism concerns. In the mid-2000s, a number of gene synthesis companies 
in the United States and Europe voluntarily began to screen customer orders 
to ensure that the sequences they supplied could not be used to make high-risk 
pathogens. But the industry did not adopt a uniform approach, and some com-
panies declined to screen at all. To help develop a more harmonized approach, 
various gene synthesis companies began to form international consortiums to 
promote greater attention to biosecurity, including the screening of orders. In 
2009, the International Association Synthetic Biology, a group of largely German 
commercial suppliers, developed a proposal for screening sequence and customer 
orders. A few months later, five of the world’s leading gene synthesis companies 
formed a competing group, the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, to 
develop their own screening proposal. In the end, both industry groups, which 
together represented most of the global gene synthesis industry, agreed to screen 
all synthetic gene orders they received not only for sequences of known high-risk 
pathogens but also for reasonably similar sequences that could be used to create 
novel pathogens. They also agreed to screen all customers who placed orders, to 
maintain sequence and customer records, and to report potentially problematic 
orders to the appropriate authorities.15 Some suppliers wanted to go even further, 
arguing that their voluntary approach should be replaced by mandatory screening 
requirements in Europe and the United States, backed by strong enforcement 
action, but this has not been done.16
14. For information on INTERPOL’s bioterrorism activities, see “CBRNE,” INTERPOL, n.d., 
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/CBRNE/Biological-threats.
15. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Double Edged DNA: Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis,” Issues 
in Science and Technology XXVI (3) (Spring 2010): 23–32, http://issues.org/26-3/tucker-2/.
16. Jeremy Minshull and Ralf Wagner, “Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis,” letter to the 
editor, Nature Biotechnology 27 (9) (September 2009): 800–801.
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International Measures Governing the Handling and Use of Biological Agents
One of the earliest international initiatives focused on the handling of dual-use 
biological materials was the publication of a laboratory biosafety manual by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1983. This manual provided guidance 
for WHO member states on physical containment principles, technologies, and 
practices to prevent unintentional exposure to or release of biological materi-
als. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters, WHO began to address 
the issue of intentional biological threats, releasing in 2006 a separate volume 
on laboratory biosecurity, including guidance for the protection, control, and 
accountability of biological materials.17 As the word implies, the guidance in 
these documents was not binding on WHO member states.
In parallel with its work on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, WHO also 
began to examine the risks and opportunities of advances in the life sciences 
for global health security under a broader project on responsible life sciences 
research. In a report published in 2010, WHO recommended investing in three 
pillars that promote public health—research excellence, ethics, and laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity—and provided a self-assessment questionnaire for 
public health officials, laboratory managers, and scientists to use to evaluate 
their strengths and weaknesses in these areas. This approach was premised on 
the belief that one of the most effective ways of preparing for deliberately caused 
disease is to strengthen public health measures for natural and accidental disease 
outbreaks. It also reflected the view that individual countries were in the best 
position to determine how to promote the safety and security of their biological 
research activities. The latter was a departure for the organization, which had 
previously issued international guidelines on both biosafety and biosecurity for 
member states.18
Like WHO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) also has played a role in encouraging international harmonization 
of guidelines and regulations related to the handling of biological materials. In 
1986, for example, the OECD issued a handbook on Recombinant DNA Safety 
Considerations for industrial, agricultural, and environmental applications.19 In 
2001, the OECD began to link various government, industry, and academic 
facilities that store, test, or use biological materials into a global exchange net-
work of what it called biological resource centers (BRCs). To facilitate the 
sharing of biological agents among its members, the OECD also developed 
17. For the biosafety manual, see World Health Organization, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 
3rd ed. (Geneva: WHO, 2004), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/
WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/. For the biosecurity guidance, see World Health Orga-
nization, Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance (Geneva: WHO, 2006), http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf.
18. World Health Organization, Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security: A 
Guidance Document (Geneva: WHO, 2010), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
HSE_GAR_BDP_2010_2/en/.
19. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recombinant DNA Safety Con-
siderations (Paris: OECD, 1986), http://www.oecd.org/sti/biotech/40986855.pdf.
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and issued biosecurity guidelines to prevent unauthorized access to the culture 
collections and other biological resources of the BRCs, including procedures for 
risk assessment and management, personnel security and training, and material 
controls. As with many of the other multilateral initiatives, the OECD’s efforts 
apply only to its members—thirty-four as of early 2016—and are nonbinding.20
CURRENT STATE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, a wide range of laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines 
have been adopted in an effort to prevent biological materials, equipment, 
or information from causing harm. For many years, most of these measures 
focused on ensuring domestic implementation of the BWC’s prohibitions on 
biological weapons development and possession, trying to prevent the spread 
of biological weapons to other countries, or promoting the safe handling and 
use of biological materials. After September 11 and the anthrax letters, many of 
these measures were broadened to address concerns that terrorists or other non-
state actors might seek to acquire or use biological weapons (see Table 2). An 
unprecedented debate also began among U.S. scientists, government officials, 
security experts, and other stakeholders over how to prevent the accidental or 
deliberate misuse of advances in life sciences research—a debate that continues 
to this day (see Table 3).
U.S. Restrictions on Biological Weapons Development and Possession
Although the United States played a major role in the conclusion of the BWC, it 
did not adopt domestic legislation outlawing the development and possession of 
biological weapons until nearly a decade and a half after the BWC entered into 
force. Under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, it became 
a crime to knowingly develop, produce, possess, or transfer biological agents, 
toxins, or delivery systems for use as a weapon or to assist another country or 
organization to do so. The act provided for criminal penalties against those who 
engage in prohibited activity but puts the burden of proof on the government 
to demonstrate hostile intent.21
In April 1996, following the Oklahoma City bombings and the acquisition 
of plague cultures through the mail by a member of the neo-Nazi organization 
Aryan Nation, the U.S. Congress expanded the scope of activities subject to 
criminal penalties under the 1989 law from knowingly developing, producing, 
20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Best Practice Guidelines 
on Biosecurity for BRCs (Paris: OECD, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/sti/biotech/38778261.pdf.
21. Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–298, 104 Stat. 201 (1990). 
For a discussion of the legislation, see Ronald Atlas, Kenneth I. Berns, Gail Cassell, and Janet 
Shoemaker, “Preventing the Misuse of Microorganisms: The Role of the American Society for 
Microbiology in Protecting against Biological Weapons,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 24 (3) 
(February 1998): 273–280.
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possessing, or transferring biological agents for use as a weapon to attempts, 
threats, or conspiracies to do so. The April 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, which was the source of this broader criminalization pro-
vision, also expanded the definition of a biological agent to include genetically 
engineered products or components thereof.22
After September 11 and the anthrax letters, the United States modified 
these provisions on criminalization still further, making it a crime under the 
October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act for anyone to knowingly possess any bio-
logical agent, toxin, or delivery system not reasonably justified for prophylactic, 
protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purposes. Of note, the bill shifted 
the burden of proof—instead of the government having to prove hostile intent, 
suspects now had to demonstrate that their activities were for peaceful purposes. 
The bill also criminalized the possession, transportation, or receipt of particu-
larly dangerous pathogens, known as select agents, by certain restricted persons, 
including illegal aliens, individuals from terrorist-list countries, fugitives from 
justice, and individuals who are under indictment or have been imprisoned for 
more than one year.23 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Directorate, a law enforcement unit dedicated to prevent-
ing terrorism and proliferation involving biological and other weapons of mass 
destruction, was given responsibility for enforcement.24
As U.S. government biodefense research expanded following September 
11, U.S. government agencies also put in place formal review processes to 
ensure that their biological research activities complied with the BWC. Since 
2001, for example, the Department of Defense (DOD) has required all biolog-
ical-based activities, which include both classified and unclassified biodefense 
research, conducted at DOD facilities or funded by DOD to be reported annu-
ally to the department and reviewed by its BWC Compliance Review Group. 
Dual-use research does not, however, receive special attention in the DOD 
BWC compliance review process.25
22. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996), sec. 511. The CDC role in implementing this legislation builds upon the responsibility 
given to CDC in 1971 to help ensure the safety of interstate shipments of infectious substances. 
See Gerald Epstein, “Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions 
among the Research Community, Industry and the National Security Community,” Critical 
Reviews in Microbiology 27 (4) (2001): 323.
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107–56 (2001), sec. 817.
24. Ten Years after 9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks: Protecting against Biological Threats: Hearing 
before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One 
Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Vahid Majidi, Assistant 
Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation), http://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/ten-years-after-9/11-and-the-anthrax-attacks-protecting 
-against-biological-threats.
25. Although the DOD BWC compliance policy dates to 1992, a more structured process does 
not appear to have been adopted until 2001. Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, 
Ensuring Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, Meeting Report (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, July 2009).
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In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its own 
compliance review policy for DHS biological research, development, and acqui-
sition activities, including biodefense research. The DHS policy covers both 
treaty compliance and compliance with U.S. regulatory requirements, including 
those involving biosafety and the security of select agents. In contrast to DOD, 
DHS explicitly scrutinizes certain categories of dual-use biological research to 
ensure that it complies with U.S. BWC obligations. Under the DHS approach, 
all relevant projects must be submitted to the DHS Compliance Assurance Pro-
gram office, which is responsible for reviewing and assessing the projects prior 
to their consideration by the department’s Compliance Review Group (CRG). 
The CRG, which is chaired by the deputy secretary of DHS, must approve all 
such projects before they can proceed.26
U.S. Measures to Control Access to Biological Materials, Equipment, and 
Information
For many years, the United States has undertaken a number of initiatives to try 
to prevent countries of proliferation concern from acquiring material, equip-
ment, and information that could be used to develop and produce biological 
weapons. Under the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA), the 
Commerce Department began in the 1980s to require a license for the export 
of several categories of biological agents, including genetically modified agents. 
Following revelations that U.S. and other Western companies had supplied 
dual-use chemical and biological materials and equipment to Iraq’s weapons 
programs, the United States expanded its dual-use export controls under Exec-
utive Order 12735 and the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. Among 
other things, these 1990 measures extended U.S. export controls to dual-use 
chemical and biological equipment and technology as well as to any other pro-
posed export that might be related to the acquisition or use of chemical or 
biological weapons. Today the biological provisions of the Commerce Control 
List include human, plant, and animal pathogens and toxins controlled by the 
AG, select agent pathogens, and genetic elements for those controlled agents 
and toxins. Consistent with the AG, the United States also controls the export 
of nine types of dual-use equipment that could be used to handle biological 
agents. Members of the AG and other countries that have entered into agree-
ments to control dual-use biological material and equipment are exempt from 
the EAA’s licensing requirement.27
26. Ibid.
27. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Executive Order 12735: Chemical and Biologi-
cal Weapons Proliferation,” November 16, 1990; and White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
“Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative,” December 13, 1990. For current 
information on U.S. dual-use biological export controls, see Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Industry and Security, “Chemical and Biological Controls,” updated January 2014, http://
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/ 
16-policy-guidance/product-guidance/122-chemical-and-biological-controls.
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Under the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department has similar 
authority to control military biological exports. Biological agents and biologi-
cally derived substances specifically developed, configured, adapted, or modified 
for the purpose of increasing their capability to produce casualties in human 
beings or livestock, to degrade equipment, or to damage crops are controlled 
as “significant military equipment” on the United States Munitions List and 
require a license for export. Both the State and Commerce Departments also 
control the transfer of specific technical information necessary for the devel-
opment, production, or use of biological weapons to foreign nationals in the 
United States under a category called “deemed exports.”
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United 
States sought to prevent the proliferation of former Soviet nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons capabilities to other countries through the Nunn-Lu-
gar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Threat reduction activities 
related to biological weapons have continued since that time and, after Septem-
ber 11 and the anthrax letters, expanded from Russia and other former Soviet 
republics to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. This multiagency U.S. 
effort involving the Defense, State, Energy, and Homeland Security Depart-
ments has dismantled former biological weapons facilities, redirected former 
weapons scientists from illicit to legitimate activities, secured collections of dan-
gerous pathogens, carried out biosafety and biosecurity upgrades at research 
laboratories, and provided biosafety and biosecurity training to scientists and 
other laboratory personnel. Many of these projects have been spearheaded by 
DOD, where biological threat reduction has grown from less than 10 percent 
of the threat reduction budget in the 1990s to more than 60 percent today. 
This growth is a reflection of the expansion of the CTR program’s biological 
mission, from preventing the spread of biological weapons capabilities from 
the former Soviet Union to promoting biological nonproliferation, biosafety, 
and biosecurity around the globe.28 Much of the proliferation threat from the 
former Soviet biological weapons program has been eliminated; however, resid-
ual concerns remain about Russia’s handful of still-secret military biological 
facilities and about the future of its nonmilitary biological facilities since Russia 
ended its participation in the CTR program in 2014.29
U.S. efforts to control access to dual-use biological materials, equipment, 
and information have not, however, been motivated only by proliferation 
concerns. Fears of bioterrorism also have led to efforts to tighten controls on 
domestic access to biological weapons–related items. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these is the select agent program, which was established by the April 
28. Mary Beth Nikitin and Amy Wolff, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues 
for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, R43143 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, June 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf.
29. Richard Weitz, “Russian-US Cooperative Threat Reduction beyond Nunn-Lugar 
and Ukraine,” Arms Control Association, July 2, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2014_0708/Features/Russian-US-Cooperative-Threat-Reduction-Beyond-Nunn-Lugar 
-and-Ukraine.
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1996 antiterrorism law to strengthen the security of biological agents that could 
pose a severe threat to human health. Regulations to implement the new law 
were published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
October 1996 and took effect in April 1997 and included:
• a select agent list of approximately forty human pathogens and toxins, 
including genetic elements and genetically modified organisms associ-
ated with those agents;
• a registration requirement for any facility that seeks to transfer or receive 
select agents, including certification to the CDC that the facility and its 
laboratories meet the requisite biosafety standards; and
• a disclosure obligation, including information from both the transferring 
and receiving facility on the type and amount of agent requested and 
the proposed use.30
After September 11 and the anthrax letters, the U.S. Congress extended 
these controls over facilities that transfer or receive select agents to cover facil-
ities that possess and use them as well, and added new personnel reliability and 
security requirements. Under the May 2002 Public Health Security and Bio-
terrorism Preparedness and Response Act, anyone who was to have access to 
select agents was now required to register with the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and undergo a Justice Department background check, 
known as a security risk assessment. The act also directed HHS to maintain 
a national database of registered facilities, persons, and the select agents they 
possess or are transferring and to conduct inspections of relevant facilities. Civil 
and criminal penalties can be imposed on facilities for failing to register or for 
transferring select agents to an unregistered facility. The May 2002 bioterrorism 
law also required the secretary of agriculture to establish parallel registration, 
security, record keeping, and inspection requirements to enhance the security 
of biological agents and toxins that could pose a severe threat to plants and 
animals.31 Final regulations to implement the May 2002 law were published in 
April 2005.32
These efforts to control access to dangerous pathogens came under harsh 
scrutiny in late 2008 after the FBI identified Bruce Ivins, a U.S. Army biode-
fense scientist, as the likely perpetrator behind the 2001 anthrax letters. This led 
30. The law exempted clinical specimens (i.e., patient blood or tissue) being transferred for diag-
nostic and verification purposes and certain toxins and vaccine strains of select agents. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “42 CFR 
Part 72: Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents,” Federal 
Register 61 (207) (October 24, 1996): 55190, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-10 
-24/pdf/96-27082.pdf.
31. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
188 (2002). The relevant sections of the conference report, H. Report 107–481, may be found 
in the Congressional Record 148 (66) (May 21, 2002): H2721–2724.
32. For the HHS regulations, see 42 CFR 73.12. For the USDA regulations, see 9 CFR 121.12 
and 7 CFR 331.
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to a variety of proposals for refining the select agent list, strengthening person-
nel reliability, and enhancing laboratory safety and security. In May 2009, for 
example, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which 
had been created in 2004 to advise the U.S. government on biosecurity issues, 
proposed reducing or stratifying the select agent list to focus on the agents of 
greatest concern. The NSABB also recommended more rigorous vetting of 
foreign nationals with access to such agents.33 In November 2009, the Working 
Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States, which had been 
established by President George W. Bush to review security at select agent facil-
ities, echoed the call for a reduced or stratified select agent list as well as better 
coordination of U.S. government inspections and better guidance on inventory 
management and recordkeeping. The working group also recommended iden-
tifying or establishing a federal entity to coordinate biosecurity oversight across 
all relevant U.S. government agencies.34
After entering office, President Barack Obama also created an interagency 
experts panel to provide advice on the select agent program and laboratory secu-
rity. In November 2010, the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) 
called for the removal of twenty-five agents and toxins from the select agent 
list and the creation of a separate list of eleven biological agents and toxins 
that posed the greatest risk, so-called Tier 1 agents. To strengthen personnel 
reliability, FESAP recommended modifying the security risk assessment process 
to better assess mental health, as well as providing guidance to facilities for 
conducting preaccess suitability and ongoing reliability assessments. Finally, to 
enhance physical security, FESAP called for the development of risk assessment 
guidance and cybersecurity standards.35
In October 2012, HHS and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued 
revised select agent regulations that reflected many of these recommendations. 
Three new viruses were added to the select agent list, and twenty-two other 
agents and toxins were removed; eleven of the remaining sixty-three select 
33. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Enhancing Personnel Reliability among 
Individuals with Access to Select Agents (Washington, D.C.: NSABB, May 2009), http://osp 
.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/NSABB%20Final%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29 
-09.pdf.
34. The Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States was established 
pursuant to Executive Order 13486, of January 9, 2009. See “Executive Order 13486 of Jan-
uary 9, 2009: Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the United States,” Federal Register 74 
(9) (January 14, 2009): 2289–2291, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-14/pdf/
E9-818.pdf. For the working group’s report, see Report of the Working Group on Strengthening the 
Biosecurity of the United States (Washington, D.C., 2009), http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/ 
legal/boards/biosecurity/Documents/biosecreportfinal102309.pdf.
35. “Executive Order 13546 of July 2, 2010: Optimizing the Security of Biological Select 
Agents and Toxins in the United States,” Federal Register 75 (130) (July 8, 2010): 39, 439–
442, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-08/pdf/2010-16864.pdf; and Federal 
Experts Security Advisory Panel, Recommendations Concerning the Select Agent Program 
(revised) (Washington, D.C., June 13, 2011), http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/
boards/fesap/Documents/fesap-recommendations-101102.PDF. The FESAP report was 
originally released November 2, 2010.
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agents and toxins were designated Tier 1 because they present “the greatest 
risk of deliberate misuse with the most significant potential for mass casualties 
or devastating effects to the economy, critical infrastructure, or public con-
fidence.”36 The revised select agent rules also established new personnel and 
physical security requirements for facilities with Tier 1 agents, including require-
ments for preaccess assessments and on-going monitoring of personnel with 
access to Tier 1 pathogens and toxins and for bolstering the use of barriers and 
intrusion detection devices. New guidance documents on personnel reliability 
and physical security were released along with the revised regulations.37 One 
important recommendation that the U.S. government did not implement was 
for the creation of a federal entity to coordinate biosecurity oversight across 
government agencies.
In December 2014, FESAP issued new recommendations on laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity38 in response to disclosures the previous summer of 
three other incidents involving select agents: the accidental exposure of some 
eighty-four CDC laboratory workers to live anthrax; CDC’s shipment of a 
relatively benign bird flu (H9N2) that had been contaminated with the highly 
lethal H5N1 influenza virus; and the discovery of vials of smallpox and other 
infectious agents that had been left in an unsecured storage area in an NIH 
lab for more than fifty years.39 To help prevent similar incidents in the future, 
FESAP recommended that HHS and USDA establish a review body to vali-
date the policies and protocols being used at select agent research facilities to 
inactivate, sterilize, and decontaminate hazardous biological materials. They 
also called for greater transparency in government reporting about laboratory 
incidents involving select agents and for a federal review to determine how many 
U.S. high-containment laboratories are needed for research on select agents.
In 2014, the most recent year for which data are available, 316 facilities and 
some eleven thousand individuals were approved to work with select agents.40 
But limited information is available from the U.S. government about the com-
pliance of these facilities and individuals with the select agent regulations, as 
the last U.S. government audits appear to have been done in 2006, when ten 
out of ten institutions subject to USDA regulations and eleven out of fifteen 
institutions subject to HHS regulations were found by their respective agen-
36. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “42 
CFR Part 73: Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins; Biennial Review,” Fed-
eral Register 77 (194) (October 5, 2012): 61084, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012 
-10-05/pdf/2012-24389.pdf.
37. For the full text of the select agent regulations, see ibid., 61084–61115.
38. Report of the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel, December 2014, http://www.phe 
.gov/s3/Documents/fesap.pdf
39. Dina Fine Maron, “CDC Botched Handling of Deadly Flu Virus,” Scientific American, 
July 11, 2014, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cdc-botched-handling-of-deadly 
-flu-virus/.
40. Lori J. Bane, Associate Director for Policy, CDC Division of Select Agents and Toxins, per-
sonal correspondence, November 14, 2014.
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cies to be in violation of at least one aspect of the select agent rules.41 A 2015 
investigation by a U.S. newspaper found that since 2003, HHS and USDA 
have cited more than one hundred laboratories for serious safety and security 
lapses. Of the labs subject to HHS oversight, seventy-nine have been referred 
for potential enforcement action, including nineteen who have been fined over 
$2.4 million. Since 2008, thirty-three labs have agreed to participate in perfor-
mance improvement programs after repeated failures to correct past biosafety 
and security problems or to comply with security requirements for working with 
the most dangerous select agents. For its part, USDA has conducted forty-eight 
investigations of laboratories subject to its oversight, and has levied fines of 
about $117,000.42
Even as controls on select agents were first being implemented, attention 
began to focus on the risk that advances in gene synthesis technology might 
make possible the creation of select agents de novo, without naturally occur-
ring nucleic acids or pathogens. In a report in 2006, the NSABB pointed to 
the global availability of gene synthesis suppliers, equipment, and reagents, 
as well as the diversity of practitioners, some of whom, such as high school 
students or engineers, had little exposure to biosafety rules. As noted earlier, 
although some commercial suppliers of gene sequences had begun to screen 
customer orders voluntarily, suppliers were uncertain about what actually fell 
within U.S. select agent laws and regulations. In order to prevent synthetically 
derived sequences from evading the select agent rules, the NSABB recom-
mended that the U.S. government develop a process for commercial suppliers 
to use to determine which sequences to screen for—select agent or other-
wise—as well as standards and practices for how to screen, including record 
keeping. The NSABB also called for the development and implementation of 
universal standards and practices for screening sequences and, longer term, 
an effort to replace the existing list of specific select agents with a broader 
sequence-based system focused on the predicted properties of select agents.43
41. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General Southeast Region, Audit Report: 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Evaluation of the Implementation of the Select Agent 
or Toxin Regulations Phase II, Report no. 33601-3-AT (Washington, D.C.: Department of Agri-
culture, January 2006), http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-3-AT.pdf; and Department 
of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Summary Report on Universities’ 
Compliance with Select Agent Regulations, A-04-05-02006 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Health and Human Services, June 2006), http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region4/40502006 
.pdf. A 2014 audit of over 4,000 facilities found 27 instances in which select agents had not 
been registered properly. But the audit focused only on inventory controls at U.S. government 
facilities. “FACT SHEET: Biosafety and Biosecurity in the United States,” December 16, 2014, 
http://www.cdc.gov/about/pdf/lab-safety/external-usg-wide-fact-sheet_bsat-safety-stand 
-down-and-summary-table_final_12-16-2014.pdf.
42. Alison Young and Nick Penzenstadler, “Inside America’s Secretive Biolabs,” USA Today, May 
28, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/05/28/biolabs-pathogens-location 
-incidents/26587505/.
43. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to 
the Synthesis of Select Agents (Washington, D.C.: NSABB, December 2006), http://osp.od.nih 
.gov/sites/default/files/resources/Final_NSABB_Report_on_Synthetic_Genomics.pdf.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S84
In October 2010, nearly four years after the NSABB report and a year after 
the International Association Synthetic Biology and the International Gene Syn-
thesis Consortium had issued their own proposals for sequence and customer 
screening, the U.S. government released its guidance for commercial gene syn-
thesis suppliers. This guidance was weaker than the approaches recommended 
by the NSABB and by the gene synthesis industry because it was both voluntary 
and focused on screening customer orders only for sequences associated specifi-
cally with select agents. In addition to outlining steps for sequence and customer 
screening, the guidance also addressed record keeping and screening software.44
U.S. Measures Governing the Handling and Use of Biological Agents
U.S. efforts to govern the handling and use of biological agents date to the 
mid-1970s, when concerns about the potential risks of the new field of biotech-
nology led the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to create the Recombinant 
DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) to develop guidelines for the conduct of 
recombinant DNA (rDNA) research. The first NIH Guidelines for Research 
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines) classified agents into 
four risk groups based on their relative pathogenicity for healthy human adults 
and outlined the combination of laboratory practices, equipment, and facili-
ties appropriate both for the agent and the proposed experiment. For rDNA 
research, this was supplemented by the use of biological barriers to limit the 
infectivity of a vector for specific hosts or to limit its dissemination and sur-
vival in the environment. Specific plant and animal pathogens also had special 
handling conditions. Research facilities were required to establish institutional 
biosafety committees (IBCs) to ensure that their rDNA work was done in accor-
dance with the NIH Guidelines, which applied to all rDNA research conducted 
at institutions in the United States and abroad that received funds from NIH 
for such research. The guidelines were voluntary but included penalties for 
noncompliance, including the loss of NIH funds for rDNA research.45
In 1984, HHS published the first consolidated U.S. safety guidelines for 
laboratory activities involving biological agents. Like the NIH Guidelines, 
the HHS manual on Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 
(BMBL) categorizes agents into four classes or levels depending upon their 
degree of risk and describes the combination of laboratory practices, equipment, 
and facilities recommended to work safely with those agents. Following the 
adoption of the select agent program, the BMBL began to address laboratory 
biosecurity as well, providing guidance not only on risk assessment methodol-
44. Department of Health and Human Services, Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of 
Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services, 
October 2010), http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/
syndna-guidance.pdf.
45. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, NIH Guidelines 
for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines) (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services, November 2013), http://osp.od.nih 
.gov/sites/default/files/NIH_Guidelines_0.pdf.
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ogy but on physical security, personnel management, inventory controls, and 
other aspects of a laboratory biosecurity plan. As with its approach to biosafety, 
the BMBL’s biosecurity guidance links the protection of biological agents and 
toxins to their identified risks. Although the BMBL represents voluntary guide-
lines, U.S. government contractors and grantees as well as facilities registered to 
work with select agents are required to follow the manual.46
Beginning in 1993, the U.S. Army published detailed guidance for Army 
personnel, contractors, and subcontractors engaged in biological research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities under its biological 
defense program.47 Shortly after the anthrax letters, the Army began to develop 
a biological surety program to strengthen the safety and security of dangerous 
pathogens and toxins at its facilities. This “biosurety” program, which was 
not implemented formally until 2008, was based on those the military already 
had developed for nuclear and chemical weapons and focused on laboratory 
safety, physical security, agent accountability, and personnel reliability.48 Later 
that year, following the anthrax charges against Army biodefense scientist Ivins, 
the DOD Inter-Service Council for Biosecurity and Biosafety recommended 
upgrading background-check requirements, increasing supervisor review and 
control of after-hours access to labs, and improving control over select agent 
stocks at DOD facilities.49 A Defense Science Board task force on biosafety and 
biosecurity further recommended improving the video monitoring of DOD labs 
and better coordination of laboratory inspections.50
U.S. government regulations also address other aspects of the handling of 
biological agents in an effort to prevent harm to human beings, animals, plants, 
and the environment. For example, under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates commercial research 
and development with new microorganisms and any other microorganisms the 
agency determines are for a significant new use.51 Under USDA regulations, 
46. Department of Health and Human Services, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009); and Frank 
Gottron and Dana A. Shea, Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for 
Congress, CRS Report for Congress, R40418 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Ser-
vice, May 2009), 8.
47. Department of the Army, “Biological Defense Safety Program, Technical Safety Require-
ments,” Army Regulation 385-69, December 31, 1993, at 32 CFR 627.
48. Department of the Army, “Biological Surety,” Army Regulation 50–1, July 28, 2008.
49. Government Accountability Office, High Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for 
Oversight Is Needed, GAO-09-574 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 2009), http://www 
.gao.gov/new.items/d09574.pdf.
50. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Program (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Defense, May 2009), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA499977.pdf.
51. New microorganisms are defined as microorganisms “formed by the deliberate combination 
of genetic material originally isolated from organisms of different taxonomic genera.” 15 USC 
2604 and 40 CFR 725.3. See also Fact Sheet—Microbial Products of Biotechnology: Final Regu-
lations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (n.d.).
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any person wishing to import, move, or release genetically engineered plant 
pests must either provide notification to or obtain a permit from the USDA.52
Research Oversight
U.S. efforts to oversee consequential biological research have followed two 
distinct but parallel tracks. The first track involves the NIH Guidelines, which in 
addition to prescribing physical containment requirements for rDNA research 
also originally prohibited six types of rDNA experiments because of biosafety 
concerns.53 In the late 1970s, these restrictions in the guidelines began to be 
loosened as concerns about the risks of biotechnology research diminished. By 
1982 the research prohibitions in the original guidelines had been eliminated, 
and local IBCs and institutional review boards (IRBs; for overseeing human 
subject research) had replaced the RAC as the primary authority for reviewing 
and approving most rDNA research.54 Serious questions, however, began to be 
raised about compliance with these local review requirements after a 2004 study 
of U.S.-based IBCs revealed that scores of U.S. biotechnology companies had 
no IBC registered with NIH and that many of the university and other IBCs 
that were registered either did not meet or issued blanket approvals rather than 
review each research project separately.55
By comparison, oversight of the rDNA experiments that remain subject to 
NIH approval under the NIH Guidelines has been made even stronger since 
2001. Under the May 2002 bioterrorism bill, any rDNA experiment that must 
be approved by NIH also has to be approved by the secretary of HHS or 
the administrator of USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service if it 
involves agents or toxins on either department’s select agent list. From January 
2006 to December 2013, ninety-one of these so-called restricted experiments 
were proposed to HHS, of which thirty-one were approved. The remaining 
sixty experiments, all of which involved inserting drug-resistance traits into 
select agents, were not approved because they posed potentially serious risks 
to public health and safety. In recent years there have been four violations of 
the legal requirements governing HHS’s oversight of restricted experiments, 
two of which resulted in civil penalties ranging from $40,000 to $1 million.56 
52. 7 CFR 340.3 and 7 CFR 340.4.
53. Donald Fredrickson, The Recombinant DNA Controversy, a Memoir: Science, Politics, and the 
Public Interest, 1974–1981 (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 2001), 39–40.
54. Epstein, “Controlling Biological Warfare Threats,” 338; and Ronald M. Atlas, “Applicabil-
ity of the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee Paradigm for Reducing the Threat of 
Bioterrorism” (draft paper prepared for the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project, April 
2002), 3–8.
55. Sunshine Project, Mandate for Failure: The State of Institutional Biosafety Committees in an 
Age of Biological Weapons Research (Austin: Sunshine Project, October 2004).
56. Jacinta Smith, Denise Gangadharan, and Robbin Weyant, “Review of Restricted Experiment 
Requests, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2006–2013,” Health Security 13 (5) (2015): 307–316.
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No comparable data on restricted experiment proposals or violations have been 
released by USDA.
In April 2010, the NSABB proposed expanding the NIH Guidelines to 
include synthetic biology, which seeks to create novel biological structures with 
predictable properties and functions, either by reengineering existing organisms 
or genomes or assembling nonliving biological components in novel ways. Gov-
ernance of this evolving field, as the NSABB noted in a report at the time, is 
challenging because of the difficulty of predicting the biological characteristics 
of the new systems being created; the pace of developments and volume of infor-
mation being produced; the diversity of disciplines involved, which includes the 
life sciences, engineering, chemistry, materials science, and computer modeling; 
and the variety of practitioners, not only university and high school students but 
also private sector and amateur scientists. Despite these challenges, the NSABB 
recommended establishing oversight arrangements for research with synthetic 
nucleic acids, including by explicitly adding synthetic nucleic acids to the NIH 
Guidelines.57 NIH implemented the NSABB recommendation two years later, 
expanding the guidelines to include research with synthetic nucleic acid mole-
cules even if rDNA techniques are not used.58
The second track of U.S. efforts to oversee biological research has focused 
on the security concerns raised by dual-use research. This began in the summer 
of 2001 when, spurred in part by the Australian mousepox experiment, the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel chaired by Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology professor Gerald Fink to examine the risks from 
dual-use biotechnology research. The Fink Committee, as it came to be called, 
issued its aptly titled report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, in 
October 2003. The report emphasized that dual-use biotechnology research has 
the capacity “to cause disruption or harm, potentially on a catastrophic scale”; it 
also pointed out that U.S. and international measures governing such research 
do not address this security threat, in that they focus largely on biosafety and 
nonproliferation.
To help fill this gap, the Fink Committee proposed adding seven types 
of what it called “experiments of concern” to the research oversight process 
already in place under the NIH Guidelines. Specifically, it called for local IBC 
review followed, if necessary, by further review by the RAC or the NIH director, 
of any experiment that would
• demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective;
• confer resistance to antibiotic or antiviral agents;
57. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related 
to Synthetic Biology (Washington, D.C.: NSABB, April 2010), http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/
default/files/resources/NSABB%20SynBio%20DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20%282%29_6-7 
-10.pdf.
58. For information on the NIH Guidelines, see National Institutes of Health, “Biosafety: 
NIH Guidelines,” n.d., http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/biosafety/nih 
-guidelines.
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• enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent;
• increase the transmissibility of a pathogen;
• alter the host range of a pathogen;
• enable evasion of diagnosis or detection methods; or
• enable weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.
The committee noted that these seven types of experiments represented 
current dangers but that additional types of experiments would need to be 
included in the future to address other potential threats. The committee also 
acknowledged that although oversight would initially apply only to research 
at facilities that were subject to the NIH guidelines, eventually all relevant 
research, including in private-sector and non-NIH government facilities, should 
be included in the oversight process. To help address these issues, the Fink 
Committee proposed the establishment of a national science advisory board 
for biodefense within HHS.59 The creation of the NSABB in March 2004 was 
a direct result of the Fink Committee’s recommendations.
In June 2007, after more than three years of deliberations, the NSABB 
released a proposed framework for oversight of dual-use research. The NSABB 
proposal differed from the Fink Committee’s approach in a number of important 
respects. First, the NSABB focused on dual-use research of concern (DURC), 
a subset of dual-use research. Second, rather than have IBCs make the initial 
determination of whether research was of potential concern, the NSABB pro-
posed that researchers do this themselves. Third, the NSABB proposed a single 
criterion for researchers to use to determine if their work met the definition of 
DURC—whether, based on current understanding, the research can be “rea-
sonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could 
be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, 
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material.”60 
Finally, recognizing that determining the applicability of this criterion would 
be a “subjective and challenging task,” the NSABB outlined seven broad cate-
gories of experimental effects (similar to the Fink Committee’s experiments of 
concern) that, if generated by the proposed research, might mean that it met 
the DURC criterion and thus required further institutional review or oversight 
by an IBC or other expert review committee. 61
Although the NSABB initially recommended applying its oversight frame-
work to federally funded research only, it later shifted position, arguing in its 
59. National Research Council, Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent 
the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php 
?record_id=10827.
60. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual 
Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Informa-
tion (Washington, D.C.: NSABB, 2007), http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/
Framework%20for%20transmittal%20duplex%209-10-07.pdf; emphasis added.
61. Ibid.
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April 2010 synthetic biology report that dual-use oversight should be uniform 
and comprehensive, extending beyond the life sciences and academia to include 
other practitioners, including in the private sector.62 The NSABB was silent, 
however, on the issue of classified biodefense research, which was explicitly 
outside the scope of its responsibilities. This was especially unfortunate, given 
that the biodefense research program then being developed by DHS for its new 
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center fell squarely within 
the Fink Committee’s seven experiments of concern.63
Even before the NSABB oversight framework was released publicly in June 
2007, CDC put in place a DURC review process for its own research activities, 
known as intramural research, based on the NSABB’s recommendations.64 
NIH did the same in 2008.65 In presentations at a biosafety conference in 
2010, NIH researchers reported that a retrospective review of NIH intramural 
research projects approved between 2004 and 2009 showed that only a small 
subset of biomedical research raised potential dual-use concerns in their initial 
screening (101 of 3,444 in one study and 12 of 734 in another) and that further 
expert review determined that only two projects actually met the definition of 
DURC. The NIH review also concluded that dual-use review was “easily incor-
porated” into existing IBC review processes and resulted in “no additional cost” 
and “no adverse effects” on research progress.66 A CDC review of manuscripts 
from its intramural research program found that from 2007 to 2010, only 
eight manuscripts raised DURC questions, out of an annual publication rate of 
approximately 3,000 articles. After additional review, all eight manuscripts were 
published substantively “as is.”67 Neither NIH nor CDC has released informa-
tion since 2010 on the impact of their respective DURC review processes.
Despite CDC and NIH’s efforts to review their own intramural research, 
nearly five years passed before a broader policy for U.S. government DURC 
was announced. The release of this policy in March 2012 was a direct result of 
controversy over two external or extramural research projects on the H5N1 
62. NSABB, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology.
63. Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense Crossing the Line,” 
Politics and the Life Sciences 22 (2) (2003): 2–3, http://www.politicsandthelifesciences.org/
Contents/Contents-2003-9/PLS2003-9-22-02-0002.pdf.
64. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Oversight and Clearance of Dual-Use Research 
of Concern, CDC-SM-2007-01 (Atlanta, GA: CDC, March 23, 2007).
65. Megan C. Morgan, “Evaluation of a First-Tier Screening Program for Dual-Use Research of 
Concern” (presentation at the 53rd Annual Biological Safety Conference, Denver, October 5, 
2010), http://www.absaconference.org/pdf53/Session11-Morgan.pdf.
66. Morgan, “Evaluation of a First-Tier Screening Program for Dual-Use Research of Con-
cern”; and Molly S. Stitt-Fischer, “The National Institutes of Health Dual Use Screening Pro-
gram: A Proposed Quality Control Model” (presentation at the 53rd Annual Biological Safety 
Conference, Denver, October 5, 2010), http://www.absaconference.org/pdf53/Session11 
-Stitt-Fischer.pdf.
67. Mary D. Ari, PhD, “CDC’s Implementation of Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC) 
Oversight” (presentation at the Council of Science Editors Annual Meeting, Seattle, May 20, 
2012), http://www.resourcenter.net/images/cse/files/2012/annmtg/handouts/03_ari_3.pdf.
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influenza virus, which had been funded by NIH without considering dual-
use concerns. The new policy, which applied only to unclassified life sciences 
research funded or conducted by the U.S. government, drew heavily on both 
the Fink Committee’s original experiments of concern and the NSABB’s sin-
gle, proposed criterion for assessing research. But it also narrowed the NSABB 
approach by adding a requirement that the research also had to involve one of 
fifteen specific agents or toxins from the select agent list. Agencies were ordered 
to review their intramural and extramural research projects to determine whether 
they involved DURC and, if so, to conduct risk-benefit assessments, develop 
risk mitigation plans, and provide periodic reports on the projects.68
Concern over the H5N1 influenza research projects (one of which had 
been conducted by Dutch scientists)—including questions about the scientific 
value of the research, the biosafety conditions under which the projects were 
undertaken, and the dissemination of the results—continued to draw attention 
to the adequacy of U.S. oversight policies for dual-use research. But instead of 
examining the effectiveness of its approach more broadly, the U.S. government 
reacted in a piecemeal way, outlining first, in February 2013, a complicated 
and lengthy process by which HHS would make future funding decisions on 
certain highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) research proposals. These 
studies were called “gain of function” (GOF) research, because they involved 
modifying already dangerous pathogens in order to increase their transmissi-
bility or pathogenicity or to alter their host range.69 Six months later, HHS 
extended the H5N1 funding review process to proposed experiments with the 
H7N9 influenza virus after twenty-two scientists published letters in Nature and 
Science seeking support for conducting GOF experiments with H7N9, which 
had emerged earlier in the year in China and was believed to pose a potential 
pandemic risk.70
Despite, or perhaps because of these piecemeal steps, the controversy over 
GOF research did not end. In early 2014, other work to create new virus strains 
similar to the 1918 pandemic virus and to enable the H1N1 virus to evade 
the human immune system produced an outcry among scientists that spread 
quickly to the mainstream press in the United States and abroad.71 Concerns 
68. United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Con-
cern (Washington, D.C., March 2012), http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/us 
-policy-durc-032812.pdf.
69. Department of Health and Human Services, A Framework for Guiding U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for 
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses That Are Transmissible among 
Mammals by Respiratory Droplets (Washington, D.C.: HHS, February 2013), http://www.phe 
.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf.
70. David Malakoff, “Critics Skeptical as Flu Scientists Argue for Controversial H7N9 Studies,” 
Science 341 (6146) (August 9, 2013): 601; and Harold Jaffe, Amy P. Patterson, and Nicole Lurie, 
“Extra Oversight for H7N9 Experiments,” Science 341 (6147) (August 16, 2013): 713–714.
71. See, for example, “Scientists Condemn ‘Crazy, Dangerous’ Creation of Deadly Airborne Flu 
Virus,” Guardian, June 11, 2014; and Steve Connor, “Exclusive: Controversial US Scientist 
Creates Deadly New Flu Strain for Pandemic Research,” Independent, July 1, 2014.
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about the safety and security of research with highly dangerous pathogens were 
reinforced at the same time by the reports that had come to light regarding the 
mishandling of anthrax, the H5N1 influenza virus, and smallpox at government 
research facilities. 
In July 2014, a call to curtail experiments involving the creation of 
potential pandemic pathogens pending further analysis and the convening of 
a meeting to discuss such work was issued by eighteen leading scientists and 
quickly endorsed by nearly three hundred other U.S. and foreign scientists 
and policy experts. Other scientists more positively disposed toward GOF 
research also endorsed the meeting idea.72 In October 2014, the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy responded, announcing that the U.S. 
government would undertake a deliberative process on GOF experiments with 
help from the NSABB and the National Research Council of the National 
Academies in order to develop a new U.S. policy on the conduct and funding 
of such research. The White House also announced a funding pause on new 
GOF studies involving influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 
and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) viruses and encouraged those 
already conducting such work to pause voluntarily until a new policy was in 
place.73 (The White House subsequently lifted the pause on five MERS and 
two influenza studies.74)
Over the next eighteen months, the NSABB held five meetings and com-
missioned both a risk-benefit assessment study and an analysis of the ethical 
issues surrounding GOF research.75 The former, a $1 million, one-thousand-
page contractor effort, was highly criticized by opponents of GOF research on 
technical and analytical grounds, including the study’s failure to calculate the 
probability of an enhanced pathogen escaping the laboratory, a key variable in 
the calculation of pandemic risk. The study was also criticized for bias, in that 
80 percent of the scientists interviewed about the benefits of GOF research were 
either scientists who conducted such research or representatives of agencies 
72.“Cambridge Working Group Consensus Statement on the Creation of Potential Pandemic 
Pathogens (PPPs),” July 14, 2014, http://www.cambridgeworkinggroup.org/; and “Scientists 
for Science,” Virology Blog, July 28, 2014, http://www.virology.ws/2014/07/28/scientists 
-for-science/.
73. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative 
Process and Research Funding Pause on Selected Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, 
MERS and SARS Viruses: Frequently Asked Questions (Washington, D.C.: HHS, November 
2014), http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/gof-qanda.pdf.
74. Nell Greenfieldboyce, “NIH Allows Restart of MERS Research That Had Been Questioned,” 
Shots: Health News from NPR, December 18, 2014, at http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
2014/12/18/371686933/nih-allows-restart-of-mers-research-that-was-deemed-too-risky.
75. Joseph Kanabrocki, “NSABB Working Group Report: Preliminary Findings and Draft Rec-
ommendations,” PowerPoint presentation for National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 
meeting January 7–8, 2016, http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB%20Working 
%20Group%20-%20Preliminary%20Findings%20and%20Draft%20Recommendations.pdf.
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who funded it.76 The ethical study, by comparison, provided a comprehensive, 
balanced discussion of the various ethical and decision-making frameworks of 
potential relevance to evaluating GOF proposals. Of particular importance was 
the study’s suggestion that a federal advisory body like the NSABB might play 
a role in reviewing GOF research.77
The NSABB also prepared a draft working paper outlining its initial 
thoughts on a conceptual approach for reviewing proposed GOF studies. As 
in its earlier work on dual-use research, the NSABB recommended focusing 
GOF oversight on research that posed the greatest risk, or what it called GOF 
studies of concern. The working paper also recommended that oversight for 
these studies should be incorporated into existing policy frameworks (for exam-
ple, the NIH Guidelines and the oversight policies for DURC), although it 
recognized that additional oversight might be required in some cases.78 The 
National Research Council contributed to the NSABB’s work by holding two 
symposiums to elicit input from the scientific community and the public. The 
first symposium focused on scientific and technical questions related to the 
conduct of risk-benefit assessments of GOF research. The second symposium 
examined possible oversight policies, including the recommendations in the 
draft NSABB working paper.79 
In the coming months, the NSABB is expected to refine and elaborate its 
proposed recommendations and, ultimately, submit a final report to the federal 
government for consideration. But whether the policy that emerges from the 
U.S. deliberative process is effective will depend not only on the details of the 
oversight arrangements but also on the policy’s scope: whether it applies only 
to U.S. government funded research, as currently planned, or is used to review 
all relevant research in the United States and, eventually, other countries.
In parallel with the 2014 announcement of the GOF deliberative process, 
the U.S. government also finally released in September 2014, nearly seven years 
after the NSABB oversight proposal, a new policy on the responsibilities of 
research institutions involved in dual-use research. Like the 2012 policy for 
76. Gryphon Scientific, “Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,” Draft Final 
Report, December 2015, http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/Risk%20and%20Benefit 
%20Analysis%20of%20Gain%20of%20Function%20Research%20-%20Draft%20Final%20Report 
.pdf. For public comments on the report, see http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/
bls/agenda/Compiled%20Public%20Comments%20to%20NAS%20and%20NSABB%20-%20
ALL%20COMMENTS.pdf.
77. Michael J. Selgelid, “Gain of Function Research: Ethical Analysis,” White Paper, n.d., http://
osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/Gain-of-Function%20Research%20Ethical%20Analysis%20
White%20Paper%20by%20Michael%20Selgelid_0.pdf.
78. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, “Working Paper Prepared by the NSABB 
Working Group on Evaluating the Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Studies to Formulate Pol-
icy Recommendations,” Deliberative Draft, December 23, 2015, http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/
default/files/NSABB%20WG%20Working%20Paper%20on%20Gain-of-Function%20Studies 
%2012-23-2015_0.pdf.
79. For the report from the first symposium, see http://dels.nas.edu/Workshop-Summary/
Potential-Risks-Benefits-Gain/21666?bname=bls; for information on the second symposium, see 
http://dels.nas.edu/Upcoming-Event/Gain-Function-Research-Second/AUTO-9-61-70-Q.
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U.S. government DURC, this new policy applies only to unclassified research 
involving one or more of fifteen specific select agents and toxins. But it also is 
somewhat broader than the 2012 policy in that it covers relevant research at any 
institution (e.g., government, academic, or private) that receives federal funding 
for life sciences research, even if the U.S. government is not funding the project 
in question. However, both research at institutions that do not receive federal 
funds for life sciences research and classified research (including for biodefense) 
remain outside the scope of U.S. DURC oversight requirements.
Under the new U.S. policy, the DURC review process begins only after 
a research project has secured funding. The primary investigator (PI) is 
expected to initiate the DURC review and to work with an institutional 
review entity (IRE), such as an IBC, to conduct a risk-benefit assessment 
and, if appropriate, to develop a draft risk mitigation plan. The IRE is 
responsible for making the final determination of whether the research is 
DURC, for ensuring that an appropriate risk mitigation plan is in place, 
and for reviewing both the plan and the research on an annual basis. The 
institution where the DURC is to be carried out is responsible for notifying 
the appropriate U.S. government agency of the DURC determination and 
for submitting the draft risk mitigation plan for final approval. Although the 
policy is not legally based, failure to comply could lead to the loss of existing 
or future U.S. government research funds.80
Current State of Governance in Other Countries
As in the United States, other countries also have adopted measures aimed at 
preventing the spread of biological weapons capabilities or ensuring the safety 
and security of work involving dangerous biological materials (see Table 4). 
For example, EU members have enacted national legislation to implement the 
BWC’s prohibitions against biological weapons development and acquisition. 
Since 1994, EU member states also have approved various regulations and 
directives designed to control exports of dual-use items, including those related 
to biological weapons. These regulations and directives are binding on every EU 
country. Under European Council regulation (EC) 3381/94, member states 
must require a license for exports outside the EU of biological materials, equip-
ment and technical information. Consistent with AG controls, the regulation 
also includes a “no-undercut” policy as well as catch-all controls requiring the 
licensing of any nonlisted dual-use items that pose a proliferation risk. Biological 
agents adapted for use in war and equipment specifically designed for biolog-
ical weapons purposes are controlled by EU members under the EU’s list of 
common military goods, which is based on the munitions list of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the multilateral export control regime that succeeded the Cold 
80. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research 
of Concern (Washington, D.C., September 24, 2014), http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/ 
Documents/durc-policy.pdf.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S94
War–era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, known as 
CoCOM.81
Because of concerns about the safety of genetic modification techniques 
generally and genetically modified foods specifically, EU member states also 
have enacted directives on the safe handling of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). For example, under European Council Directive 90/219/EEC, 
facilities must notify their relevant government authority before using GMOs 
for the first time. The notification must include a description of the proposed 
work, an assessment of the risks to human health and the environment, and 
other information depending on the characteristics of the organism and level of 
containment required. Activities requiring Level 3 containment or above may 
not proceed without prior government approval.82 Under European Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC, before deliberately releasing a GMO into the environ-
ment, a manufacturer or importer must submit a notification to the government 
containing a full assessment of the risks to human health, animal health, and 
the environment of the proposed release, as well as detailed information on the 
GMO, the release plans and receiving environment, and monitoring and control 
arrangements. Final authority for approving the release resides with the European 
Commission.83 Violators may be subject to penalties within EU member states.
81. (EC) 3381/94 established the general principles while Annex I of 94/942/CFSP contained 
the original control lists. These were later combined in (EC) 1334/2000. The most recent 
version of which is (EU) 388/2012. See “Report to Parliament and the Council on the Imple-
mentation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 Setting Up a Community Regime for 
the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology, October 2000 to May 2004,” 20 
September 2004, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118993 
.pdf; and German Ethics Council, Biosecurity—Freedom and Responsibility of Research (Berlin: 
Deutscher Ethikrat, May 2014), http://www.ethikrat.org/files/opinion-biosecurity.pdf. For 
the EU munitions list, see “Common Military List of the European Union,” Official Journal 
of the European Union, C 90 (March 27, 2013): 1–37, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:090:0001:0037:EN:PDF.
82. “Council Directive of 23 April 1990 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-or-
ganisms (90/219/EEC),” Official Journal of the European Union, L 117 (May 8, 1990): 1–14, 
http://www.biosafety.be/GB/Dir.Eur.GB/Cont.Use/90.219/TC.html. For the amended ver-
sion, 2009/41/EC, see “Directive 2009/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 May 2009 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms (Recast),” Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union, L 125 (May 21, 2009): 75–97, http://www.biosafety.be/ 
PDF/2009_41_EN.pdf?REQUEST=Seek-Deliver&COLLECTION=oj&SERVICE=eurlex 
&LANGUAGE=en&DOCID=2001l073p0032. The EU’s “Level 3” corresponds to biosafety 
level (BSL) 3 in the United States. The biosafety level refers to the level of physical containment 
required for work with biological materials in a laboratory facility. The levels are designated in 
ascending order from BSL-1 (the lowest) to BSL-4 (the highest), with each level building on 
the previous level’s requirements for laboratory practices, safety equipment, and facility design.
83. “Council Directive of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (90/220/EEC),” Official Journal of the European Union, L 117 
(May 8, 1990): 15–27, http://www.biosafety.be/GB/Dir.Eur.GB/Del.Rel./90.220/TC.html. 
For the amended version, 2001/18/EC, see “Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 12 March 2001on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC,” Official Jour-
nal of the European Union, L 106 (April 17, 2001): 1–39, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource 
.html?uri=cellar:303dd4fa-07a8-4d20-86a8-0baaf0518d22.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
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Members of the EU also have taken steps to prevent terrorists or other 
nonstate actors from acquiring or using biological agents, although few of these 
measures are legally binding. One exception is the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA), which was adopted by the UK after September 
11 and the anthrax letters to control access to biological agents that could be 
used against human beings, including genetic elements and genetically modified 
organisms associated with those agents. Under the ATCSA, facilities that possess 
or plan to possess these agents are required to notify the government and com-
ply with any reasonable security enhancements imposed after an inspection of 
the site. They also are required to comply with official requests for information 
about security at their facility and about persons who have or are proposed to 
have access to controlled pathogens. Background checks may be conducted by 
the government, which may also deny individuals access to controlled patho-
gens or facilities where they are located. In 2007, following a foot-and-mouth 
disease outbreak in Surrey, the ATCSA was extended to include animal patho-
gens as well.84
In 2009, EU members adopted an action plan that, among other things, 
seeks to block unauthorized access to biological and other materials of concern. 
In 2011, members agreed on a common control list for each type of material, 
including a list of high-risk biological agents. EU members also agreed to imple-
ment the European Committee for Standardization’s Laboratory Biorisk Man-
agement Standard, which provides guidance for handling biological materials in 
laboratories and other facilities based on WHO biosafety and biosecurity guide-
lines.85 EU member states have released relatively little information about their 
implementation of these measures, which are politically but not legally binding.
Outside of the EU, Canada has strengthened its domestic controls on access 
to biological materials, which originally applied only to human pathogens and 
toxins that were being imported into the country. In 2009, the Canadian Par-
liament adopted the Human Pathogens and Toxin Act, which revised Canadian 
law to include all risk group 2, 3, and 4 human pathogens and toxins, natural 
84. Statutory Instrument 2001 (no. 4019), Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, http://
www.opbw.org/nat_imp/leg_reg/uk/ATCS.pdf. The 2007 revisions are described in “Patho-
gens and Toxins Guidance ATCSA 2001 Schedule 5 Order 2007 Notes (SI 2007/929)” (n.d.),
http://www.cf.ac.uk/osheu/resources/Schedule%205%20pathogens%20and%20toxins%20
list%20and%20guidance.pdf. 
85. Commission of the European Communities, “On Strengthening Chemical, Biologi-
cal, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union—an EU CBRN Action Plan,” 
COM(2009) 273 final, June 24, 2009, http://www.bureaubiosecurity.nl/dsresource?type=pdf 
&disposition=inline&objectid=rivmp:243738&versionid=&subobjectname; European Commis-
sion, “Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan, May 2012,” n.d., 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/securing 
-dangerous-material/docs/eu_cbrn_action_plan_progress_report_en.pdf; and European Com-
mittee for Standardization, Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard, CWA 15793:2008 (Brus-
sels: European Committee for Standardization, February 2008), http://www.absa.org/pdf/
CWA15793_Feb2008.pdf. 
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or synthetic, whether imported or acquired domestically.86 Under recent imple-
menting regulations, no person may possess, produce, store, transfer, release, or 
dispose of high-risk pathogens or toxins without first obtaining a government 
license. Before a license is issued, facilities are required to designate a bio-
safety officer, and facilities conducting scientific research are required to sub-
mit information on their biosafety and biosecurity procedures. The regulations 
also require that any person entering a facility area handling so-called security 
sensitive biological agents (a subset of risk group 3 and 4 human pathogens) 
must have a security clearance or be accompanied by someone with a clearance. 
Compliance monitoring through inspections, as well as enforcement actions, 
are also authorized under the law and regulations.87
Progress in strengthening oversight of dual-use life sciences research has 
been more limited, with few countries outside the United States having adopted 
research oversight policies. One that has is Denmark, which in June 2008 passed 
an Act on Securing Specific Biological Substances, Delivery Systems and Related 
Materials. Under the Danish law, dual-use research that can be used directly for 
the development of biological weapons or for offensive purposes is considered a 
type of technology and thus a “related material.” The law applies to all entities, 
public or private, military or civilian, that handle, use, or store controlled items 
and thus combines in a more robust way the U.S. laws on select agents and 
U.S. policies on DURC.88
To ensure prompt implementation of the Danish biosecurity law as well 
as the flexibility to respond to future technological developments, both the 
lists of controlled items and the basic requirements were included in a separate 
executive order, which was adopted in 2009. Under the executive order, any 
entity that possesses or plans to possess a controlled item must obtain a license 
from the Danish biosecurity agency, known as the Center for Biosecurity and 
Biopreparedness (CBB). Such entities must prepare a vulnerability assessment 
and security plan for their site and appoint a biosafety officer to keep records 
of all individuals given access to controlled biological materials. Once licensed, 
they must maintain an inventory of all controlled items and submit to inspec-
86. “Risk group” refers to the classification of a biological agent based on its ability to cause 
disease. The risk groups are designated in ascending order from risk group 1, for agents that pose 
no or low risk, to risk group 4, for agents that pose the greatest risk.
87. “Human Pathogens and Toxin Regulations,” Canada Gazette 148 (25) (June 21, 2014), 
http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2014/2014-06-21/html/reg2-eng.php.
88. For a detailed discussion of the Danish approach, see Centre for Biosecurity and Bioprepared-
ness, An Efficient and Practical Approach to Biosecurity (Copenhagen: CBB, 2015), https://
www.biosikring.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_FILER/Biosecurity_book/An_efficient_and 
_Practical_approach_to_Biosecurity_web1.pdf.
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tions by Danish authorities. Violations may result in fines, imprisonment, or 
criminal penalties.89
Because the 2009 executive order could not address every implementation 
detail, other CBB documents provide additional guidance, including on the 
process for evaluating research proposals for dual-use concerns. Scientists are 
responsible for conducting the initial screening of their research to determine 
whether it has dual-use potential, using a CBB questionnaire. If one or more 
of eleven possible research outcomes applies, the scientist must contact CBB 
so the agency can decide how possible risks should be addressed and whether a 
license or other form of regulation, such as restrictions on participation in the 
research or on its publication, is required.90
In November 2008, Israel adopted similar biosecurity legislation in 
response to a report by the Steering Committee on Biotechnological Research 
in an Age of Terrorism (COBRAT), a special committee created by the Israeli 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Israeli National Security Council. 
Although modeled on the U.S. Fink Committee, COBRAT went much further 
than its American counterpart, recommending mandatory research oversight in 
all facilities, including government laboratories, as well as controls on dangerous 
biological agents.91
Under Israel’s 2008 Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents 
Act, the Ministry of Health must authorize any institution or laboratory that 
possesses, conducts research on, or works with certain listed biological agents. 
Such institutions and laboratories are required to establish an institutional com-
mittee of scientists, security experts, and safety personnel to review research pro-
posals for biosafety and biosecurity, including dual-use concerns. The law also 
provides for the creation of an interdisciplinary council to advise the Ministry 
of Health on the formulation and implementation of the necessary operating 
rules and regulations, including those governing the list of controlled agents, 
the proceedings of the institutional committees, and related issues.92
89. Danish Ministry of Health and Prevention, “Act on Securing Specific Biological Substances, 
Delivery Systems and Related Materials,” ACT no. 474, June 17, 2008, https://www.biosikring 
.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_FILER/Biosikringsdokumenter/ACTNo474of17 
_June2008.pdf; and Danish Ministry of Health and Prevention, “Executive Order on Securing 
Specific Biological Substances, Delivery Systems and Related Materials,” EO no. 981, October 
15, 2009, https://www.biosikring.dk/499/.
90. Centre for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness, An Efficient and Practical Approach to Biosecu-
rity, 115–16, 239–43; and Centre for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness, “Questionnaire about 
Dual Use Research of Concern for Companies, Project Managers, Etc.,” August 18, 2015, 
https://www.biosikring.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_FILER/UK_forms_and_guides/
Questionnaire_about_dual-use_research_of_concern.pdf.
91. Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, Biotech-
nology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 
and Israel National Security Council, 2008).
92. David Friedman, “Israel,” in Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences: Strengthening the 
Prohibition of Biological Weapons, ed. Brian Rappert (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 2010), esp. 82–85, http://press.anu.edu.au?p=51221.
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Recommendations also have been made in two other countries for research 
oversight policies, but as of early 2016 these have yet to be adopted. The first 
is the Netherlands, where in 2007 a biosecurity working group established by 
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) proposed a code 
of conduct to prevent life sciences research from contributing to activities pro-
hibited under the BWC or to any other misuse of biological agents or toxins. 
The KNAW Code of Conduct for Biosecurity outlines rules related to a number 
of issues, including screening for dual-use research as well as access to facilities 
involved in such work.93 However, following the 2011 controversy over U.S. 
and Dutch research with the H5N1 virus, a separate KNAW biosecurity com-
mittee concluded that the code was not sufficient for addressing dual-use con-
cerns and recommended the creation of an independent Biosecurity Advisory 
Committee for Research in the Life Sciences to advise researchers and institu-
tions on relevant research proposals, including the conduct of the research and 
possible publications restrictions. The Dutch government has not responded 
to the biosecurity committee’s report, although it has organized biosecurity 
workshops and published an online biosecurity questionnaire for use by those 
working with dangerous pathogens.94
The second country is Germany, where in 2014 the German Ethics Council 
released a report with two key research oversight recommendations. The first 
was to establish a national German code of conduct for responsible research to 
sensitize researchers and others to the risk of misuse and to define what consti-
tutes responsible conduct. The council emphasized that the code should apply 
to all public and private facilities doing relevant research and should obligate 
researchers, after suitable training, to screen and monitor their own research for 
DURC. The council also recommended the adoption of legislation providing 
a legal definition of dual-use research of concern, establishing a national-level 
dual-use research interdisciplinary commission with the authority to vote on 
research projects, and requiring researchers to consult with the commission 
prior to and during the conduct of their research. To give its recommendations 
greater force, the council proposed that German funding bodies fund proposals 
only from researchers who comply with the code of conduct and have received 
a positive vote by the dual-use research commission. The council also proposed 
that the German government take the lead in trying to secure adoption of a 
similar dual-use research policy within the EU and of the code and definition 
of dual-use research of concern on a global level.95 The German government 
has not responded to the Ethics Council report.
93. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), Biosecurity Working Group, A 
Code of Conduct for Biosecurity (Amsterdam: KNAW, 2008).
94. As described in German Ethics Council, Biosecurity—Freedom and Responsibility of Research 
(Berlin: German Ethics Council, 2014), http://www.ethikrat.org/files/opinion-biosecurity.pdf. 
Copies of the KNAW reports are available at https://www.knaw.nl/en/news/publications/
improving-biosecurity. 
95. German Ethics Council, Biosecurity—Freedom and Responsibility of Research, http://www 
.ethikrat.org/files/opinion-biosecurity.pdf. 
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Other Measures for Managing Biological Technology
While many proposals have been made over the last decade and a half for man-
aging the risks from biological technology, two types warrant particular atten-
tion. The first, scientific codes, have received strong support from across the 
scientific community. The second, restrictions on the dissemination of sensitive 
dual-use research information, have elicited the opposite reaction, notwith-
standing periodic debates over the need for a mechanism to that effect.
Codes for Scientists
Since the collapse of the BWC protocol negotiations, significant attention has 
focused on the utility of scientific codes in helping address dual-use concerns. 
Much of this discussion has focused on ethical codes, which describe personal 
and professional standards; or on codes of conduct, which provide guidelines 
on appropriate behavior. Little attention, however, has been given to codes of 
practice, which outline enforceable procedures and rules.96
At the suggestion of the United States, codes of conduct were a major topic 
of discussion in the BWC intersessional meetings in 2005. One important non-
governmental participant was the InterAcademy Panel (IAP), a global network 
of science academies from around the world. The IAP proposed five principles 
to guide the development of codes of conduct: (1) awareness of dual-use risks; 
(2) safe and secure laboratory practices; (3) education and information about 
dual-use laws, regulations, and policies; (4) the accountability of scientists to 
report violations of rules against using biology for destructive purposes; and (5) 
the promotion of these principles within oversight arrangements for dual-use 
research and publications. More than seventy member academies have endorsed 
the IAP approach.97
In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society has supported codes of conduct 
both as a means of raising consciousness among scientists about the potential 
for misuse of their work and as a focal point for training and education on 
relevant national and international obligations. The society also has argued for 
more-detailed codes of practice built on existing biosafety laws and regulations 
to help prevent the misuse of scientific research.98 Codes of conduct also have 
been proposed by national science bodies in Germany and the Netherlands. 
96. Brian Rappert, “Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the Threat from Biological 
Weapons,” Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Briefing Paper no. 13 (2nd ser.), 
University of Bradford, Bradford, UK, September 2004, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/
briefing/BP_13_2ndseries.pdf.
97. The InterAcademy Panel, “IAP Statement on Biosecurity,” November 7, 2005, http://
www.interacademies.net/10878/13912.aspx; and Jo L. Husbands, “Engaging the International 
Scientific Community in Issues of Dual-Use Research: The Experience of the NAS and the Inter-
Academy Panel” (presentation at The Advancement of Science and the Dilemma of Dual Use: 
Why We Can’t Afford to Fail, Warsaw, November 9–10, 2007).
98. See, for example, Royal Society, The Roles of Codes of Conduct in Preventing the Misuse 
of Scientific Research (London: Royal Society, June 2005), https://royalsociety.org/~/media/
Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2005/9645.pdf.
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In the United States, the NSABB outlined the possible elements of a code of 
conduct in an appendix to its 2007 dual-use oversight framework, identifying 
the most important individual, group, and institutional responsibilities at each 
stage of the research process. The NSABB later developed an education module 
on dual-use research for scientists and a toolkit to help scientists formulate and 
disseminate a code of conduct.99
Professional associations such as the International Union of Microbiological 
Societies and the American Society of Microbiology (ASM) also have adopted 
codes of conduct. These codes have several common features: a commitment 
to biosafety, support for the ethical conduct of research, and opposition to the 
misuse of microbiology, including for development of biological weapons.100 All 
of these codes, however, are general in nature.
The same is true of the only government code known to have been devel-
oped and promulgated for scientists and scientific institutions, the British code 
of ethics. This voluntary code, which was issued in 2007, contains a small num-
ber of broad principles: rigor, honesty, and integrity; respect for life, the law, and 
the public good; and, responsible communication, listening, and informing.101
Restrictions on the Dissemination of Information
Since September 11 and the anthrax letters, both scientists and scientific journals 
have been concerned about the possibility of restrictions on the dissemination 
of scientific findings that could have security implications. U.S. scientific jour-
nals have tried to forestall government-imposed restrictions, offering instead to 
establish their own review processes for handling sensitive manuscripts. The first 
to do so were the scientific journals published by the ASM, which in August 
2002 began to require peer reviewers to inform journal editors of any manu-
script that contained information on methods or materials that might be mis-
used or pose a threat to public health or safety. The manuscripts would then be 
reviewed by the editor in chief in consultation with the ASM publications board. 
A few months later, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences quietly 
adopted a similar process for reviewing manuscripts involving select agents. 
This was followed in January 2003 by a statement from thirty journal editors 
and scientists calling for the development of processes for considering the secu-
rity implications of proposed manuscripts and, where necessary, for modifying 
99. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, Enhancing Responsible Science—Consider-
ations for the Development and Dissemination of Codes of Conduct for Dual Use Research (Wash-
ington, D.C.: NSABB, February 2012), http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/
COMBINED_Codes_PDFs.pdf.
100. Australian Society for Microbiology, “Ethics” (1979), http://www.theasm.org.au/
about-us/governance/; American Society for Microbiology, “Code of Ethics” (2005), http://
www.asm.org/index.php/governance/code-of-ethics; and International Union of Microbiolog-
ical Societies, “Code of Ethics” (2008), http://www.iums.org/index.php/code-of-ethics.
101. United Kingdom, Government Office for Science, Rigour, Respect and Responsibility: A 
Universal Ethical Code for Scientists (London: Government Office for Science, September 2007), 
http://virtualbiosecuritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/UK-ethical-code.pdf.
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or refraining from publishing papers whose potential harm outweighed their 
potential benefits. None of these initiatives, however, included guidance for 
reviewers on how to identify information that constituted a potential threat.102
In 2005 the limits of the journal editors’ approach was put to the test when 
research involving the 1918 H1N1 virus was submitted to Science for publica-
tion. The NSABB was asked for its opinion and recommended publishing the 
paper after adding information on the public health benefits of the research. 
However, Donald Kennedy, Science’s editor in chief, later made clear that unless 
the paper had been classified he would have proceeded with publication, irre-
spective of the NSABB’s recommendation.103 Michael Osterholm, an NSABB 
member at the time, subsequently regretted the NSABB decision, arguing that 
if the reconstructed H1N1 virus had escaped the lab it could have caused a 
1918-like pandemic, contrary to the NSABB’s original assessment.104
In 2011, the NSABB again was asked for publication advice, this time 
on the work involving the construction of modified H5N1 viruses capable of 
respiratory transmission in mammals. But instead of supporting full publication, 
the NSABB recommended redacting methodological and other experimental 
details that could enable the modified viruses to be recreated and used to cause 
harm.105 The NSABB also called for an international meeting of experts to 
discuss H5N1 research policy. Although WHO quickly organized the meeting, 
the participants were, as Osterholm later noted, from the “involved influenza 
research community, telling us what they should and shouldn’t be allowed to 
do” based on their own self-interest.106 The WHO experts group concluded 
that trying to limit access to the complete manuscripts would pose insurmount-
able practical problems, though it acknowledged the potential value of develop-
ing a mechanism for controlling access to other dual-use research information 
in the future.
After the WHO meeting, the U.S. government asked the NSABB to recon-
sider the two H5N1 manuscripts, which had been edited at the request of 
NIH to clarify the public health benefits of the research and the laboratory 
safety measures taken with the virus. Given what was in effect a choice between 
publishing the full manuscripts or none at all, the NSABB voted unanimously 
in one case and 12–6 in the other for publication. Paul Keim, another former 
102. As discussed in Elisa Harris and John Steinbruner, “Scientific Openness and National Secu-
rity after 9-11,” CBW Conventions Bulletin (67) (March 2005): 1–6.
103. Donald Kennedy, “Better Never than Late,” Science 310 (5746) (October 14, 2005): 195.
104. Michael T. Osterholm to Amy Patterson, April 12, 2012, https://labs.fhcrc.org/cbf/
Papers/H5N1_docs/Osterholm_Letter_April_2012.pdf.
105. For a discussion of the handling of these manuscripts, see Biological Security: The Risk 
of Dual-Use Research: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
National Institutes of Health), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/2012-04-26-fauci 
-testimony-biological-security.
106. Osterholm to Patterson.
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NSABB member, later commented that disinterested parties needed to be part 
of the process, as scientists could not be expected to assess the risks of their 
research on their own. Osterholm was more scathing, charging that the NSABB 
was continuing to “kick the can down the road” instead of figuring out how to 
manage DURC and its dissemination.107
Following the H5N1 controversy, NIH agreed to explore the feasibility of 
a mechanism for restricting access to sensitive dual-use information. This appar-
ently was done as part of the review process that led to the U.S. government 
policies for oversight of DURC.108 But rather than a mechanism for controlling 
access, NIH instead developed guidance for communicating DURC respon-
sibly, including points for institutions and researchers to consider in assessing 
the risks and benefits of communicating their work. The guidance included 
an option for restricting access to sensitive information, but was silent on how 
institutions and researchers should do this.109
ASM journal editors also have acknowledged the difficulties of identifying 
and handling dual-use research information. In 2013–2014 the journals used 
the new U.S. government DURC policy to review several HPAI gain of func-
tion manuscripts. They concluded that determining whether an experiment 
meets the U.S. government definition of DURC is a judgment call and thus 
problematic for journal editors and IBCs. Presumably the same is true, but to 
an even greater extent, for researchers. In an unprecedented step, the editors, 
two of whom had served on the NSABB, called in April 2014 for the creation 
of a federal advisory board similar to the RAC to provide a more organized 
approach to managing DURC and its dissemination.110
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
Governments have traditionally viewed the risks posed by advances in the life 
sciences as a biosafety matter involving legitimate scientists or as a prolifera-
tion problem focused on national biological weapons programs. The former 
is reflected in the variety of international and national measures governing the 
handling and use of biological agents, such as the WHO biosafety manual, the 
107. Brendan Maher, “The Biosecurity Oversight,” Nature 485 (7399) (May 24, 2012): 431–
434; and Osterholm to Patterson.
108. Kathryn Harris, Biosecurity and Biosafety Program, National Institutes of Health, personal 
correspondence, July 13, 2015.
109. National Institutes of Health, Tools for the Identification, Assessment, Management, and 
Responsible Communication of Dual Use Research of Concern: A Companion Guide to the United 
States Government Policies for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (Washing-
ton, DC: National Institutes of Health, September 2014), 48–53, http://www.phe.gov/s3/
dualuse/Documents/durc-companion-guide.pdf.
110. Arturo Casadevall, Terence S. Dermody, Michael J. Imperiale, Rozanne M. Sandri-Goldin, 
and Thomas Shenk, “On the Need for a National Board to Assess Dual Use Research of Con-
cern,” Journal of Virology 88 (12) (2014): 6535–6537.
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NIH Guidelines, and the EU’s biosafety regulations and directives. The latter is 
reflected in the conclusion of the BWC and in the subsequent multilateral and 
national efforts to deny proliferators access to biological materials, equipment, 
and related information through initiatives such as the Australia Group, export 
controls, and threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union.
However, the September 11 terrorist attacks and the anthrax letters pro-
foundly altered perceptions of the biological threat. To a greater degree than 
ever before, advances in the life sciences were viewed as not only a force for 
public good but also as a potential source of harm, particularly if used by ter-
rorists or other nonstate actors. In response, further governance efforts concen-
trated first on what could be achieved most quickly: preventing unauthorized 
access to the most dangerous biological agents and toxins. In the United States, 
this meant stronger laws (the 2001 PATRIOT Act and 2002 bioterrorism bill) 
criminalizing biological weapons development and possession and regulating 
individuals and facilities that possess or use select biological agents or toxins. 
Over time, it also meant trying to keep pace with advances in technology (by 
screening gene sequence orders and including synthetic nucleic molecules 
in the NIH Guidelines) and with the diffusion of technology (by expanding 
threat reduction programs beyond the former Soviet Union). Internationally, 
it resulted in similar measures aimed at controlling access to specified biological 
agents and toxins (e.g., the 2001 UK antiterrorism law) and at strengthening 
the security of biological agents and toxins (e.g., UNSCR 1540, the OECD’s 
biosecurity guidelines, and the INTERPOL bioterrorism prevention program).
On its own, each of the governance measures discussed in this chapter 
has a role to play in helping address one or more of the risks posed by dual-
use biological materials, equipment, and related information. Together, they 
help create a web of prevention—against accidental harm to human beings or 
the environment from the research activities of legitimate scientists, as well as 
against deliberate harm to human beings, animals, or plants from the acquisi-
tion and use of biological agents or toxins by national governments, terrorists 
or other nonstate actors.
Few question the harm that could be caused by a dedicated national biolog-
ical weapons program. A landmark 1993 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 
proliferation study, for example, estimated that 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 deaths 
could result in a metropolitan area like Washington, D.C., if one hundred kilo-
grams of anthrax spores were delivered as an aerosol from a single aircraft, under 
optimal dispersal and weather conditions, against an unprotected population.111
Of course deaths are not the only measure of harm. A proliferator’s use of 
biological weapons could also have a severe economic impact, depending on 
the agent used, the delivery conditions, and the availability of post-attack pro-
phylaxis. CDC scientists estimated in 1997 that the cost of an aerosol release 
111. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1993), 52–54.
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of anthrax spores in the suburbs of a major city could be up to $26.2 billion 
for every one hundred thousand people exposed. This estimate included only 
the casualty-related costs: lost future earnings, hospitalization, treatment, and 
so on. It did not include the decontamination or other costs associated with 
remediation after an attack or the broader costs to businesses and the economy 
from the disruption caused by the attack.112
No terrorist group or nonstate actor is known to have the technical and 
operational capabilities required to prepare and disseminate a large quantity of 
anthrax or other biological agent in an aerosol form. However, a more rudi-
mentary terrorist capability, like that considered in a 2004 U.S. Homeland 
Security Council scenario, would still result in significant human and economic 
costs. Under this scenario, five cities were attacked sequentially by a truck dis-
seminating an anthrax aerosol from a concealed, improvised spraying device. 
These attacks resulted in an estimated 328,848 exposures, 13,208 fatalities, and 
a further 13,342 casualties.113
Proliferators and terrorists are not the only potential sources of harm. 
Today, scientists have the capacity to resurrect extinct pathogens, as U.S. scien-
tists did in the case of the 1918 HIN1 virus, which is estimated to have killed 
some 50 million people during the 1918 pandemic. Scientists can also modify 
existing pathogens to make them more dangerous, as Dutch scientists did when 
they made the highly lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus capable of respiratory 
transmission in mammals. And they can use synthetic biology to create novel 
pathogens, either by reengineering existing pathogens or by assembling non-
living biological components in novel ways. The accidental release of such 
pathogens could lead to devastating losses, human and financial.
This last source of potential harm is now overtaking biological weapons 
proliferation and bioterrorism as a primary concern. The latest U.S. government 
report on arms control treaty compliance, released in June 2015, raises ques-
tions about biological research and development activities in Russia and Iran 
and about whether North Korea and Syria still consider the use of biological 
weapons as a military option. But no country is charged with maintaining a 
biological weapons program.114 Similarly, eight years after the Commission on 
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
predicted that a terrorist incident with biological weapons would likely occur 
by the end of 2013, concerns about bioterrorism gradually are being replaced 
112. A. F. Kaufmann, M. I. Meltzer, and G. P. Schmid, “The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist 
Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?” Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 3 (2) (April–June 1997): 83–94, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/3/2/97-0201.
113. Homeland Security Council, “Scenario 2: Biological Attack—Aerosol Anthrax,” in Planning 
Scenarios: Executive Summaries, 2–1–2 (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Council, July 
2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/hsc-planning-scenarios 
-jul04.htm#toc.
114. Department of State, “2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” June 5, 2015, http://
www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm#BWC2.
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by broader concepts of biorisk and health security, which bring together all 
biological threats, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in origin.115
What may now be the most serious source of potential harm is also subject 
to the weakest governance efforts. Despite more than a decade of meetings, dis-
cussions, and reports, little progress has been made toward achieving effective 
national measures or common international policies for overseeing the most 
consequential areas of dual-use life sciences research. Proposals have been made 
by the Fink Committee, the NSABB, and others in the United States, as well 
as by science and ethics bodies in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 
Germany to include all relevant research in the oversight process and to work 
to harmonize these policies internationally. But thus far, serious challenges have 
prevented these proposals from being adopted.
The first and perhaps most important challenge is from scientists them-
selves. Surveys from 2004 to 2007 found that U.S. scientists believe the select 
agent requirements pose a burden, affecting their ability to collaborate domes-
tically and internationally and increasing the time and financial costs of conduct-
ing research.116 Fears that scientists would abandon much-needed life sciences 
research, including work with select agents, led many scientists to endorse 
self-governance of life sciences research as an antidote to government regula-
tion. In the United States, this bias toward self-governance was a dominant fea-
ture of the NSABB’s initial recommendations for oversight of dual-use research. 
As Paul Keim later observed in response to criticism over the NSABB’s handling 
of the H5N1 manuscripts, “We’re accused of being the bad guys. But most of 
what we’ve done is to push back against harsher regulations.”117 Self-governance 
has also been at the heart of the limited policies that the U.S. government finally 
began to put in place in 2012, more than five years after the NSABB released its 
DURC oversight recommendations. Internationally, the challenge from scien-
tists can be seen in the priority given by WHO and other science bodies to rais-
ing awareness among life scientists through training and education in biosafety 
and biosecurity as well as through voluntary codes of conduct. Scientists, the 
argument went, were in the best position to assess the risk of their own work, 
and creating a culture of responsibility would facilitate this process.
115. In addition to predicting a biological weapons terrorist attack, the commission also empha-
sized that, given the technical expertise required to carry out a large-scale biological attack, 
the United States should “be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more 
concerned that biologists will become terrorists.” Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 
xv, 11; and Al Mauroni, “Gauging the Risk from Bioterrorism,” War on the Rocks, June 2014, 
http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/gauging-the-risk-from-bioterrorism/.
116. As discussed in M. Beatrice Dias, Leonardo Reyes-Gonzalez, Francisco M. Velosoa, and 
Elizabeth A. Casman, “Effects of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 2002 Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness Act on Select Agent Research in the United States,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 107 (21): 9556–9561.
117. Heidi Ledford, “Call to Censor Flu Studies Draws Fire,” Nature 481 (7379) (January 5, 
2012): 9–10.
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Many of the predicted negative effects on select agent research in the 
United States that helped encourage the push for self-governance of dual-use 
research do not seem to have been borne out. In a study published in 2010, 
investigators reported an overall stimulus to the field after 2002, based on an 
archival review of the number of Bacillus anthracis and Ebola virus “papers 
published per year, number of researchers authoring papers, and influx rate of 
new authors.” Even after controlling for the increased funding available for 
select agent research after 2001, the study found an increased propensity for 
U.S. authors to begin select agent research. Domestic collaborations on select 
agent research also increased, as did international partnerships with certain for-
eign research institutions. The most significant negative effect was a loss of 
efficiency: the number of research papers published per million dollars of select 
agent funding declined two- to five-fold.118
In the United States, effective governance of biotechnology research has 
also been challenged by the sharp increase in biodefense spending since Sep-
tember 11. Much of this funding has been for research on medical countermea-
sures to protect against deliberate biological attacks. At the NIH, for example, 
funding for civilian biodefense, which excludes military biodefense spending, 
increased from a modest $53 million in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to $6.72 billion 
(budgeted) for FY 2016.119 In the first few years of this expansion, from 2001 to 
January 2005, the number of NIH-funded research grants on anthrax, plague, 
and other potential biological warfare agents jumped to almost five hundred 
from thirty-three between 1996 and 2000.120 NIH also created a broad network 
of facilities to support its biodefense work, including eleven Regional Centers 
of Excellence (RCEs) for biodefense and emerging infectious diseases research; 
two national and twelve regional biocontainment laboratories for research 
requiring high levels of containment; and, most recently, fourteen Centers of 
Excellence for Translational Research (CETR) on medical countermeasures or 
related technology, which have replaced the RCEs. These laboratories were 
part of a broader expansion of U.S. high-containment laboratories from slightly 
118. Beatrice Dias et al., “Effects of the USA PATRIOT Act.”
119. Tara Kirk Sell and Matthew Watson, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2013–
FY2014,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 11 (3) (September 2013): 196–216; and Crystal Boddie, 
Tara Kirk Sell, and Matthew Watson, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2016,” Health 
Security 13 (3) (2015): 186–206. The figure of $6.72 billion for FY 2016 includes $1.37 billion 
for civilian biodefense and $5.35 billion for multiple hazard and preparedness line items previ-
ously included as civilian biodefense funding by Boddie, Sell, and Watson. 
120. Biodefense: Next Steps: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health 
Preparedness of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, United States Sen-
ate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, 109th Cong. (2005) (prepared statement of 
Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infections Diseases, National 
Institutes of Health), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg98930/pdf/CHRG 
-109shrg98930.pdf.
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more than four hundred in 2004 to an estimated fifteen hundred today.121 
Across the U.S. government, funding for civilian biodefense exceeded $90 bil-
lion from FY 2001 to FY 2016.122
Although the Fink Committee singled out biodefense research as raising 
particular dual-use concerns, neither the oversight approach it recommended 
nor that proposed by the NSABB clearly apply to military biodefense work, 
given the decision by both to link dual-use oversight only to academic or other 
institutions formally subject to the NIH Guidelines. One of the RCEs estab-
lished by NIH to conduct biodefense research, the Southeast RCE (SERCEB), 
initiated its own dual-use review process in 2004 for proposals it intended to 
fund. SERCEB identified two important issues in the course of its dual-use 
reviews: (1) that few investigators were aware of the dual-use problem; and 
(2) that technical expertise was critical to dual-use risk assessment. For these 
reasons, SERCEB cautioned against making researchers solely responsible for 
identifying whether their own research posed dual-use risks, noting that dual-
use awareness is highly subjective.123
Classified biodefense work was explicitly exempted not only from the scope 
of the NSABB’s work but, ultimately, from the dual-use oversight policies pro-
mulgated by the U.S. government in 2012 and 2014. According to the DOD, 
classified projects are not reviewed for dual-use concerns because the informa-
tion and products from those projects are controlled through the classification 
process.124 This reflects a profound misunderstanding of the purpose of dual-use 
review, which is to identify and mitigate risks not only from research results 
but from the research process itself. Whether DHS includes classified research 
projects in its dual-use review process is not known.
Finally, differing national perceptions of the risk from biotechnology 
research and of the importance of the issue in national policy have been a chal-
lenge to effective national and international governance efforts. For developing 
countries, the possible misuse of dual-use biological materials, equipment, or 
information is an abstract problem compared to the millions of people who 
die each year from naturally occurring diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, 
and hepatitis. For these countries, the global diffusion of dual-use technology 
121. As the Government Accountability Office has repeatedly pointed out, the exact dimensions 
of this laboratory expansion are not known, as only facilities that possess or transfer select agents 
must register with a government agency. Government Accountability Office, High Containment 
Laboratories: Assessment of the Nation’s Need Is Missing, GAO-13-466R (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, February 25, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652308.pdf. 
122. Sell and Watson, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2013–FY2014”; and Boddie, 
Sell, and Watson, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY 2016.” The $90 billion figure 
includes $78.82 billion reported in Sell et al. for FY 2001 through FY 2014; $3.05 billion 
reported in Boddie Sell, and Watson for FY 2015 and FY 2016; and $10.11 billion reported in 
Boddie, Sell, and Watson for FY 2015 and FY 2016 “multiple hazard and preparedness” line 
items previously included as civilian biodefense funding by the authors.
123. E. Megan Davidson, Richard Frothingham, and Robert Cook-Deegan, “Practical Experi-
ences in Dual-Use Review,” Science 316 (5830) (June 8, 2007): 1432–1433.
124. Walter B. Chase III, CTR OSD OUSD ATL, personal communication, June 19, 2015.
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is critical not only to their ability to fight indigenous disease threats but to 
their economic and technological development more broadly. Concerns about 
the potential impact of biotechnology research are seen as a preoccupation of 
Western countries and, in some cases, as a veiled excuse for technology denial.
While developing countries generally do not share the West’s dual-use con-
cerns, even developed countries have been slow to embrace effective governance 
of all aspects of the dual-use problem. Long-standing biosafety measures cou-
pled with efforts aimed at preventing national biological weapons programs 
were supplemented after September 11, 2001, with other initiatives designed 
to deny terrorists access to dangerous pathogens and toxins or equipment that 
could enable their production. National oversight of biotechnology and other 
research being conducted as part of the evolving revolution in the life sciences 
has been much more limited, emerging in only a few countries. Efforts to 
develop common international policies and procedures for overseeing the most 
consequential areas of dual-use research have been even less successful. This has 
been the case despite the fact that virtually every report by a scientific body on 
the dual-use biotechnology research issue over the past decade has underscored 
the international dimension of the problem and the corresponding need for an 
international response. From the Fink Committee to the British Royal Society 
to the WHO, the importance of harmonized international standards for man-
aging dual-use research of concern has been repeatedly highlighted. 
 ***
Many important steps have been taken over the past half-century to try to 
respond to the complex and multifaceted risks posed by dual-use biological 
materials, equipment, and related information. Although direct links cannot be 
drawn between specific measures and outcomes, most observers are likely to 
agree that, taken together, these measures have contributed to progress in pre-
venting the acquisition of biological weapons, controlling access to biological 
weapons–related capabilities, and promoting the safe handling of dangerous 
biological materials. Most of these measures emerged in response to specific 
controversies or concerns. Opposition to the use of herbicides and riot con-
trol agents in Vietnam contributed to the conclusion of the BWC. Fears of 
recombinant DNA technology led to the NIH Guidelines and to EU directives 
controlling GMOs. Western assistance to Iraq’s chemical and biological weap-
ons programs resulted in the creation of the AG and the adoption of national 
controls on biological weapons–related capabilities. And post–Cold War worries 
about the proliferation of material and expertise from the former Soviet weap-
ons program stimulated the CTR.
The September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax letters were 
directly responsible for a wide array of other national and international mea-
sures. These include the U.S. select agent regulations and biological weap-
ons criminalization provisions, the UK antiterrorism act, Danish and Israeli 
laws controlling dangerous pathogens and high-consequence research, and the 
Canadian law regulating human pathogens. Internationally, these measures 
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include UNSCR 1540, the G8 Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, the INTERPOL bioterrorism prevention program, and the WHO 
and OECD biosecurity guidelines.
Even the limited measures that have been adopted in the United States to 
manage the risks from dual-use research emerged only after other controversies. 
The NSABB provided its recommendations on dual-use oversight in June 2007 
but not until March 2012 did the U.S. government publish its first policy on 
the issue—and only then after controversy had erupted over the U.S. and Dutch 
H5N1 projects, which had been funded by NIH without considering dual-use 
concerns. The U.S. government’s September 2014 institutional DURC policy 
was released in the midst of an unprecedented debate within the scientific com-
munity over GOF research and after a summer of revelations regarding U.S. 
laboratory incidents involving dangerous pathogens.
Given the wide range of challenges to effective oversight, it is difficult to 
imagine that policy-makers in the United States or other countries will support 
a robust approach to oversight of DURC in the absence of an event that makes 
effective oversight a more salient political issue. But perhaps that is too pessi-
mistic. It is possible that the “deliberative process” now underway in the United 
States to develop a policy on the conduct and funding of GOF research will 
result in stronger oversight measures, at least for this particular type of research. 
In the near term, the most direct and expeditious way of achieving this is by add-
ing GOF studies of concern to the restricted experiments section of the select 
agent regulations, which not only outline clear oversight requirements but are 
legally based. The possibility that other types of experiments might require more 
stringent scrutiny and need to be added to the restricted experiments was in 
fact explicitly acknowledged by both HHS and USDA in their regulations.125
Ultimately, however, more robust oversight arrangements need to be 
adopted for other types of DURC as well. To encourage compliance and 
adequate funding for implementation, the oversight requirement should be 
mandatory. To make it more effective, it should apply to all relevant research, 
whether academic, industry, or government, including classified biodefense or 
other projects. And to help researchers determine whether their proposed work 
is subject to oversight, the affected categories of research should be clearly 
defined. The Danish approach to dual-use research is one example of how this 
could be done: outlining the basic obligation, including the scope of applica-
tion, in legislation but using executive actions (such as executive orders and 
policy guidance), which provide more flexibility for responding to technological 
developments, to enumerate the implementation details.  
The oversight arrangements also should be coordinated by an independent 
federal entity, as the biosecurity working group established by President George 
W. Bush recommended in 2009. To build confidence, it should consult with 
but not be based within any of the government agencies that are responsible 
125. This idea comes from Richard Ebright. See https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/10/
restricted-experiments/.
C H A P T E R  2 :  T H E  C A S E  O F  B I O L O G I C A L  T E C H N O L O G Y 111
for funding or conducting dual-use research. It should oversee and assess the 
progress and impact of the oversight requirements and, as the GOF ethical study 
suggested, provide an additional level of review of proposed research projects 
that raise the most serious concerns.    
Finally, consistent with the globally distributed nature of life sciences 
research, the U.S. government should seek to establish common DURC rules 
and procedures internationally. This means going beyond mere discussions of 
biosecurity and biosafety in various international fora, as has been done for 
many years, and developing a concrete strategy for pursuing international har-
monization of laws, regulations, and policies for the most consequential types 
of life sciences research. As the Fink Committee pointed out, this is essential if 
the risks from dual-use research are to be managed effectively. It also is essential 
to avoid U.S. scientists being put at a competitive disadvantage in relation to 
life sciences researchers in other countries.
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Chapter 3
Governance of  
Information Technology  
and Cyber Weapons
Herbert Lin
FRAMING THE PROBLEM
In the twenty-first century, information is the key coin of the realm. Nations rely 
on information and information technology (IT) to ever-increasing degrees. 
Computers and networks are integral for most business processes, including 
payroll and accounting, tracking of sales and inventory, and research and devel-
opment (R&D). Delivery of food, water, energy, transportation, healthcare, and 
financial services all depend on IT, which is itself a major sector of the economy. 
Modern military forces use weapons that are computer controlled. Coordina-
tion of actions of military forces depends on networks that allow information 
about the battlefield to be shared. Logistics for both civilian and military activ-
ities depend on IT-based scheduling and optimization.
But bad guys also use IT. Criminals use IT to steal intellectual property 
and commit fraud. Terrorists use IT for recruitment, training, communications, 
and public outreach, often in highly sophisticated ways, although to date they 
are not known to have used IT to commit destructive acts. And as the U.S. 
government is exploring various ways of using cyberspace as an instrument of 
national policy to create political, military, diplomatic, economic, or business 
advantages, other nations—some of them with interests that do not align with 
those of the United States—are doing the same.
One commonly used definition of dual-use technology is “technology 
intended for beneficial purposes that can also be misused for harmful purpos-
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es.”1 This article focuses on the governance of specific applications of IT (or 
research aimed at developing such applications) designed and intended to create 
specific negative effects on a target’s computer or communications system or 
the information inside it, being carried through it, or being processed within it 
and which can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. In the lexicon 
of this article, these specific applications are “cyber weapons.”2 The negative 
effects of possible concern are effects on integrity (in which data or computer 
operations are altered with respect to what users expect), effects on availability 
(in which services provided to users of the system or network are unavailable 
when expected), and effects on confidentiality (in which information that users 
expect to keep secret is exposed to others).
Note the distinction between effects and purpose. A gun is designed to 
have negative effects on objects and people. But in the hands of the good 
guys, (e.g., the police), its use is beneficial to society.3 Guns are misused for 
harmful purposes primarily when they are put into the hands of the bad guys 
(e.g., criminals). Similar comments apply to applications of IT with negative 
effects. For example, a negative effect of a specific program might be to render 
ineffective the encryption capabilities of a targeted system. In the hands of the 
good guys, the purpose may be benign or societally beneficial—consider, for 
example, the properly authorized use of such a program by a law enforcement 
agency against a computer used by criminals. But if the same computer program 
performing the same task were used by a terrorist or criminal (e.g., used against 
a government computer containing classified information or a corporate com-
puter holding confidential business plans), that purpose would be regarded as 
a harmful or nonbenign misuse.
When the use of a cyber weapon affects the integrity or the availability of a 
service, it is usually classified as a cyberattack. More generally, cyberattack refers 
to the use of cyber weapons to alter, usurp, deny, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or 
destroy computer systems or networks used by an adversary or competitor or 
the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or net-
works. The activities may also affect artifacts connected to these systems and 
networks—examples of such artifacts, often called cyber-physical devices, include 
1. See, for example, National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004); and Seumas Miller and Michael J. Selgelid, 
“Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences,” 
Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4) (2007): 523–580. The definition used in the life sciences 
contrasts with what might be called a “traditional” definition of dual-use technology; namely, 
technology that has both civilian and military applications. This traditional definition is used by 
the U.S. government (15 CFR 730.3) and the European Commission (see “Dual-Use Export 
Controls,” updated January 28, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/
trade-topics/dual-use/).
2. The term weapon is not entirely satisfactory in this context, since in noncyber contexts a 
weapon is usually an artifact that is used to destroy or damage human beings or other objects. 
However, this author knows of no other word that is any better, and many that are worse.
3. Although not all uses of guns by police are societally beneficial, such uses are not the intent 
of supplying guns to police officers.
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generators, radar systems, and physical control devices for airplanes, automobiles, 
and chemical manufacturing plants. A cyberattack might be conducted to prevent 
authorized users from accessing a computer or information service (a denial of 
service attack), to destroy computer-controlled machinery, or to destroy or alter 
critical data (e.g., timetables for the deployment of military logistics).
When the use of a cyber weapon compromises the confidentiality of infor-
mation that is intended to be kept secret from unauthorized parties, it is usually 
classified as a “cyber exploitation.” (Press accounts often use the term cyber-
attack when the activity conducted is actually cyber exploitation.) More gener-
ally, cyber exploitation refers to the use of cyber weapons to obtain information 
resident on or transiting through a system or network. The information sought 
is information that the target wishes not to be disclosed. For a company, such 
information may include trade secrets, negotiating positions, R&D informa-
tion, or other business-sensitive information. For a nation, such information 
may include intelligence information, the strength and disposition of military 
forces, military plans, communications with allied nations, and so on. Of par-
ticular interest is information that will allow the perpetrator to conduct further 
penetrations on other systems and networks to gather additional information.
In general, a cyber weapon requires both penetration and payload. (Select-
ing the targets on which cyber weapons are used is a matter of command and 
control of those weapons.)
Penetration requires a mechanism for gaining access to the system or net-
work of interest (e.g., through the Internet, by physical intrusion) and taking 
advantage of a vulnerability in the system or network. Vulnerabilities may be 
accidentally introduced through a design or implementation flaw (often called a 
“bug”), or introduced intentionally (e.g., by an untrustworthy insider). Before 
a vulnerability is known to the supplier of the system or network (and thus 
before it can be repaired), a system with that vulnerability can be penetrated by 
an adversary who does know of it. When an adversary uses a vulnerability that is 
unknown to others to effect penetration, it is termed a “zero-day” penetration 
or compromise, since the victim will have had zero days to respond to it.
Payload is the term used to describe the mechanism for affecting the vic-
tim’s system or network after penetration has occurred. The payload is a pro-
gram that executes after the cyber weapon has entered the computer system 
of putative interest;4 payload execution may result in the weapon reproducing 
and retransmitting itself, destroying files on the system, or altering files. Pay-
loads can be designed to do more than one thing, and these things can happen 
at different times. If a communications channel is available, payloads can be 
remotely updated. (And in some cases, the function of the payload is performed 
by a human being who has gained remote access to the computer in question 
through use of a penetration mechanism.)
4. The qualifier “of putative interest” accounts for the possibility that the payload may find itself 
in a computer system that the attacker did not intend to attack; in this case, payload execution 
may have negative effects on the wrong system.
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From the standpoint of the victim, one of the most problematic aspects of 
cyber weapons arises from the fact that the payload—and only the payload—
determines whether the weapon is used for damaging or destructive actions 
(attacks) or nondestructive actions (exploitation/espionage). Even after rec-
ognizing an intrusion into a system or network, the victim usually cannot be 
certain whether the purpose of that intrusion is destructive or nondestructive.5
Some of the most important characteristics of cyber weapons are as follows:
• The use of a cyber weapon can lead to results that vary from the utterly 
insignificant to destruction over a large scale. Similarly, the duration 
and spatial scale of a cyber weapon’s impact can span many orders of 
magnitude. But any given cyber weapon almost certainly is not designed 
to span such a range.
• A given cyber weapon can often be used only once because a penetration 
that takes advantage of a system or network vulnerability usually reveals 
the vulnerability. If the victim repairs the vulnerability, a later use of the 
same weapon may not succeed.
• Obtaining a large-scale and long-lasting impact from the use of a single 
cyber weapon can be highly challenging. Large-scale impact may well 
require simultaneous attacks against a large number of heterogeneous 
targets, and such heterogeneity means that a different attack would have 
to be crafted against each target type. Long-lasting impact may require 
repeated strikes against the targets of interest, and any vulnerability 
whose presence resulted in serious negative effects is likely to be repaired 
quickly, making that vulnerability unusable in the future.
• The effects of using a cyber weapon may or may not be significantly 
delayed in time from the moment of penetration. That is, the payload 
may not execute immediately once penetration has been effected.
• The successful use (launch) of a cyber weapon generally depends heavily 
on accurate, detailed, and timely information about the target (and what 
is connected to it). Such information may be gathered through the use 
of a variety of methods, including the use of other cyber weapons. In 
the absence of such information, the use of any given cyber weapon may 
have no effect whatsoever.
• The effects of using a cyber weapon remain unknown until the payload 
executes (or until all of the payload is available for analysis).
• The use of a cyber weapon is plausibly deniable under many circum-
stances—the so-called attribution problem. High-confidence attribution 
5. In some contexts, certain forms of espionage—for example, involving ships, submarines, or 
aircraft as the collection platforms—have been seen as military threats, so the mere fact that a 
given action might count as espionage (among other things) does not mean that the action in 
question must be regarded as “only” espionage. See, for example, Roger D. Scott, “Territorially 
Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law,” Air Force Law Review 46 (1999): 
217–226, http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090108-036.pdf.
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of such use to an entity that can be held responsible is most difficult 
when the weapon in question has never been used before (which means 
there is no historical record with which to compare), when the respon-
sible entity has maintained perfect operational security (which means the 
victim has no other sources of intelligence on which to make a judg-
ment), and when the judgment needs to be made quickly. Conversely, 
when these conditions are not true, attribution is often much easier.
• A given cyber weapon may or may not be self-propagating. Self-propa-
gation refers to the ability of software to duplicate itself on one system 
and then to take advantage of connections to other systems to spread 
to those systems. Depending on the weapon’s programming, self-prop-
agation may be limited or unlimited. To the extent that the computing 
environments of affected systems constitute a monoculture, self-propa-
gation is dangerous because the same program can affect all of the sys-
tems involved. But if the relevant computing environments are different 
from one another, similar effects on all of the systems are unlikely to be 
the result. A cyber weapon that is not self-propagating affects only the 
system against which it is targeted, except to the extent that failures in 
that system may affect other systems connected to it.
• The expertise and infrastructure needed to create certain kinds of cyber 
weapons extend beyond the usual purview of computer scientists. Cyber 
weapons that are intended to be used against cyber-physical systems—
systems or devices that are controlled by computer but have tangible 
effects in the physical world—also require expertise specific to those 
systems or devices and also, under some circumstances, test facilities that 
are a high-fidelity replica of the targets to be attacked. (For example, the 
Stuxnet worm used to attack Iranian centrifuge facilities was previously 
tested on facilities located at Dimona, the Israeli nuclear complex in the 
Negev Desert.6)
Because cyber weapons can be used for beneficial purposes (i.e., by the 
good guys) and misused for harmful purposes (i.e., by the bad guys), cyber 
weapons constitute a dual-use technology of concern. But unlike the case for 
the analogous dual-use technology in biology (for which there is a well-estab-
lished consensus that the use of a biological weapon would define the user as a 
bad guy), what makes the use of a cyber weapon harmful is very much in the 
eyes of the beholder.
For example, consider technologies that make it easier for nations to spy 
on one another. Most nations conduct espionage operations on other nations, 
and yet no nation wants other nations to conduct similar operations against it. 
From Nation A’s perspective regarding Nation B, A’s use of espionage against 
6. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called 
Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” New York Times, January 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html.
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B serves a beneficial purpose, whereas B’s use of espionage against A serves a 
harmful purpose. Of course, Nation B believes the opposite.
The nations of the world have not agreed that the use of cyber weapons 
is ipso facto a harmful use, nor have they agreed that only bad guys use cyber 
weapons or that the development and acquisition of cyber weapons is neces-
sarily something to be avoided.7 For these reasons, much of the governance 
discussion in this chapter explores what the world does and does not believe 
about cyber weapons.
A second example comes from the email people routinely receive. A sub-
stantial portion of email traffic consists of “spam”—unsolicited commercial 
email that is sent in bulk. For the vast majority of recipients, such emails are 
annoying and in effect constitute a denial of service attack on them. Recipients 
waste time deleting these emails in search of useful emails in their traffic. But 
for the senders of such email and a small proportion of those who receive it, the 
email is beneficial. Senders earn some profit from sending the emails, and some 
individuals want the products or services offered and respond affirmatively.
So what are the beneficial purposes of cyber weapons? Perhaps the most 
important purpose is to assist defenders in testing themselves against adversaries. 
That is, if I want to strengthen my system against a cyber onslaught, I need 
to take specific measures—and then I need to test my upgraded system to see 
if indeed it is more robust. Knowledge of possible offensive techniques (using 
cyber weapons) helps me to design a better defense—and my refraining from 
developing specific cyber weapons is no assurance that others will do the same.
Who uses cyber weapons for harmful purposes? The range of possible users 
is large and includes lone hackers acting as individuals; criminals acting on their 
own for profit; organized crime (e.g., drug cartels); transnational terrorists (per-
haps acting with state sponsorship or tolerance); small nation-states; and major 
nation-states. Moreover, today one can find service providers who will, for a fee, 
use cyber weapons against targets of the customer’s choosing. The availability of 
such services enables any party with the appropriate financial resources to cause 
negative cyber effects, even if that party has no particular technical expertise.
Motivations for using cyber weapons in such operations also span a wide 
range. One of the most common motivations is financial. Cyber exploitations 
can yield valuable information, such as credit card numbers or bank log-in 
credentials; trade secrets; business development plans; or contract negotiation 
strategies—such information can be sold. Cyberattacks can disrupt the produc-
tion schedules of competitors, destroy valuable data belonging to a competitor, 
or be used as a tool to extort money from a victim.
Another possible motivation is political. A perpetrator might use cyber 
weapons to advance some political purpose. A cyberattack or exploitation may 
7. At times during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union advocated peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosives. Although the idea of such applications has largely fallen out of 
favor, some nations apparently continue to advance that position. Still, the taboo against nuclear 
explosions—for whatever purpose—is much stronger and globally widespread than any existing 
norms of behavior regarding the use of cyber weapons.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S118
be conducted to send a political message to a nation, to gather intelligence for 
national purposes, to persuade or influence another party to behave in a certain 
manner, or to dissuade another party from taking certain actions.
Still another reason for conducting such operations is personal. The perpe-
trator might conduct the operation to obtain “bragging rights,” to demonstrate 
mastery of certain technical skills, or to satisfy personal curiosities.
Lastly, the use of cyber weapons could be integrated into military opera-
tions in much the same way as kinetic weapons. In such scenarios, cyber weap-
ons become just another weapon that military commanders might use—in this 
case, to damage either the system or network directly targeted or the devices 
connected to it. Individuals with no military affiliation may also wish to use 
cyber weapons for physically destructive purposes for reasons such as malicious-
ness, extortion, or financial gain.
A focus on the governance of cyber weapons means that other governance 
measures that promote cyber defenses—applications of IT intended to thwart 
or respond to the operation of cyber weapons—are not central to this chapter. 
In the big picture of efforts to promote and enhance cybersecurity, this is a big 
omission, as the vast majority of work on cybersecurity and related governance 
measures is defensively oriented. But since the vast majority of defensive appli-
cations are regarded as benign and because few parties feel a need to govern 
benign activities, they fall outside this chapter’s ambit.8 Therefore, this chapter 
does not address governance measures focused on defense, such as measures 
to improve coordination of defensive responses to cyberattacks, to promote 
and enhance cooperative relationships among law enforcement authorities in 
different nations in order to enhance their ability to respond to cyberattacks, or 
to build stronger and more resilient cyber infrastructures. Such measures—and 
others—are unquestionably important to the governance of security in cyber-
space, but the issues associated with the governance of security in cyberspace 
constitute a vastly larger set than those associated with cyber weapons per se.
Moreover, the technical specifics of cyber defenses are not in general closely 
related to the specific details of cyber weapons. For example, a cyber defense 
may look for the known “fingerprint” of a penetration mechanism, but the part 
of the weapon that does the actual harm is its payload (which may not even be 
present at the time the penetration mechanism is recognized). In this regard, 
cyber defenses share a characteristic with nuclear defenses, which are more 
properly characterized as defenses against the delivery systems that could carry 
nuclear weapons rather than against the nuclear weapons themselves. But with 
one notable exception, cyber defenses do not seek to mitigate damage caused 
by the use of cyber weapons. (The exception is that encryption mitigates harm 
caused by cyber exploitation. Adversaries may obtain encrypted information, 
8. The allegedly benign nature of defensive applications of IT warrants one important point of 
clarification. A defensive application will just as easily protect a computer operated by a hostile 
nation as one operated by or in a friendly nation, and it serves friendly interests if the former 
computer remains vulnerable. Export controls of various kinds seek to impede the transfer of 
certain defensive applications to hostile nations.
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but that information is useless to them without a way to decrypt it.) Cyber 
defenses are thus dissimilar to biological defenses such as antimicrobial drugs or 
vaccines, which are developed to mitigate damage caused by biological agents 
(of either natural or deliberate origin).
Techniques and approaches that protect against deliberately induced fail-
ures in IT (i.e., that protect against cyber weapons) are also often useful against 
failures in IT that are not deliberately induced. For example, the Morris worm 
of 1988 was a self-replicating, self-propagating program that was released onto 
the Internet. The author, Robert Morris, had intended the program to spread 
onto systems that were previously untouched by the program, but only once. 
An error in the program caused it to replicate numerous times on the systems 
it touched, thereby crashing those systems. The program eventually spread to 
a large number of systems on the Internet (around 6,000, or about 10 percent 
of the Internet-connected systems at the time). The program took advantage of 
vulnerabilities in existing programs on those systems. Had those vulnerabilities 
been repaired or never been introduced, the program would not have been 
successful at spreading to even one machine.
An additional question remains: Given its potential for beneficial and harm-
ful uses, should IT itself be regarded as a dual-use technology? The answer is 
no, at least in the sense that one would not logically regard physics or biology 
in the same way. Physics, biology, and IT can be used to create a broad range 
of applications, only some of which raise dual-use concerns. Pencils and walk-
ie-talkies are applications of IT, and in the hands of criminals or terrorists they 
are often used to facilitate the commission of crimes and other terrorist acts. Yet 
the public has expressed little concern about the misuse of pencils and walkie- 
talkies for harmful purposes.
More generally, IT is often regarded as a medium for expressing thoughts. 
As described in a 1992 NRC report on the future of computer science, “Com-
puter programs enable the computer scientist and engineer to feel the excite-
ment of seeing something spring to life from the ‘mind’s eye’ and of creating 
information artifacts that have considerable practical utility for people in all 
walks of life.”9
Fred Brooks, arguably one of the fathers of modern computing, writes, 
“The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure 
thought-stuff. He builds castles in the air, creating by the exertion of the imag-
ination. . . . Yet the program construct, unlike the poet’s words, is real in the 
sense that it moves and works, producing visible outputs separate from the 
construct itself. . . . The magic of myth and legend has come true in our time. 
9. National Research Council, Computing the Future: A Broader Agenda for Computer Science and 
Engineering (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 
1982/computing-the-future-a-broader-agenda-for-computer-science-and. See also Computer Sci-
ence: Reflections on the Field, Reflections from the Field (Washington, D.C.: National Academies 
Press, 2004); and William J. Mitchell, Alan S. Inouye, and Marjory S. Blumenthal, eds., Beyond 
Productivity: Information, Technology, Innovation, and Creativity (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academies Press, 2003).
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One types the correct incantation on a keyboard, and a display screen comes to 
life, showing things that never were nor could be.”10
If IT is indeed a general-purpose medium for expression, meaningful “gov-
ernance” of such a technology is hard to imagine. That said, a question still 
remains regarding the existence of specific areas of research in IT where progress 
may help to enable the creation or improvement of cyber weapons.
PAST USES OF CYBER WEAPONS
Past uses of cyber weapons have encompassed a wide range of criminal activities 
(for example, use of cyber weapons to steal money, commit fraud, or appropri-
ate trade secrets that constitute intellectual property), activities that are aimed 
at obtaining national security information (for example, use of cyber weap-
ons by one nation to conduct espionage against another), and activities that 
are destructive in nature (for example, use of cyber weapons to destroy data, 
render information systems inoperable, or damage machinery controlled by 
computers).
Some of the more notable instances in which cyber weapons have been used 
include the following.11
• A denial of service attack in 2007 against Estonian government websites, 
media sites, and online banking services prevented citizen access to these 
sites and services for an extended period of time. The attack is widely 
believed to have originated in Russia, though whether the attack was 
launched at the explicit behest of the Russian government is less clear.
• Stuxnet, a cyberattack conducted in 2009 and 2010, destroyed about 
one thousand Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges.12 The United 
States and possibly Israel are widely believed to have been responsible 
for the attack.
• In August 2012, Aramco, the national oil firm of Saudi Arabia, was 
struck by a cyberattack that wiped out the data and operating systems on 
thirty thousand computers connected to the Aramco network.13 Accord-
10. Frederick Brooks, The Mythical Man-Month (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
11. A more complete list of notable international cyber events can be found in Catherine A. 
Theohary and Anne I. Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report R43848 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2015), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=761572.
12. For a primer on Stuxnet, see “Cyberattacks on Iran—Stuxnet and Flame,” New York Times, 
n.d., http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malware/
stuxnet/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=stuxnet&st=cse.
13. Nicole Perlroth, “In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back,” New York Times, 
October 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack 
-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html.
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ing to press reports, the United States believes Iran was responsible for 
the attack.
• A denial of service attack in the fall of 2012 against U.S. banks caused 
significant delays for users trying to access online banking sites.14 Some 
analysts believe that the government of Iran tolerated or encouraged 
these attacks, though the extent of its responsibility is unclear.
• In June 2013 the U.S. Department of Defense acknowledged that sen-
sitive unclassified data regarding the F-35 fighter jet had been stolen, 
significantly reducing the U.S. design and production edge on fifth-gen-
eration fighters (e.g., cost advantage and lead time) compared to other 
nations that are seeking to produce such fighters.15
• In December 2013, Target reported a data breach involving the credit 
and debit card records of more than 40 million customers, as well as 
personal information such as email and mailing addresses for some 70 
million people. The access path used by the intruders involved one of 
Target’s HVAC service vendors. The vendor apparently had access to 
the entire Target network.16
• In May 2014 the U.S. Justice Department issued indictments against 
five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for violations of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Economic Espi-
onage Act, alleging that these individuals engaged in criminal acts of 
industrial espionage that took place in the 2006–2014 period.17
• In September 2014, Home Depot reported that about 56 million credit 
and debit cards had probably been compromised over a six-month 
period earlier that year through malicious software implanted on point-
of-sale terminals.18
• In November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment was the victim of a 
cyberattack that compromised unreleased films, private email correspon-
dence, and other sensitive information and also destroyed operating sys-
14. Nicole Perlroth, “American Banks Undamaged by Cyberattacks,” Bits (blog), New York 
Times, September 26, 2012, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/american-banks 
-undamaged-by-cyberattacks/.
15. David Alexander, “Theft of F-35 Design Data Is Helping U.S. Adversaries—Pentagon,” 
Reuters, June 19, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/usa-fighter-hacking 
-idUSL2N0EV0T320130619.
16. Nicole Perlroth, “Heat System Called Door to Target for Hackers,” New York Times, Feb-
ruary 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/technology/heat-system-called-door 
-to-target-for-hackers.html.
17. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hack-
ers for Cyber Espionage against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial 
Advantage,” May 19, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military 
-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
18. Julie Creswell and Nicole Perlroth, “Ex-Employees Say Home Depot Left Data Vulnera-
ble,” New York Times, September 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/
ex-employees-say-home-depot-left-data-vulnerable.html.
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tems on Sony computers.19 The United States publicly attributed this 
attack to North Korea.
• In January 2015, Wired magazine reported that a cyberattack on a steel 
mill in Germany had manipulated control systems in such a way that “a 
blast furnace could not be properly shut down, resulting in ‘massive’—
though unspecified—damage.” The German government report on this 
incident does not specify when the attack occurred.20
• In February 2015, Anthem, one of the largest health insurers in the 
United States, announced that it had been the target of an effort to 
obtain the personal information of tens of millions of its customers and 
employees. The information in question included names, Social Security 
numbers, birthdays, addresses, email addresses, and employment infor-
mation, including income data.21
• In March 2015, Premera Blue Cross, a health insurer based in Wash-
ington State, reported that the personal information of up to 11 million 
customers could have been exposed in a data breach that occurred in 
2014.22
• In August 2015, the Office of Personnel Management of the U.S. gov-
ernment revealed that approximately 22 million personnel records of 
U.S. government employees—including those with high-level security 
clearances—had been compromised. These records contained informa-
tion that went far beyond basic identifying information and, in the case 
of those who had applied for security clearances, included fingerprints 
and lists of foreign contacts.23
19. Lori Grisham, “Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack,” USA Today, January 5, 
2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-hack-timeline 
-interview-north-korea/20601645/.
20. Kim Zetter, “A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage for the Second Time 
Ever,” Wired, January 8, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack 
-destruction/. For the original German government report, see Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (Bonn, 2015), http://
www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Lagebericht2014.pdf.
21. Reed Abelson and Matthew Goldstein, “Millions of Anthem Customers Targeted in Cyber-
attack,” New York Times, February 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/business/
hackers-breached-data-of-millions-insurer-says.html.
22. Jaikumar Vijayan, “Premera Hack: What Criminals Can Do with Your Healthcare Data,” 
Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/ 
2015/0320/Premera-hack-What-criminals-can-do-with-your-healthcare-data.
23. Mike Levine and Jack Date, “22 Million Affected by OPM Hack, Officials Say,” ABC News, 
July 9, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-25-million-affected-opm-hack-sources/
story?id=32332731. On fingerprints, see Andrea Peterson, “OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints 
Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many as Previously Thought,” Washington Post, September 
23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now 
-says-more-than-five-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/.
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Over time, the vast majority of instances in which cyber weapons have been 
used have involved the exfiltration of information—cyber exploitation—rather 
than an act of destruction or denial.
As for scale, few good numbers are available for the frequency with which 
cyber weapons have been used in the past. Part of the problem is that both failed 
and successful uses may easily go unreported because they have not been noticed. 
A failed penetration attempt may go unnoticed because it is unsuccessful. A suc-
cessful penetration attempt may be successful precisely because it was unnoticed. 
Definitions of what it means to “use” a cyber weapon are also inconsistent. (For 
example, some analysts define use as a successful use, whereas others define a use 
as an attempted use, successful or not. Some analysts regard a probe to test for 
access points as the “use” of a cyber weapon, while others do not because such 
probes generally do not compromise system operation.)
With these caveats in mind, a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers of more 
than 9,700 security, IT, and business executives found that respondents detected 
42.8 million cybersecurity “incidents” in 2014, an increase of 48 percent over 
2013.24 A spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Agency was quoted in 
2012 as saying that the agency experiences up to 10 million “security significant 
cyber security events” each day, of which “less than one hundredth of a percent 
can be categorized as successful attacks against the Nuclear Security Enterprise 
computing infrastructure.”25
TODAY’S GOVERNANCE OF CYBER WEAPONS
One source refers to governance as “all processes of governing, whether under-
taken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal 
or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power 
or language.”26 With such a broad scope, mechanisms of governance clearly 
go beyond law, though law is an important aspect of governance. Governance 
mechanisms also include government policies, norms of behavior (which may or 
may not be reflected in law), codes of conduct, ethics, markets, and education. 
They may also involve nongovernment actors.
What aspects of cyber weapons could governance mechanisms operate or 
affect? In principle, three distinct aspects should be considered.
24. “The Global State of Information Security Survey 2015—Managing Cyber Risks in an 
Interconnected World,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, n.d., http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/
rcs_info_security_2015.html.
25. Jason Koebler, “U.S. Nukes Face Up to 10 Million Cyber Attacks Daily,” U.S. News and 
World Report, March 20, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/20/
us-nukes-face-up-to-10-million-cyber-attacks-daily.
26. Mark Bevir, Governance: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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• Governance might address the acquisition of some or all cyber weapons, 
where acquisition should be understood to mean research, development, 
testing, production, sale, transfer, or some combination thereof.
• Conceptually separate from restrictions on acquisition, governance 
might also seek limits on the deployment or use of some or all cyber 
weapons or limit the circumstances of such use.
• Lastly, governance might make use of transparency and confidence-build-
ing measures, which call for nations to take or refrain from taking certain 
actions in the hope that such behavior will reassure other parties about 
their own benign intent.
International Law Regarding Cyber Weapons
No treaties or other international agreements address any aspect of the acquisi-
tion of cyber weapons. Thus, research, development, testing, or production of 
cyber weapons is entirely unconstrained by international law.
In addition, no treaties or other international agreements address directly 
and explicitly the use of cyber weapons. However, some existing bodies of law 
may in principle be applied to the use of cyber weapons. In a 2012 speech, 
Harold Koh, then legal adviser to the U.S. secretary of state, explicitly stated the 
U.S. view that international law principles do apply in cyberspace.27 Thus, from 
the U.S. perspective, international law provides an important legal framework 
from which to understand constraints on the use of cyber weapons.
Specifically, international law—under the rubric of the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC)—addresses the use of armed force by states in two ways. First, when 
is it legal for a nation to use force against another nation? This body of law is 
known as jus ad bellum. Second, what are the rules that govern the behavior of 
combatants who are engaged in armed conflict? Known as jus in bello, this body 
of law is separate and distinct from jus ad bellum.
The UN Charter and Jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is governed by the UN 
Charter (written in 1945), interpretations of the UN Charter, and some cus-
tomary international law that has developed in connection with and sometimes 
prior to the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits nations from 
using “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.” Article 51 provides for an exception to this prohibition, 
affirming the inherent right of states of self-defense in the case of an “armed 
attack.”
The UN Charter does not formally define use of force, threat of force, or 
armed attack. Based largely on historical precedents, nations appear to agree 
that a variety of unfriendly actions, including unfavorable trade decisions, space-
27. See Harold Hongju Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace” (presentation at the USCY-
BERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, Md., September 18, 2012), http://www 
.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. Koh was the legal advisor of the Department 
of State.
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based surveillance, boycotts, severance of diplomatic relations, denial of com-
munications, espionage, economic competition or sanctions, and economic and 
political coercion, do not rise to the threshold of a “use of force,” regardless 
of the scale of their effects. “Armed attack” is also likely to include declared 
war, occupation of territory, naval blockade, or the use of armed force against 
territory, military forces, or civilians abroad.
In his 2012 speech, Koh expanded on the use of cyber weapons and jus ad 
bellum, noting that:
• cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force 
within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law;
• a state’s inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, may be triggered by computer network activities that 
amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof;
• states conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the 
sovereignty of other states, including outside the context of armed con-
flict; and
• states are legally responsible for activities undertaken through “proxy 
actors” who act on the state’s instructions or under its direction or 
control.
For actions relating to security, international law also recognizes the con-
cept of countermeasures.28 According to Michael Schmitt, countermeasures 
are “State actions, or omissions, directed at another State that would otherwise 
violate an obligation owed to that State and that are conducted by the former 
in order to compel or convince the latter to desist in its own internationally 
wrongful acts or omissions.”29 That is, countermeasures taken by B against A 
would themselves be unlawful actions were it not for the wrongful actions of A 
against B. B’s countermeasures must be taken only for the purpose of persuad-
ing A to desist in A’s wrongful actions. Moreover, countermeasures are relevant 
only when A’s wrongful actions do not rise to the threshold of a “use of force” 
or “an armed attack” as the latter terms are used in the UN Charter. (If A’s 
actions do rise to these levels, Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter 
come into play.)
Countermeasures are subject to two constraints. First, they must themselves 
be below the threshold of a use of force or an armed attack. Second, the provok-
ing action must be attributable to a specific responsible nation (in the example 
28. In this context, countermeasures is a legal term that contrasts with its more technical usage. 
For example, in the case of biological weapons, the term countermeasures refers to defenses 
against biological warfare agents. For cyber weapons, technical countermeasures might refer to 
the use of scanners to detect malicious software or active defense measures using cyber weapons 
to inflict damage or pain against a cyber intruder.
29. Michael Schmitt, “‘Below the Threshold’ Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response 
Option and International Law,” Virginia Journal of International Law 54 (3) (2014): 697–732, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353898.
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above, A must be known to be the specific nation that is in fact responsible for 
the action).
The Geneva Conventions and Jus in bello. Jus in bello is governed by the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their subsequent protocols, interpretations 
of the conventions, and some customary international law that has developed in 
connection with and sometimes prior to the conventions. Several fundamental 
principles underlie the Geneva Conventions, including:
• Military necessity. The only targets that may be attacked are those that 
make a direct contribution to the enemy’s war effort or those whose 
damage or destruction would produce a military advantage because of 
their nature, location, purpose, or use.
• Proportionality. Attacks on valid military targets may result in collateral 
injury and damage to civilian assets or people, and thus the Geneva 
Conventions allow some degree of collateral damage but not if the 
foreseeable collateral damage is disproportionate to the military advan-
tage likely to be gained from the attack. In the event that military and 
nonmilitary assets are circumstantially commingled (e.g., the use of a 
common electrical grid to power both military and civilian facilities), the 
attacker must make a proportionality judgment. If the enemy has delib-
erately intermingled military and nonmilitary assets or people (e.g., by 
using human shields), the enemy must also assume some responsibility 
for the collateral damage that may result. (In the latter case the attacker 
must still make a proportionality judgment.)
• Distinction. Distinction requires armed forces to make reasonable efforts 
to distinguish between military and civilian assets and between mili-
tary personnel and civilians and to refrain from deliberately attacking 
civilians or civilian assets. The Geneva Conventions also confer special 
protected status on civilian facilities such as houses of religious worship 
and hospitals.
• Discrimination. Nations have agreed to refrain from using weapons such 
as biological and chemical weapons at least in part because they are 
inherently indiscriminate weapons. An inherently indiscriminate weapon 
is one that is impossible to be used in a manner that discriminates 
between combatants and noncombatants. However, because nearly all 
weapons can be used indiscriminately, harm to noncombatants is mini-
mized through adherence to requirements of proportionality imposed 
on the use of weapons.
Regarding cyber weapons and jus in bello, Koh said that:
• in the context of an armed conflict, the law of armed conflict applies to 
regulate the use of cyber tools in hostilities, just as it does other tools;
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• the jus in bello principle of distinction (that is, distinguishing between 
military and nonmilitary objectives) applies to computer network attacks 
undertaken in the context of an armed conflict; and
• the jus in bello principle of proportionality applies to computer network 
attacks undertaken in the context of an armed conflict.
Applying Existing International Law to the Use of Cyber Weapons. As of 
early 2016 no international legal precedents—no decisions by the International 
Court of Justice, no resolutions from the UN Security Council or General 
Assembly—guide interpretation of international law as it pertains to the use of 
cyber weapons.
A variety of reports and proposals, however, do address the topic. Perhaps 
the best known of these analyses—the Tallinn Manual on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare of 2013—presents the views of twenty inter-
national law scholars and practitioners on how international law applies to cyber 
warfare and proposes ninety-five “black-letter rules” relevant to cyber conflict 
that can be derived from international law (including law related to sovereignty, 
state responsibility, and neutrality, as well as the UN Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions).30
Two examples of the manual’s black-letter rules will give a flavor of their 
character:
• Rule 10 states, “A cyber operation that constitutes a threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations, is unlawful.”31
• Rule 37 states, “Civilian objects shall not be made the object of cyber-
attacks. Computers, computer networks, and cyber infrastructure may 
be made the object of attack if they are military objectives.”32
The Tallinn Manual was the result of an initiative undertaken by the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, although the book’s 
introduction states that the manual “is not an official document but rather 
the product of a group of independent experts acting solely in their personal 
capacity.”33 The introduction further states that it does not represent the views 
of the Centre of Excellence, its sponsoring nations, or NATO. Nevertheless, the 
document is the only comprehensive source of legal analysis on this topic and is 
widely regarded as the most authoritative treatment to date.
30. Michael N. Schmitt et al., eds., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); hereafter “Tallinn manual.” 
“Black-letter” rules are legal rules that are so well settled they are no longer subject to serious 
dispute in the legal community.
31. Ibid., 42.
32. Ibid., 124.
33. Ibid., 11.
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Rule 9 of the Tallinn Manual briefly discusses countermeasures, stating, 
“A state injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to proportion-
ate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsi-
ble state.”34 The manual also notes a disagreement among its experts on what 
actions count as allowable countermeasures, some arguing that countermea-
sures entailing the use or threat of force are entirely prohibited and others 
arguing that a limited use of force might be appropriate if that use were below 
the threshold of an armed attack.
A second noteworthy document is the August 2013 report of the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Information, Telecommunications, 
and International Security. This group, comprised of governmental experts on 
IT from fifteen nations (Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, 
Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States), was established at the request 
of the UN General Assembly to study “existing and potential threats in the 
sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address 
them including norms, rules or principles of responsible behavior of States and 
confidence-building measures with regard to information space, as well as the 
concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and tele-
communications systems.”35
The 2013 GGE report concludes that “International law, and in particular 
the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining 
peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT 
[information and communications technology] environment.”36 Although this 
statement is a recommendation of the group of experts rather than an author-
itative commitment from the nations they represent, many of the experts in 
the group have formal affiliations with their national governments and this has 
frequently been interpreted as indicating a concurrence among the represented 
nations that international law applies to cyberspace. The report was presented to 
the UN General Assembly, in accordance with the report’s terms of reference, 
after which the General Assembly unanimously took note of the report without 
accepting any of its specific assessments or recommendations.37
34. Ibid., 36.
35. “Statement by the Chair of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Devel-
opments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, H.E. Ambassador Deborah Stokes of Australia,” October 25, 2013, http://www 
.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/68/pdfs/TD_25-Oct_OWMD 
_Chair_UNGGE.pdf.
36. “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Tele-
communications in the Context of International Security,” A/68/98, United Nations General 
Assembly, June 24, 2013, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/98.
37. “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security,” A/RES/68/243, United Nations General Assembly, January 9, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/243.
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In July 2015, a new UN group of government experts issued a second 
report on “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of International Security.”38 The new group numbered twenty 
and included Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Paki-
stan, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Although the 2015 report does explicitly endorse other parts of the 2013 
report, such as those related to capacity building, it does not explicitly endorse 
the conclusion of the 2013 report that “international law, and in particular 
the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining 
peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT 
environment.” However, Paragraph 28(c) of the 2015 report says, “Underscor-
ing the aspirations of the international community to the peaceful use of ICTs 
for the common good of mankind, and recalling that the Charter applies in its 
entirety, the Group noted the inherent right of States to take measures consis-
tent with international law and as recognized in the Charter.”39
Some commentators have interpreted the inclusion of Paragraph 28(c) as 
an implicit acknowledgment that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to the 
use of ICTs. Others—including this author—note that, at the very least, Para-
graph 28(c) of the 2015 GGE report is nowhere as clear as the allegedly com-
parable statement in the 2013 report and that no nations—except the United 
States and the United Kingdom—have authoritatively repeated the assertion 
that international law applies to cyberspace.
Since the issuance of the 2015 GGE report, two significant events have 
occurred. In a joint statement resulting from the Sino-American summit 
between Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama in September 2015, the 
two nations agreed not to “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft 
of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business 
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies 
or commercial sectors.”40 In addition, they “welcomed” the 2015 UN GGE 
report on cybersecurity, which recommended that states “should not conduct or 
knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international 
law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the 
use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public.”41
Cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property has been the most significant 
impediment to better cyber relations between China and the United States, and 
38. “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Tele-
communications in the Context of International Security,” A/70/174, United Nations General 
Assembly, July 22, 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174.
39. Ibid.
40. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit 
to the United States,” September 25, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.
41. Ibid.
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the joint statement is noteworthy because China has never before made such an 
explicit statement on that topic. (President Xi has also issued similar joint state-
ments with the leaders of the United Kingdom and Germany.) But observers 
have expressed skepticism about whether the stated commitment from China 
will be accompanied by an actual reduction in such theft in the future.42 More-
over, the statement is entirely silent on the use of cyber weapons for destructive 
purposes against critical infrastructure.
Just two months later, the second significant event occurred when the 
leaders of the G20, which represents the world’s largest advanced and emerging 
economies, agreed in the communiqué from their summit in Antalya, Turkey, 
that no country should conduct or support cyber theft “of intellectual prop-
erty, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with 
the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial 
sectors” and, further, that “we [the leaders of the G20] affirm that international 
law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to state conduct in the use 
of ICTs.”43 This last statement mirrors the statement contained in the 2013 
GGE report but, because it is explicitly endorsed by the national leaderships of 
the signatory nations, can be regarded as authoritative.
In the few months after the 2015 GGE report was released, a number of 
observers (including this author) were concerned that because the GGE report 
failed to include statements that strongly endorsed the recommendations of the 
2013 report, certain nations, such as China and possibly Russia, were backing 
away from the 2013 statement regarding international law’s applicability to 
cyberspace.
The G20 summit communiqué is a significant change that ameliorates some 
of these concerns. Whether the communiqué will be regarded as the start of an 
emerging consensus on cyber norms, however, remains to be seen.
The Budapest Convention. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime of 
2001 is an international agreement among forty-seven nations (including most 
members of the Council of Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
Japan).44 Notably, Russia and China are not parties to the convention. The con-
vention has three main purposes: to enact domestic laws that criminalize certain 
kinds of behavior in cyberspace; to implement certain investigative procedures 
42. Even President Obama said immediately after the summit, “The question now is, ‘Are words 
followed by actions? . . . And we will be watching carefully to make an assessment as to whether 
progress has been made in this area.” See Julie Hirschfeld Davis and David E. Sanger, “Obama 
and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cybertheft,” New York Times, September 25, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html.
43. For the text of the summit communiqué, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ 
international-summit/2015/11/G20-Antalya-Leaders-Summit-Communique-pdf/. The G20 
members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.
44. “Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185: Convention on Cybercrime,” Coun-
cil of Europe, updated February 11, 2016, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.
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for law enforcement in the signatory nations; and to enhance international 
cooperation regarding law enforcement activities against cybercrime.45
• Criminalized behavior. Some of the behaviors that parties to the con-
vention agree to criminalize include improper access to a computer, 
improper interception of data, data interference, system interference, 
and misuse of devices.46 In many cases, the use of a cyber weapon could 
be included under these rubrics.
• Investigatory procedures. Parties to the convention agree to enact a 
variety of procedural mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the inves-
tigation of cybercrimes or any crimes committed with a computer or for 
which evidence may be found in electronic form.
• International cooperation. Parties to the convention agree to implement 
mechanisms through which they will assist one another in investigating 
cybercrimes and other crimes involving electronic evidence. However, 
cooperation may be limited or delayed by a nation’s domestic laws or by 
other arrangements. In addition, parties can usually decline to cooperate 
if such cooperation would compromise their sovereignty, security, law 
enforcement, public order, or other essential interests.
Of these purposes, only the first category addresses the governance of cyber 
weapons as such—focusing on uses of cyber weapons that should be discour-
aged through criminalization.
The Budapest Convention itself does not establish international law that 
criminalizes specific behaviors. Rather, it harmonizes domestic criminal law 
across the signatory nations regarding these behaviors.
The Agreement between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization. In June 2009, the six member states of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbeki-
stan) concluded a Russian-drafted agreement defining “information wars” 
broadly as a “confrontation between two or more states in the information 
space aimed at damaging information systems, processes and resources, criti-
cal and other structures, undermining political, economic and social systems, 
[and] mass psychologic brainwashing to destabilize society and state.”47 While 
45. The discussion of the Budapest Convention is based largely on Michael Vatis, “The Council 
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: 
Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Acad-
emies Press, 2010).
46. The text of the convention refers to access and interception “without right,” a term that 
means “without proper legal authorization.”
47. “Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, Yekaterin-
burg, 16 June 2009,” in S. A. Komov, ed., International Information Security: The Diplomacy 
of Peace—Compilation of Publications and Documents (Moscow, 2009), 202–213. This is an 
unofficial translation; the authentic languages of the Agreement are Russian and Chinese.
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this definition does include cyberattack within its ambit, the status of cyber 
exploitation is uncertain.
For the most part, this agreement was a joint statement among the signato-
ries emphasizing their views on the undesirability of information war. However, 
Article 4(1) states, “The parties shall cooperate and act in the international 
information space within the framework of this agreement in such a way that 
the activities contribute to social and economic development and comply with 
maintaining international security and stability, generally recognized princi-
ples and norms of international law, including the principles of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes and conflicts, non-use of force, non-interference in internal 
affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the principles 
of regional cooperation and non-interference in the information resources of 
the States of the Parties.”
In the reading of this author, this statement does not require any signatory 
to refrain from any particular action in cyberspace. The agreement commits the 
parties to take actions that contribute to social and economic development in a 
manner consistent with the principles listed, but it does not explicitly prohibit 
one signatory from launching cyberattacks against another if, in the judgment of 
the launching nation, such attacks might help to maintain security and stability.
The Sino-Russian Cyber Security Agreement of 2015. On May 8, 2015, the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China signed an agreement to 
cooperate on information security,48 a term that is discussed in greater detail in 
a later section of this paper. Article 4(3) states, “Each Party has an equal right 
to the protection of the information resources of their state against misuse and 
unsanctioned interference, including computer attacks against them. Each Party 
shall not exercise such actions with respect to the other Party and shall assist the 
other Party in the realization of said right.”49 Dr. Elaine Korzak, at the time of 
this writing a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, 
notes that these two sentences together could be read in a way to prohibit Rus-
sia and China from using “computer attacks” against each other.
A Note on Cyber Espionage. The term cyber weapon encompasses all appli-
cations of IT that have an impact on the integrity, availability, or confidentiality 
of information inside a targeted information system or network, being carried 
through it, or being processed within it. This definition focuses on the technical 
dimensions of cyber weapons, but the legal distinction between these kinds of 
impact is significant.
48. Andrew Roth, “Russia and China Sign Cooperation Pacts,” New York Times, May 8, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/world/europe/russia-and-china-sign-cooperation 
-pacts.html. For the original, Russian-language version of the Russian-Chinese agreement, see 
http://government.ru/media/files/5AMAccs7mSlXgbff1Ua785WwMWcABDJw.pdf. For an 
unofficial English-language translation, see James Lewis, “Sino-Russian Cybersecurity Agree-
ment 2015,” CSI Strategic Technologies Program, May 11, 2015, http://www.csistech.org/
blog/2015/5/11/sino-russian-cybersecurity-agreement-2015.
49. Elaine Korzak, “The Next Level for Russia-China Cyberspace Cooperation?” Net 
Politics (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, August 20, 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/
cyber/2015/08/20/the-next-level-for-russia-china-cyberspace-cooperation/.
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In particular, compromises of confidentiality are usually regarded as espio-
nage. Most important, a compromise of confidentiality still leaves the targeted 
computer working exactly as it did before—if I steal a $10 bill from you, I 
have it and you do not. But if I steal your Social Security number, I have it and 
you still have it. Espionage—whether committed through cyber or noncyber 
means—is illegal under the domestic laws of virtually all nations, but it is not 
forbidden under international law. For example, W. Hays Parks (former Defense 
Department attorney and Special Assistant to the Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral) writes,
Each nation endeavors to deny intelligence gathering within its terri-
tory through domestic laws . . . . Prosecution under domestic law (or 
the threat thereof) constitutes a form of denial of information rather 
than the assertion of a per se violation of international law; domestic 
laws are promulgated in such a way to deny foreign intelligence collec-
tion efforts within a nation’s territory without inhibiting that nation’s 
efforts to collect intelligence about other nations. No serious proposal 
has ever been made within the international community to prohibit 
intelligence collection as a violation of international law because of 
the tacit acknowledgement by nations that it is important to all, and 
practiced by each.50
Thus, by this logic, espionage conducted by or through the use of a com-
puter—also known as cyber espionage—is also not forbidden by international 
law, and nations that engage in cyber espionage do derive significant benefit 
from it.
U.S. Domestic Law Regarding Cyber Weapons
In the United States, no domestic law addresses any aspect of research, devel-
opment, testing, or production of cyber weapons. However, the United States 
criminalizes unauthorized access to computers under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA). Most significant, the CFAA criminalizes unauthorized 
access originating from any party under U.S. jurisdiction to any computer con-
nected to the Internet, wherever in the world the computer is located. That 
access may be effected in any number of ways, including through the use of a 
cyber weapon. The CFAA contains an explicit exception for U.S. law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies, however, allowing them to engage in activities 
that are otherwise prohibited under the act.
The United States also criminalizes unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications under the provisions of the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act (ECPA), as amended. (The ECPA also contains a number of exceptions 
applying to U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.) Under the defini-
50. W. Hays Parks, “The International Law of Intelligence Collection,” in National Security 
Law, ed. John Norton Moore and Robert Turner (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 
1990), 433–434.
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tions used in this chapter, an application of IT that enabled the interception of 
communications would be classified as a cyber weapon.
Many domestic laws criminalize actions without specific regard for the 
instruments used in those actions. For example, the Economic Espionage Act 
criminalizes the stealing of economic information but does not specifically men-
tion how one might effect such a theft. Today such theft is often perpetrated 
through the use of cyber weapons.
As for domestic law regarding the export of cyber weapons, the United 
States is a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, in which a number of states have 
agreed to regulate exports of certain cyber weapons and related dual-use tech-
nologies. (In this case, the adopted definition of dual-use technologies—namely, 
technologies that can be used for either civilian or military purposes—is that 
of the U.S. government.) This arrangement was established “to contribute to 
regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States 
seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items 
do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities 
which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabili-
ties.”51 In the United States, controlled dual-use technologies are enumerated 
on the Commerce Control List (CCL),52 and the export of items on the CCL 
is administered by the Department of Commerce.
For many years, certain technologies for cyber defense were controlled in 
this manner. Restricting the availability of these technologies to undesirable 
nations made attacking or conducting signals intelligence against them easier. 
But in March 2014, certain technologies for cyber weapons were added to the 
Wassenaar control list.53
• Under Category 4-A-5: “Systems, equipment, and components there-
for, specially designed or modified for the generation, operation, or 
delivery of, or communication with, ‘intrusion software’”—where 
“intrusion software” is “‘Software’ specially designed or modified to 
avoid detection by ‘monitoring tools’, or to defeat ‘protective counter-
measures’, of a computer or network-capable device, and performing 
any of the following: (a) The extraction of data or information, from a 
computer or network-capable device, or the modification of system or 
user data; or (b) The modification of the standard execution path of a 
51. “About Us,” n.d., http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html.
52. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl.
53. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies: List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List (Vienna: Was-
senaar Arrangement, 2014), http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/WA 
-LIST-14-2.pdf.
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program or process in order to allow the execution of externally pro-
vided instructions.”54
• Under Category 5-A-1-j: “IP network communications surveillance sys-
tems or equipment, and specially designed components therefor” with 
certain technical capabilities.55
A particular twist to the Wassenaar formulation is that it apparently applies 
controls not to a hostile payload but to the means of delivery and creation of 
hostile payloads. That is, the payload per se—the part of a cyber weapon that 
actually causes negative effects on the targeted computer—is unaffected by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement.56 Thus, a destructive payload could be exported freely 
as long as it was not packaged with a penetration mechanism. The reason for 
this exception is unknown.
As an example of the Wassenaar Arrangement’s impact, VUPEN Security, 
a leading seller of vulnerabilities, changed its sales policy to sell its products 
only to approved government agencies in approved countries. VUPEN also 
announced it would automatically exclude countries subject to European Union 
restrictions and countries subject to embargoes by the United States or the 
UN.57
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a harmonization regime for the domestic 
laws of its signatories rather than an international legal agreement. In this regard 
it is similar to the Budapest Convention.
Export Controls on Munitions
Export controls have long been used to stem the proliferation of certain “dan-
gerous” technologies; that is, technologies that would be dangerous were they 
to fall into the hands of adversaries. In the United States, the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 (22 USC 39) gives the president authority to control the 
export of defense articles and defense services. (Defense articles and services are 
those intended explicitly and primarily for military use and thus do not fall into 
the “dual-use” category.) The act is implemented by the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the regulated defense articles and services 
are found on the United States Munitions List (USML).58 The Department of 
State administers the ITAR.
54. Ibid., 73, 212.
55. Ibid., 81.
56. For more discussion of the application of export controls to different components of a cyber 
weapon, see Trey Herr and Paul Rosenzweig, “Cyber Weapons and Export Control: Incorporat-
ing Dual Use with the PrEP Model,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 8 (2) (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2501789.
57. Jennifer Granick and Mailyn Fidler, “Changes to Export Control Arrangement Apply to 
Computer Exploits and More,” Just Security, January 15, 2014, http://justsecurity.org/5703/
export-control-arrangement-apply-computer-exploits/.
58. For the USML, see 22 CFR 121, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/documents/ 
official_itar/ITAR_Part_121.pdf.
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Information technologies found on the munitions list are mostly found in 
Category XIII (auxiliary military equipment) and include military information, 
security assurance systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software, and 
components specifically designed, developed, modified, adapted, or configured 
for military applications (including command, control, and intelligence appli-
cations). Items 1, 2, and 4 of this list contain defensive cyber technologies that 
the United States would prefer to keep out of the hands of adversaries; doing 
so enables the United States to conduct more effective attacks or espionage in 
cyberspace. Item 3 on the list contains the only mention of technology related 
to cyber weapons: military cryptanalytic systems, equipment, assemblies, mod-
ules, integrated circuits, components, or software that would enhance an adver-
sary’s signals intelligence capabilities.
However, Category 21 (miscellaneous items) of the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment is a catchall category for items not enumerated in the other categories: 
“Any article not specifically enumerated in the other categories of the U.S. 
Munitions List which has substantial military applicability and which has been 
specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military 
purposes. The decision on whether any article may be included in this cate-
gory shall be made by the Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy.” 
Authorities related to Category 21 are not likely to have been used to restrict 
the transfer of cyber weapons to other nations.59
The original purpose of ITAR and the USML was to regulate the sale of 
weapons designed and intended for military purposes. But IT is inherently dual-
use, and thus a clear definition of when an IT artifact with some destructive or 
damaging capability is designed or intended for military purposes is elusive. 
Recognizing a military purpose for an IT artifact that is also used in a civilian 
context is problematic. Thus, judgments about the permissibility of a U.S. sale 
of cyber weapons to Nation X will, more likely than not, be based less on the 
capabilities of the artifacts involved and more on the perceived intentions of 
Nation X and the U.S. relationship with Nation X.
U.S. Policy Statements Concerning Cyber Weapons
In May 2011 the White House released its International Strategy for Cyberspace. 
This document was remarkable for its near-total silence regarding the acquisi-
tion or use of cyber weapons. The closest the document comes to this topic is 
its statement that, “consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an 
inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in 
cyberspace.” It further states, “the United States will respond to hostile acts in 
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. . . . We reserve the 
right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and eco-
nomic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order 
to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.” Nevertheless, 
the document emphasizes, “we will exhaust all options before military force 
59. Trey Herr, George Washington University, personal communication, September 2015.
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whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the 
costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens 
our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.”60
The document also speaks of norms of behavior that its authors believe 
could bring “predictability to state conduct, helping prevent the misunder-
standings that could lead to conflict.” In addition to the right of self-defense 
as one such norm, the document argues, “States must identify and prosecute 
cybercriminals [presumable criminals using cyber weapons], to ensure laws and 
practices deny criminals safe havens, and cooperate with international criminal 
investigations in a timely manner.”61 (Compliance with such norms during con-
flict is not—and cannot be—assured.)
Another policy statement was made by Michael Daniel, special assistant to 
the president and White House cybersecurity coordinator, in an April 2014 blog 
post. In this post, Daniel discusses the tension between revealing a vulnerability 
in a system so that it can be repaired (thus improving security for those using 
that system) and withholding knowledge of that vulnerability (thus enabling 
those with that knowledge, such as the U.S. government, to use that vulnera-
bility as part of a cyber weapon). He further noted that when the U.S. govern-
ment does obtain knowledge of such a vulnerability, the administration “takes 
seriously its commitment to an open and interoperable, secure and reliable 
Internet, and in the majority of cases, responsibly disclosing a newly discovered 
vulnerability is clearly in the national interest. This has been and continues to 
be the case.”62 To the extent that this is actually the case (there is significant 
public skepticism on this point), disclosure helps to inhibit the development of 
cyber weapons. 
In April 2015, the DOD released The DOD Cyber Strategy.63 This docu-
ment went further than any previous official statement in asserting the right 
of the United States to use cyber weapons. Three passages in the document 
warrant special attention.
60. White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Net-
worked World (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 2011), 10, 14, https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
61. Ibid., 9–10.
62. Michael Daniel, “Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabilities,” 
White House Blog, April 28, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/28/heartbleed 
-understanding-when-we-disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities.
63. Department of Defense, The DOD Cyber Strategy (Washington, D.C.: DOD, April 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD 
_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf.
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• “There may be times when the President or the Secretary of Defense 
may determine that it would be appropriate for the U.S. military to con-
duct cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s military-related networks 
or infrastructure so that the U.S. military can protect U.S. interests in 
an area of operations. For example, the United States military might use 
cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms, or to 
disrupt an adversary’s military systems to prevent the use of force against 
U.S. interests. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) may 
also be directed to conduct cyber operations, in coordination with other 
U.S. government agencies as appropriate, to deter or defeat strategic 
threats in other domains.”64
• “[A strategic goal of the DOD cyber strategy is to] build and maintain 
viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control conflict 
escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages. During 
heightened tensions or outright hostilities, DOD must be able to pro-
vide the President with a wide range of options for managing conflict 
escalation. If directed, DOD should be able to use cyber operations to 
disrupt an adversary’s command and control networks, military-related 
critical infrastructure, and weapons capabilities. . . . To ensure unity of 
effort, DOD will enable combatant commands to plan and synchronize 
cyber operations with kinetic operations across all domains of military 
operations.”65
• “DOD will work with agencies of the U.S. government as well as U.S. 
allies and partners to integrate cyber options into combatant command 
planning.”66
The United States thus reserves the right to use cyber weapons to militarily 
protect U.S. interests in an area of operations, to deter or defeat strategic 
threats in other domains, and to integrate the use of cyber weapons into mil-
itary planning efforts as an additional tool, albeit with special characteristics, 
in the U.S. arsenal.
Around the same time, in May 2015 in Seoul, Secretary of State John 
Kerry delivered a speech on the Internet. After reiterating the U.S. view that 
the basic rules of international law apply in cyberspace, that acts of aggression 
are not permissible, and that countries that are hurt by a cyberattack have a 
right to respond in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, he said that the 
United States also “support[s] a set of additional principles that, if observed, can 
contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability in time of peace.”67 
64. Ibid., 5.
65. Ibid., 14.
66. Ibid., 26.
67. “Text of John Kerry’s Remarks in Seoul on Open and Secure Internet,” Voice of America, 
May 18, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/text-of-john-kerrys-remarks-in-seoul-on 
-open-and-secure-internet/2776139.html.
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He did not use the term norms in this context, but Kerry’s principles are in fact 
norms by any conventional definition of the term. These principles include the 
following (with the author’s principle-by-principle commentary indented and 
in brackets after each quotation from Kerry’s speech):
• “No country should conduct or knowingly support online activity that 
intentionally damages or impedes the use of another country’s critical 
infrastructure.”
[This principle can be construed as limiting the use of cyber weapons 
against another nation’s critical infrastructure. (Other analysts have 
suggested restrictions on targeting critical infrastructure as well.68) 
Such restrictions would be in some ways analogous to prohibitions on 
targeting hospitals and places of worship as provided by the Geneva 
Conventions. However, the Kerry speech does not define critical 
infrastructure, and in the United States, at least, a large fraction of 
the U.S. economy (well over 50 percent) is categorized as such. The 
principle is also silent about the extent of damage or impediment that 
it forbids. At the upper end (a large-scale cyberattack against critical 
infrastructure that results in nationwide collapse of that infrastruc-
ture), LOAC already rules out such an attack because it would be 
likely to result in a large amount of damage and harm to civilians and 
thus to fail the LOAC test of proportionality. At the lower end (e.g., 
a small cyberattack against a single electrical generator powering a 
military facility), it is hard to imagine that the principle is intended 
to prohibit such an action. Indeed, The DOD Cyber Strategy explic-
itly says that military-related critical infrastructure is not off-limits. 
Lastly, agreements to refrain from such targeting can remove an overt 
and openly declared cyber threat against these facilities, but all of 
the concerns about actual attacks on these facilities will continue to 
be unaddressed, a point that has two consequences: (1) The cyber 
defenses of critical infrastructure must be just as strong and robust as 
they would be in the absence of a targeting agreement. That is, the 
defense of critical infrastructure is not simplified or made easier in any 
way by such an agreement. (2) Political costs that might be expected 
to accrue to a violator of such an agreement could be mitigated to 
some degree by the inherent plausible deniability of cyber operations. 
Political costs accrue only if evidence is available that would convince 
68. “Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace: A Multistakeholder Approach for Stability and 
Security,” Atlantic Council, November 5, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/
reports/confidence-building-measures-in-cyberspace-a-multistakeholder-approach-for-stability 
-and-security; and John Steinbruner, “Prospects for Global Restraints on Cyberattack,” Arms 
Control Today 41 (December 2011), http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2011_12/Prospects 
_for_Global_Restraints_on_Cyberattack.
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third-party observers of responsibility in the face of outright denial 
by the perpetrator, and finding convincing evidence is particularly 
problematic in the cyber world.]
• “No country should seek either to prevent emergency teams from respond-
ing to a cybersecurity incident, or allow its own teams to cause harm.”
[This principle can be construed as limiting the use of cyber weap-
ons against computer emergency response teams and is somewhat 
analogous to restrictions on targeting hospitals, medical personnel, 
or ambulances.]
• “No country should conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellec-
tual property, trade secrets, or other confidential business information 
for commercial gain.”
[This principle is limited to prohibiting the obtaining of data for 
commercial gain but leaves unrestricted the obtaining of data for 
purposes related to national security. As such, this principle places no 
restrictions on the actual use of cyber weapons per se, though it does 
restrict the purposes to which the results of such use may be put.]
• “Every country should mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from 
its soil, and they should do so in a transparent, accountable and coop-
erative way.”
[This principle is silent on the use of cyber weapons per se, though it 
seeks to assign state responsibility for suppression of such use.]
• “Every country should do what it can to help states that are victimized 
by a cyberattack.”
[This principle is silent on the use of cyber weapons.]
Lastly, the U.S. Congress expressed concerns about the proliferation of 
cyber weapons in Section 940 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2014, which required the president to “establish an interagency 
process to provide for the establishment of an integrated policy to control the 
proliferation of cyber weapons through unilateral and cooperative law enforce-
ment activities, financial means, diplomatic engagement, and such other means 
as the President considers appropriate.”69
According to the legislation, this policy was to have two purposes:
• To identify the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial sanctions 
tools that can and should be used to suppress the trade in cyber tools and 
infrastructure that are or can be used for criminal, terrorist, or military 
activities while preserving the ability of governments and the private 
sector to use such tools for self-defense.
69. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT86280/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT86280.pdf.
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• To establish a statement of principles to control the proliferation of cyber 
weapons, including principles for controlling the proliferation of cyber 
weapons that can lead to expanded cooperation and engagement with 
international partners.
As of April 2016, the administration had not produced the requested 
report. Further, whether the concerns of Congress were related to cyber weap-
ons as mostly military artifacts or as dual-use artifacts is not clear. Supporting 
the former interpretation is the fact that the legislation passed as a part of the 
DOD authorization bill; supporting the latter interpretation is the idea that 
government and private sector entities had legitimate interests in cyber weapons 
for self-defense purposes.
Existing Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are measures that two or more nations 
agree to take to reduce the likelihood that a conflict might break out between or 
among them because of miscalculation or misperception or that a conflict might 
inadvertently escalate. As far as is known to this author, only one specific and 
currently extant CBM relates to cyberspace. At talks during the G-8 meeting in 
June 2013, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed on CBMs for 
cyberspace to increase transparency and reduce the possibility that a misunder-
stood cyber incident could create instability or a crisis.70 The measures include:
• The establishment of a direct secure voice communications line between 
the U.S. Cybersecurity Coordinator and the Russian Deputy Secretary 
of the Security Council, should there be a need to directly manage a cri-
sis situation arising from a cybersecurity incident. It is planned that this 
direct line will be seamlessly integrated into the existing Direct Secure 
Communication System (“hotline”) that both governments already 
maintain.
• The establishment of secure and reliable lines of communication for each 
nation to make formal inquiries of the other about cybersecurity inci-
dents of national concern so as to reduce the possibility of misperception 
and escalation from cybersecurity incidents. The existing Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center links established in 1987 between the two nations will 
house these cyber lines of communication.
• The sharing of threat indicators between the United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team and its counterpart in Russia, including tech-
nical information about malicious software or other indicators reflecting 
malicious activity appearing to originate from each other’s territory. Shar-
ing such information helps in the proactive mitigation of threats.
70. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Russian Cooperation 
on Information and Communications Technology Security,” June 17, 2013, http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-us-russian-cooperation-information 
-and-communications-technol.
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Nothing in this arrangement speaks directly to governing either the acquisition 
or use of cyber weapons (or the underlying technology).
Current State of Governance of Cyber Weapons in Other Countries
Many states other than the United States criminalize unauthorized access to 
computers (see, for example, the UK’s Computer Misuse Act 1990).71 How-
ever, to the best of this author’s knowledge, no state has attempted to regulate 
the acquisition of cyber weapons within its borders.
A number of states also place export controls on technologies relevant 
to cyber weapons, thus limiting the acquisition of cyber weapons by certain 
nations. In some cases, these controls closely mirror the U.S. controls (for 
example, when the nations in question are parties to the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment); in others they are somewhat different.
Outside the United States, the government of the Netherlands has been 
comparatively outspoken in its discussion of offensive operations in cyberspace. 
For example, in December 2009, some members of the Dutch Parliament stated 
that defensive capabilities alone were insufficient to engage in cyber warfare.72 
In December 2011, an advisory committee to the Dutch government freely 
discussed the value of using cyber weapons (under the rubric of offensive cyber 
capabilities as a rough synonym for cyber weapons).73 For example, it endorsed 
the view that such weapons could be used to protect friendly systems and net-
works. In January 2012, the Dutch government stated that its Ministry of 
Defence was investing in measures to develop “new (including offensive) [cyber] 
capabilities.”74 And in February 2015, the Dutch minister of defense released 
a six-page letter that revises the Dutch Defense Cyber Strategy of 2012.75 This 
letter identifies as priorities the “strengthening [of] the intelligence capability in 
the digital domain” and “strengthening the use of cyber in military missions,” 
71.“Computer Misuse Act 1990,” n.d., http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/ 
crossheading/computer-misuse-offences.
72. “Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 
2010,” Vergaderjaar 2009–2010, Kamerstuk 32123-X nr. 66, December 10, 2009, https://zoek 
.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32123-X-66.html.
73. Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and Advisory Committee on Issues of 
Public International Law (CAVV), Cyber Warfare, AIV no. 77 / CAVV no. 22 (The Hague: 
AIV and CAVV, December 2011), http://aiv-advies.nl/download/da5c7827-87f5-451a-a7fe 
-0aacb8d302c3.pdf.
74. “Government Response to the AIV/CAVV Report on Cyber Warfare,” Rijksoverheid, April 26, 
2012, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2012/ 
04/26/cavv-advies-nr-22-bijlage-regeringsreactie-en/cavv-advies-22-bijlage-regeringsreactie 
-en.pdf.
75. “Defensie Cyber Strategie,” Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 
33 321, nr. 5, http://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=194c5e2b-c5c0-4691 
-9d85-51f4ba38b094&title=Actualisering%20Defensie%20Cyber%20Strategie%20.docx. For an 
unofficial translation of this letter, see “Dutch Defense Cyber Strategy—Revised February 2015,” 
Matthijs R. Koot’s Notebook (blog), February 23, 2015, https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2015/02/
dutch-defense-cyber-strategy-revised-february-2015/.
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and the discussion of both priorities includes explicit mention of the role that 
offensive cyber capabilities play in supporting them.
Also, the government of the United Kingdom said in September 2013 
that it is “developing a full spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike 
capability.”76 The UK government has not officially provided any details on 
this point, although Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said in an interview 
with the Daily Mail that “clinical ‘cyber strikes’ could disable enemy commu-
nications, nuclear and chemical weapons, planes, ships and other hardware.”77
OTHER PROPOSALS FOR MANAGING THE RISKS  
FROM CYBER WEAPONS
State Initiatives at the United Nations78
The vast majority of cybersecurity discussions at the UN have taken place under 
the auspices of the various committees of the General Assembly, primarily the 
First Committee (whose mandate is to focus on disarmament and international 
security). In 1998, the Russian Federation introduced a draft resolution to the 
First Committee entitled “Developments in the Field of Information and Tele-
communications in the Context of International Security.”
The draft resolution invited interested states to submit their views on the 
topic, and the Russian submission stated that work should begin on the devel-
opment of international principles that would “subsequently be incorporated 
into a multilateral international legal instrument” to regulate “information 
weapons.” In its letter initiating deliberations in the First Committee, the Rus-
sian Federation wrote of “the creation of information weapons and the threat 
of information wars, which we understand as actions taken by one country to 
damage the information resources and systems of another country.”79
The Russian Federation was the sole sponsor of draft resolutions with the 
same name until 2006, at which time China, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan joined Russia as cosponsors.
76. Ministry of Defence, Joint Forces Command, and Philip Hammond, “New Cyber Reserve 
Unit Created,” GOV.UK, September 29, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit.
77. Simon Walters, “Hammond’s £500m New Cyber Army,” Daily Mail, September 28, 2013, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2436946/Hammonds-500m-new-cyber-army-As 
-reveals-secret-Whitehall-bunker-time-Defence-Secretary-says-future-wars-fought-viruses.html.
78. The discussion of initiatives at the UN borrows freely from Elaine Korzak, “Computer 
Network Attacks and International Law” (PhD dissertation, King’s College London, 2014).
79. “Letter dated 23 September 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Feder-
ation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” A/C.1/53/3, United Nations 
General Assembly, September 30, 1998, https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library 
.nsf/1c90cfa42bbb0d6985257631004ff541/663e6453bdaa2e228525765000550277/ 
$FILE/A-C1-53-3_russia.pdf.
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On a parallel but related track, China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
jointly presented in September 2011 to the UN General Assembly a proposal 
for an international code of conduct for information security.80 An updated ver-
sion of this proposal was presented in January 2015. According to the updated 
version, the purpose of the code is to “ensure that the use of information and 
communications technologies and information and communications networks 
facilitates the comprehensive economic and social development and well-being 
of peoples, and does not run counter to the objective of ensuring international 
peace and security.”81
The most significant part of the proposed code related to dual-use is the 
obligation of signatories “not to use information and communications tech-
nologies and information and communications networks to carry out activities 
which run counter to the task of maintaining international peace and security.”82
Proposals for Confidence-Building Measures and Norms of Behavior
One set of CBMs was proposed by the Organization for Security and Co-oper-
ation in Europe in 2013 with the purpose of reducing “the risks of mispercep-
tion, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs.”83
• Measure 3 of the proposed set of CBMs calls for participating states to 
engage in “consultations in order to reduce the risks of misperception, 
and of possible emergence of political or military tension or conflict that 
may stem from the use of ICT.” This measure acknowledges the pos-
sibility that the use of cyber weapons could under some circumstances 
lead to tension or conflict. A hypothetical example of such a possibility, 
not mentioned in the report, is the use of cyber means by Nation A to 
gather intelligence information during a crisis involving A and Nation 
B. Such an action by A, taken with the best of intentions (e.g., to under-
stand B’s intentions during the crisis), may well be interpreted by B as 
a prelude to attack.
• Measure 8 calls on states to “establish measures to ensure rapid commu-
nication at policy levels of authority to permit concerns to be raised at 
the national security level.” This measure is essentially a mechanism for 
greater communication during crisis.
In addition, the GGE report of 2013 was charged with studying CBMs 
to address existing and potential threats to information security. But a careful 
80. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/496/56/PDF/N1149656 
.pdf.
81. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/014/02/PDF/N1501402 
.pdf.
82. Ibid.
83. http://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true.
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examination of the report reveals only three statements that can even remotely 
be related to the governance of cyber weapons.84
• Paragraph 22 says, “States should intensify cooperation against criminal 
or terrorist use of ICTs, harmonize legal approaches as appropriate and 
strengthen practical collaboration between respective law enforcement 
and prosecutorial agencies.” Criminal or terrorist use of ICTs would 
count as use of cyber weapons, but the paragraph presents no specifics 
about the kind(s) of use that should be criminalized. This paragraph 
seems to be urging states toward the Budapest Convention or a similar 
arrangement.
• Paragraph 23 says, “States must meet their international obligations 
regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. States must 
not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. States should 
seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for 
unlawful use of ICTs.” The language about proxies suggests the unde-
sirability of a nation “outsourcing” the use of cyber weapons to a third 
party (a proxy), which could in principle be a nonstate actor. The third 
sentence asks states to assume the responsibility of suppressing the illegal 
use of cyber weapons from their territories. But since government use of 
cyber weapons is likely to be legal under the laws of the using nation, 
the third sentence is silent on such use.
• Paragraph 26(f) says, “Enhanced mechanisms for law enforcement coop-
eration to reduce incidents that could otherwise be misinterpreted as 
hostile State actions would improve international security.” This lan-
guage acknowledges that certain criminal acts involving the use of cyber 
weapons could be interpreted as hostile actions and suggests that more 
law enforcement cooperation between nations could help to reduce the 
likelihood of misinterpretation.
The GGE report of July 2015 offers recommendations regarding “vol-
untary, non-binding norms, rules, or principles for the responsible behaviour 
of States aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful 
ICT environment.”85 These recommendations include the following (with the 
author’s recommendation-by-recommendation commentary indented and in 
brackets):
• Paragraph 13(f) indicates, “A State should not conduct or knowingly 
support ICT activity . . . that intentionally damages critical infrastructure 
84. “Statement by the Chair of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Devel-
opments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, H.E. Ambassador Deborah Stokes of Australia,” October 25, 2013, http://www 
.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/68/pdfs/TD_25-Oct_OWMD 
_Chair_UNGGE.pdf.
85. “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Tele-
communications in the Context of International Security,” A/70/174, 7.
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or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to 
provide services to the public.”86
[As with the first principle identified in Secretary of State Kerry’s May 
2015 speech, the language does not provide a definition of critical 
infrastructure; it is also silent on the question of extent of damage that 
would be involved in a proscribed act, a silence that almost certainly 
reflects differing interpretations of what this norm would mean in 
practice.]
• Paragraph 13(i) indicates, “States should take reasonable steps to ensure 
the integrity of the supply chain, so end users can have confidence in the 
security of ICT products.”87
[This recommendation speaks to the possibility that cyberattacks 
might originate in or depend on compromises in the supply chain 
of IT products or services, but it is otherwise silent on the matter.]
• Paragraph 13(k) indicates, “States should not conduct or knowingly 
support activity to harm the information systems of another State’s 
authorized emergency response teams . . . [nor] use authorized emer-
gency response teams to engage in malicious international activity.”88
[As with the second principle identified in Secretary of State Kerry’s 
May 2015 speech, this norm can be construed as limiting the use of 
cyber weapons against computer emergency response teams, and it 
is somewhat analogous to restrictions on targeting hospitals, medical 
personnel, or ambulances.]
Norms and CBM proposals focusing on the use of cyber weapons and 
related issues originating from other analysts include:
• Measures to improve crisis management, such as hotlines that enable 
direct communications between states during a cyber crisis and the shar-
ing of threat information.89 (The United States and Russia established 
a means for direct communication in 2013.) Greater communication 
among responsible authorities during a crisis may be helpful to the 
extent that the content of these communications are believable. But 
86. Ibid., 8.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Katharina Ziolkowski, Confidence Building Measures for Cyberspace—Legal Implications (Tal-
linn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2013), https://ccdcoe.org/publi-
cations/CBMs.pdf; “Cyber Security,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, updated February 10, 
2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm; ABIresearch and International 
Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index: Conceptual Framework (Geneva: ITU, 
n.d.), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/GCI_Conceptual_Frame-
work.pdf; and “Cybersecurity Information Exchange Techniques (CYBEX),” International Tele-
communication Union, n.d., http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013-2016/17/
Pages/cybex.aspx.
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given the fact that the successful use of cyber weapons depends entirely 
on stealth and deception, participants in these communications may 
well have cause for skepticism about what the other side is saying. An 
additional concern is that, as with all CBMs, some degree of political will 
is necessary for their successful operation. A case in point is the military 
hotline between the United States and China. Intended to enable direct 
communication between senior military leaders on both sides during a 
crisis, it has not always been operational even during routine tests of the 
system. On several occasions in which the line was tested for operational 
capability, as well as in the wake of the 2001 EP-3 incident over Hainan 
Island,90 the Chinese military failed to respond.91
• Bans on distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks.92 DDOS attacks 
are among the most frequent attacks on cyber infrastructure, and while 
they continue, they can be crippling to the targeted organization. On 
the other hand and in contrast to permanently destructive action, their 
effects are temporary and reversible—after they stop, the targeted orga-
nization is as good as new. But the most significant point regarding 
DDOS attacks is that powerful DDOS attacks can be launched by non-
state actors, and constraining the actions of such parties continues to be 
problematic. Even worse, if such attacks by nonstate actors do occur, 
suspicious targeted nation-states might still be inclined to blame other 
nations for violating the bans in question.
Many CBMs were originally developed to address issues arising in the con-
text of kinetic armed conflict. As such, they presumed the existence of eas-
ily observed physical entities (soldiers, tracked and wheeled vehicles, artillery 
pieces, ships, airplanes, missiles). Movements of these entities from one geo-
graphic region to another had bearing on what they might or might not be able 
to do in a conflict. The number of physical entities was an important contributor 
to military power and capability.
90. In the EP-3 incident over Hainan Island in the South China Sea, a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance 
plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter. The Chinese pilot died in the incident and the EP-3 
made an emergency landing of the damaged plane onto Hainan Island. Given the involvement of 
both U.S. and Chinese military forces in this incident, U.S. military leaders tried to contact their 
counterparts in China to resolve the situation without undue escalation. Congressional Research 
Service, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, 
October 10, 2001, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf.
91. Michael D. Swaine, Tuosheng Zhang, and Danielle Cohen, eds., Managing Sino-American 
Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); James A. 
Lewis, CSIS, personal communication, September 2014; and Adam Segal, Council on Foreign 
Relations, personal communication, July 2015.
92. Robert K. Knake, Internet Governance in an Age of Cyber Insecurity, Council Special Report 
no. 56 (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, September 2010), http://www.cfr 
.org/internet-policy/internet-governance-age-cyber-insecurity/p22832. A DDOS attack is one 
in which many different compromised computers send bogus service requests to a single target, 
which is overwhelmed trying to service these (fake) requests and is thus unable to provide service 
for legitimate users of the targeted system.
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Cyberspace is very different. For example, physical distance has little mean-
ing in cyberspace. Forces as such do not move from one area to another. The 
key weaponry in cyber conflict is usually software—digitized information—and 
as such is intangible. Along with other fundamental differences, such as the 
availability of many cyber weapons to nonstate entities, measures that take for 
granted the unique characteristics of cyber weapons are unlikely to be useful in 
reducing the likelihood of cyber conflict.
Policy Proposals from the Information Technology Industry
The IT industry is an important stakeholder in the emergence of behavioral 
norms around the use of cyber weapons. Of particular note is a proposal from 
Microsoft for six norms intended to guide the behavior of nation-states with 
respect to the use of cyber weapons and to reduce the risk arising from such use.
• Norm 1: States should not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities 
(backdoors) or take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust 
in products and services.
• Norm 2: States should have a clear principle-based policy for handling 
product and service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to 
report them to vendors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit 
them.
• Norm 3: States should exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons 
and should ensure that any which are developed are limited, precise, 
and not reusable.
• Norm 4: States should commit to nonproliferation activities related to 
cyber weapons.
• Norm 5: States should limit their engagement in cyber offensive opera-
tions to avoid creating a mass event.
• Norm 6: States should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, 
respond to, and recover from events in cyberspace.93
The intent behind these norms of behavior is to minimize state actions that 
compromise the trust of users in the products and services that private sector IT 
vendors offer. From the standpoint of these vendors, the economic rationale for 
the norms, particularly norms 1 and 2, is clear: actions that undermine public 
trust in IT products and services make the public more reluctant to use those 
products and services, an outcome with foreseeable negative economic conse-
quences. Furthermore, to the extent that national security (e.g., of the United 
States) is tied to a thriving and vibrant IT industry, national security would 
benefit as well from widespread adoption of these norms.
93. Microsoft Corporation, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Inter-
net-Dependent World (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, December 2014), 11–13, http://
aka.ms/cybernorms.
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Observing these norms of behavior would not prohibit the use of all cyber 
weapons—only those that are based on taking advantage of design or imple-
mentation vulnerabilities existing in deployed products and services. In princi-
ple, the use of other cyber weapons—such as those based on taking advantage 
of flawed configurations (e.g., a port left open when it should have been closed) 
or taking advantage of features designed into the product or service in an unex-
pected or novel way—would still be allowable. Denial of service attacks would 
also be permissible in principle as well, as long as the computers used to launch 
such attacks had not been compromised through a design or implementation 
vulnerability. But these norms would inhibit “zero-day” penetrations or com-
promises (which are regarded as being enormously powerful) and would unam-
biguously commit nations to help vendors improve the security of the products 
and services they offer.
A second step the private sector—specifically vendors of IT products and 
services—has begun to take is to reduce the number of vulnerabilities through 
“bug bounty” programs. A bug bounty program is an offer from a vendor to 
pay and otherwise recognize individuals who report vulnerabilities in the prod-
uct or services of that vendor. A continuously updated list of such programs 
is maintained online.94 When these programs work, they provide vendors with 
information about previously unknown vulnerabilities that they can then repair 
before adversaries can take advantage of them. In addition, at least one firm has 
been established with a business model that connects finders of vulnerabilities 
with the appropriate bug bounty programs.95
By reducing the number of unknown vulnerabilities available to develop-
ers of cyber weapons, bug bounty programs are in principle a market-based 
mechanism that helps to inhibit the development of such weapons. However, 
the extent to which these programs have been successful in doing so is not 
yet known.
The Role of Scientists, Scientific Societies, and Community Norms
The major society in the United States associated with computer professionals 
is ACM (formerly the Association for Computing Machinery). ACM includes 
about one hundred thousand members, which is only a small fraction of the 
number of programmers and software developers in the United States.96 Mem-
bership is available to anyone for a nominal fee, and the major benefit of mem-
bership is access to an array of professional journals.
94. “The Bug Bounty List,” Bugcrowd, n.d., https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.
95. Nicole Perlroth, “HackerOne Connects Hackers with Companies, and Hopes for a Win-
Win,” New York Times, June 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/technology/
hackerone-connects-hackers-with-companies-and-hopes-for-a-win-win.html.
96. Abel Avram, “IDC Study: How Many Software Developers Are Out There?” InfoQ, January 
31, 2014, http://www.infoq.com/news/2014/01/IDC-software-developers; and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, “Software Developers,” Occupational Outlook Handbook, n.d., http://www.bls 
.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/software-developers.htm.
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ACM promulgates a code of ethics for its members, of which two provisions 
are relevant. Section 1.2 requires members to “avoid harm to others” and pro-
hibits “use of computing technology in ways that result in harm. . . . Harmful 
actions include intentional destruction or modification of files and programs 
leading to serious loss of resources.” Section 2.8 requires members to “access 
computing and communication resources only when authorized to do so” and 
states that “one must always have appropriate approval before using system 
resources, including communication ports, file space, other system peripherals, 
and computer time.”97
The code is silent about the responsibility of members to refrain from cre-
ating or developing cyber weapons; it speaks only to use.
On the educational side, accreditation of university-level computer science 
programs is provided by the Computer Science Accreditation Board, a mem-
ber of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), a 
nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that accredits over 3,400 programs 
at nearly seven hundred colleges and universities in twenty-eight countries.98 
The requirements for accreditation in computing do not include any course or 
project work that relates to ethical or legal issues in computing, although a more 
general requirement (that is, one imposed by ABET for accreditation in all rel-
evant disciplines) states that students should graduate with “an understanding 
of professional, ethical, legal, security and social issues and responsibilities.”99
Nevertheless, for much of its history as a formal academic discipline, com-
puter science has had a moderately strong norm against providing formal edu-
cation intended to teach hacking skills.100 However, in recent years, this norm 
has started to break down as a number of educational institutions have begun 
to teach courses explicitly intended to nurture hacking skills.101 Debate on the 
topic continues. Teachers of such courses note that they include a substantial 
ethical treatment in their courses and that their graduates are eagerly sought 
by government agencies and private sector entities who need people with 
such skills for carrying out offensive operations against adversary computers 
or approved “white-hat” penetration testing against an organization’s cyber 
defenses. Detractors dislike the idea of sanctioned or approved cyber intrusions, 
97. “ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct,” n.d., http://www.acm.org/about/code 
-of-ethics.
98. “About ABET,” n.d., http://www.abet.org/about-abet/.
99. “Criteria for Accrediting Computing Programs, 2016–2017,” n.d., http://www.abet.org/
accreditation/accreditation-criteria/criteria-for-accrediting-computing-programs-2016-2017/.
100. See, for example, Eugene H. Spafford, “Are Computer Hacker Break-Ins Ethical?” Journal 
of Systems and Software 41 (17) (1992): 41–47.
101. Ellen Nakashima and Ashkan Soltani, “The Ethics of Hacking 101,” Washington Post, Octo-
ber 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/the-ethics-of-hacking-101/2014/ 
10/07/39529518-4014-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html; Jackie Kemp, “The Crack 
Team,” Guardian, October 20, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/education/2008/oct/ 
21/hacking; and Queena Kim, “Good Hack, Bad Hack: A Cybersecurity Camp Teaches the 
Ethics of Hacking,” Marketplace, July 2, 2013.
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arguing that all vulnerabilities discovered should be promptly reported to par-
ties responsible for fixing them.
Academic researchers do undertake research on vulnerabilities in products 
and services with the intent of enhancing cybersecurity from the defensive per-
spective. In doing such work, the expectation of the community is that such 
research is published, and far from being regarded as antisocial or hostile activ-
ity, work to uncover weaknesses is praised by the community because only when 
such weaknesses become known can they be addressed.
One example is a series of annual workshops on offensive technologies 
(WOOT) that began in 2007. According to the current description, WOOT 
aims “to present a broad picture of offense and its contributions, bringing 
together researchers and practitioners in all areas of computer security. Offensive 
security has changed from a hobby to an industry. No longer an exercise for 
isolated enthusiasts, offensive security is today a large-scale operation managed 
by organized, capitalized actors.”102 But the fundamental rationale for such 
work is that it informs work on defensive technologies.
Another example is the research community for cryptography. Algorithms 
for encryption (which scramble and descramble digitally represented data) are 
designed to be impervious to anything but a “brute-force” attack in which 
decryption can be reliably accomplished by trying all possible decryption keys. 
But deep mathematical research can reveal vulnerabilities in an encryption algo-
rithm that allow shortcuts to be taken, thus reducing the effort needed to 
accomplish a decryption.
Users of encryption algorithms count on such research to reveal weak-
nesses. As a specific illustration, in 1997 the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) announced the initiation of a development effort for an 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) that would specify one or more encryp-
tion algorithms capable of protecting sensitive government information well 
into the twenty-first century.103 Some twenty months later, NIST announced a 
group of fifteen AES candidate algorithms, submitted by members of the cryp-
tographic community from around the world. NIST used an extensive public 
process to obtain technical commentary on the candidate algorithms, and on 
the basis of these comments NIST decided on a specific algorithm for the AES.
In general, security researchers also investigate vulnerabilities in deployed 
products, and many such individuals adhere to an ethic of “responsible disclo-
sure” in which they privately report a discovered vulnerability to the vendor 
and temporarily withhold public disclosure to give the vendor time to repair 
it. However, a growing number of such individuals are finding ways to profit 
from their discoveries, selling them to vendors (which often offer bounties for 
102. “9th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies: WOOT ’15,” Usenix, n.d., https://
www.usenix.org/conference/woot15.
103. National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
Development Effort,” updated February 28, 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/index2 
.html.
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vulnerabilities) or on the black market to parties for eventual incorporation into 
cyber weapons.
GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL AND  
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF CYBER WEAPONS
All governments are concerned about cyber weapons being used against them 
and their interests by other nations and nonstate parties—that is, they are con-
cerned about cybersecurity as the term is traditionally defined (i.e., as defense 
against hostile cyber activities). Furthermore, they are all concerned about the 
criminal use of cyber weapons—that is, nonstate actors, whether associated with 
another state or within their own jurisdictional reach, using such weapons for 
criminal purposes such as fraud, theft, or blackmail.
At the same time, many governments—most often the governments of 
major world powers—see value in having the ability to use cyber weapons. 
For example, cyber weapons are useful for espionage operations against other 
nations, including both government and private sector entities. Cyber weapons 
also have offensive (and destructive) capabilities that many nations are reluc-
tant to abandon because of their operational advantages. For example, cyber 
weapons favor the offense in the sense that it is very difficult to erect defenses 
against them, their use can often be conducted with plausible deniability, the 
effects of their use can vary broadly, they offer the possibility of asymmetric 
advantage against nations that are heavily dependent on IT, and they can be 
relatively inexpensive compared to traditional kinetic weapons. Nonetheless, 
almost all nations are silent on the question of their national capabilities for 
conducting offensive operations in cyberspace or even on the possibility that 
these capabilities might be useful to them. (Apart from the United States, the 
most significant exception to this general reluctance to discuss matters related 
to offensive cyber activities is the Dutch Ministry of Defence.)
However, just because governments see value in having access to cyber 
weapons does not mean they are necessarily sanguine about actually using 
those weapons. For example, the United States was concerned about the prec-
edent-setting nature of using cyber weapons long before the Stuxnet operation 
was launched, and even after Stuxnet the United States had similar concerns 
about the use of such weapons against Libya and in that case chose not to use 
them.104 Recent news stories also indicate that Western cyber activities against 
104. William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, eds., Technology, Policy, Law, 
and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009); and Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Debated 
Cyberwarfare against Libya,” New York Times, October 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html.
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the Iranian nuclear infrastructure drove an Iranian cyber retaliation against U.S. 
financial institutions.105
Governments do differ significantly in their willingness to outlaw the use 
of cyber weapons in a domestic legal context. In some cases, they have a robust 
legal regime that criminalizes the use of cyber weapons and a willingness to 
enforce that regime. Most of the signatories of the Budapest Convention are 
in this category. In other cases, an existing legal regime is accompanied by a 
reluctance to enforce those laws. Russia is widely regarded as an example.106
COMMENTARY AND DISCUSSION
Cyber weapons can play a much different role in conflict than nuclear weapons. 
The use of a nuclear weapon would be a threshold event of enormous strategic 
and political significance. By contrast, cyber weapons are being used every day 
by a broad range of adversaries, ranging from individual misguided teenagers to 
major nation-states—and many of these uses go entirely unnoticed. Thus, the 
use of a cyber weapon per se does not cross any kind of threshold. Only if such 
use resulted in a sufficiently large impact would it do so.
Cyber weapons also have clear value in causing damage if that is the goal. 
From a policy-maker perspective, nuclear weapons are highly unusable (despite 
the fact that military planners can easily contemplate their use), and indeed none 
have been used as a part of hostilities since 1945.107 Biological weapons have 
been widely regarded as unpredictable in their effects and of limited value in 
combat for much of their history, as their use in a conflict might well result in 
blowback against friendly forces and populations.108
105. See David Sanger, “Document Reveals Growth of Cyberwarfare between the U.S. and 
Iran,” New York Times, February 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/ 
document-reveals-growth-of-cyberwarfare-between-the-us-and-iran.html.
106. See, for example, John Blau, “Russia—A Happy Haven for Hackers,” Computer Weekly, May 
2004, http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Russia-a-happy-haven-for-hackers.
107. On the other hand, Paul Bracken points out that exploding a nuclear weapon is not the only 
way to “use” it. Moving nuclear weapons from one place to another or changing the alert status 
of nuclear delivery vehicles are actions that do not involve exploding nuclear weapons but that 
still may send politically significant messages. See Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 2013).
108. Even real and legitimate concerns about blowback in cyber are not analogous. For biological 
weapons, blowback is tactical—the same organisms that cause illness in an adversary can cause 
illness in friendly populations. For cyber weapons, blowback is strategic—launching a cyberattack 
sets precedents and helps to establish cyberattack as a legitimate means of conflict, but rarely 
would a cyber weapon be turned back on its user without significant modification. On the use of 
biological weapons more generally, see Jozef Goldblat, “The Biological Weapons Convention—
An Overview,” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 318 (June 30, 1997), https://www.icrc 
.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnpa.htm; and Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, 
President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program (Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, October 2009), http://wmdcenter.dodlive 
.mil/files/2011/11/cswmd_cs1.pdf.
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In the most general case for any weapon, acquisition requires both physical 
infrastructure (e.g., laboratories and appropriate physical devices or materials) 
and appropriate knowledge. For many cyber weapons, the physical infrastruc-
ture is not a limiting factor—the computers on which these applications can be 
developed are ubiquitous. In other cases (especially those in which the intended 
target is a specific physical system), adequate testing of adversarial applications 
may require the development and deployment of physical environments that 
mimic the intended target.109
IT and cyber weapons also have a different history than other types of 
weapons, such as nuclear or biological. The underlying IT is ubiquitous (i.e., 
more than just broadly available) around the world. Those who create cyber 
weapons take advantage of this technology base, but they are not—and never 
have been—primarily researchers. Since (more or less) the first computers, hack-
ers have been curious about how these systems work. What once made the 
threat from hackers manageable was the small number of computers in the 
world and the largely prevailing ethos of hackers to refrain from damaging the 
systems they hacked.
The cyber weapons developed in this early era were derived not from science 
but from engineering and exploration. Even today, with only a few exceptions, 
cyber weapons are not created as the result of scientific research on IT and do 
not involve the discovery of new principles. For example, the penetration aspect 
of a cyber weapon may involve the discovery of a previously unknown weak-
ness or vulnerability in an existing IT artifact such as a computer program. The 
payload aspect of a cyber weapon may involve the writing of a new computer 
program that manipulates the control system of a chemical plant. In neither case 
would one generally say that new principles were discovered.
Nor are scientific experiments involved in creating cyber weapons. To be 
sure, cyber weapons may be tested against various targets to understand how 
they might be made more effective, but such tests generally lack the features 
that characterize most scientific experiments (e.g., hypothesis testing). In fact, 
high school students have been developing techniques to penetrate computer 
systems for many years. (The author of this paper was one such high school 
student several decades ago.)
Governments fund a considerable amount of scientific research on IT, but 
since the connection between scientific research and cyber weapons is tenuous 
at best, research funding is mostly irrelevant to the creation of cyber weapons 
except insofar as such funding contributes to the overall foundations of IT.
As a result of this history, those interested in the governance of cyber weap-
ons are faced with the problem of creating new institutions and mechanisms 
where many fewer choke points exist. The inevitable result resembles what is 
seen today—a paucity of such mechanisms and institutions compared to those 
109. For example, the development of Stuxnet required the construction of a test facility con-
taining centrifuges identical to the ones Stuxnet was intended to attack. See Broad, Markoff, and 
Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay.”
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for biological and nuclear technologies and little prospect for establishing them 
on a wide scale.
One might imagine that under the rubric of “Internet governance,” discus-
sions occur regarding preventing the use of cyber weapons. But in this sphere, 
there is considerable dispute as to the appropriate participants and what subjects 
are included under the rubric of “Internet governance,” and few if any proposals 
explicitly address the acquisition or use of cyber weapons.
The dispute in Internet governance regarding participation centers on 
whether Internet governance is a multilateral endeavor or a multistakeholder 
endeavor. Those who favor a multilateral approach emphasize the role of 
national governments as the primary actors in Internet governance. Those who 
favor a multistakeholder approach identify governments as actors coequal to 
other stakeholders, such as private sector companies, public interest/civil society 
groups, and other nongovernment organizations.
The dispute over the purview of Internet governance centers on how, if 
at all, Internet governance should extend beyond the traditional function of 
managing IP addresses and domain names. Advocates of extending the scope of 
“Internet governance” wish to include regulation of various behaviors related 
to use of the Internet. Certain nations—China and Russia, for example—are 
strong advocates for the respect of national sovereignty and the right of each 
nation to define for itself the important aspects of its own history, culture, and 
social system. From this flows the natural consequence that these governments 
are concerned not only about cyber weapons that might pass through their bor-
ders but also about news stories and other information they find objectionable. 
(These concerns are generally labeled “information security.”) And they insist 
on the authority to limit their populations’ access to such information.
Advocates of restricting the scope of Internet governance to its traditional 
function reject the proposition that nations should have the right to censor the 
information to which citizens have access. Concerns about “hostile informa-
tion” that might be detrimental to state sovereignty conflict directly with the 
Western tradition of free speech and expression. Thus, a stalemate has existed 
along these lines for many years.
The debate is complicated by the scope of regulation contemplated by 
advocates of state-based information control. Specifically, centralized technical 
measures taken to restrict the use of cyber weapons transmitted through the 
Internet also conflict with the fundamental underlying design philosophy of the 
Internet. The Internet was designed in such a way that its only function is to do 
the best job possible in carrying bits from A to B without regard for the meaning 
of those bits. Whether those bits are the New York Times, a picture of my moth-
er’s cats, malicious software embedded in a PDF file, a program for running 
statistical regressions, or pornography—the Internet is designed to carry it all.
Blocking specific content at the point of receipt—at B—is a relatively 
straightforward task, assuming that objectionable content can be specified 
clearly. But in this case, blocking at point B depends on B controlling the deci-
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S156
sion to block. Nations that wish to block certain content without B’s involve-
ment inevitably resort to more centralized mechanisms located between A and 
B—that is, in the Internet infrastructure itself. Such changes to the underlying 
infrastructure would facilitate the fragmentation of the Internet into disparate 
and perhaps noninteroperable subnetworks.110
CONCLUSION
The use of a cyber weapon can have negative effects on data or program integ-
rity (in which data or computer operations are altered with respect to what 
users expect), on availability (in which services normally provided to users of 
the system or network are unavailable when expected), and on confidentiality 
(in which information that users expect to be kept secret is exposed to others).
The agents that might use cyber weapons span a broad range, including 
lone hackers acting as individuals; criminals acting on their own for profit; 
organized crime (e.g., drug cartels); transnational terrorists (perhaps acting with 
state sponsorship or tolerance); small nation-states; and major nation-states. 
Certain nonstate actors make a business out of using cyber weapons of various 
kinds against targets of their customers’ choosing.
Today, few nations regulate or have laws concerning the creation or acqui-
sition of cyber weapons, notwithstanding export control regimes that seek to 
prevent “bad” nations from obtaining cyber weapons or related knowledge 
from the nations that have them and bug bounty programs that reduce the 
supply of vulnerabilities that may be used to create cyber weapons.
International law is silent on the acquisition or use of cyber weapons, 
though to the extent that nations agree that the laws of armed conflict apply 
to cyberspace, some uses of cyber weapons are not permitted. Most nations 
of the world explicitly endorse the idea of a peaceful cyberspace, though no 
nation has publicly adopted a policy of refraining from using cyber weapons 
in its international relations for national security purposes. However, a variety 
of domestic laws in the nations of the world prohibit the criminal use of cyber 
weapons in various contexts.
Within the IT community, no broadly accepted and observed norms or 
codes of behavior proscribe, inhibit, or discourage the technical work needed 
to uncover vulnerabilities that can be used in cyber weapons. Indeed, those who 
do such work often receive accolades and financial rewards from IT product and 
service vendors when those vulnerabilities are revealed so that they may be fixed.
Four primary reasons explain why governance measures regarding cyber 
weapons have not been widely adopted. First, the underlying technology is 
ubiquitous, and it is too easy to create cyber weapons. Second, they are too 
110. More discussion of this point can be found in David Clark, Tom Berson, and Herbert Lin, 
eds., At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academies Press, 2014).
CHAPTER 3:  GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBER WEAPONS 157
useful for governments to give up or even to curb. Third, the use of a cyber 
weapon does not necessarily cross dangerous thresholds—at the lower end, the 
effect of such use is merely an annoyance or a prank, if that, which means that 
it is difficult to build cultures to inhibit such behavior per se. At the higher end, 
the threats posed by the use of cyber weapons are potentially quite serious, even 
if they are not existential in the same way that the use of nuclear or biological 
weapons can be. Finally, so many paths lead toward the IT expertise necessary 
to build cyber weapons that it would be well-nigh impossible for any gover-
nance mechanism—or set of governance mechanisms—to intervene effectively 
to prevent the development of such expertise.
This brief survey of the prospects for governance and oversight for cyber 
weapons suggests to this author that the future is grim. Cyber weapons have 
definite utility for national governments (especially in the domain of cyber 
espionage), and that utility has been demonstrated repeatedly in the last two 
decades. Accepting negotiated or unilateral constraints on cyber weapons would 
reduce their utility. Organizations both public and private need to be able to 
test their systems against cyber weapons that might be used against them (i.e., 
so-called penetration testing). Add to these points the easy availability of cyber 
weapons and the lack of meaningful choke points at which governance measures 
might operate, and one can easily see why few governance measures for cyber 
weapons exist today.
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Concluding Observations
Elisa D. Harris
TECHNOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND  
GOVERNANCE PROSPECTS
In a 2006 study the U.S. National Academy of Sciences suggested thinking 
about the proliferation potential of nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons as 
a continuum or line, with the weapons whose spread was most amenable to 
nonproliferation efforts—nuclear—on the far left, and the weapons offering 
the most limited opportunities—cyber—on the far right. Biological weapons 
fell somewhere between them: not as amenable to nonproliferation efforts as 
nuclear, but not as limited as cyber.1 The governance potential of these tech-
nologies can be thought of as a similar continuum or line, with the technology 
most amenable to governance efforts—nuclear—again on the far left, and the 
technology with the most limited opportunities—information technology—on 
the far right. Biological technology is again somewhere between them.
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the position of each of these 
technologies on a governance continuum is closely related to its characteris-
tics—its history and potential uses; the nature and availability of the relevant 
material and equipment; the level of effort required to use it for destructive 
purposes; and its possible effects (see Table 5). Nuclear technology has a special 
history, having begun as a military technology developed by the government 
for weapons purposes that later was exploited for civilian applications, primarily 
energy and research. National governments were and remain central to the 
development and use of nuclear technology, even in countries where utilities or 
other private sector entities operate nuclear facilities.
The opposite is true for biological and information technology, which 
were first and foremost civilian technologies whose destructive potential was 
recognized only after their legitimate uses had been well established. Biologi-
cal materials and equipment have extensive civilian uses, including in research, 
medicine, and agriculture. Information technology also has an unlimited num-
1. Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future 
of the Life Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2006), 53–56, http://www 
.nap.edu/catalog/11567/globalization-biosecurity-and-the-future-of-the-life-sciences.
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ber of legitimate applications. Governments have played an important role in 
the development and use of both technologies. The first applications of modern 
information technology, computers, were for military purposes such as code 
breaking and computations for the atomic bomb. But the most important stake-
holders in both the biological and information technology areas are private 
entities: academic institutions, companies, and individuals.2
The nature and availability of the material and equipment, as well as the 
level of effort needed to use nuclear, biological, and information technology for 
destructive purposes, also are very different. In the case of a nuclear explosive 
device, the number of key materials (primarily highly enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium) and key technologies (enrichment and reprocessing) are 
limited, although other dual-use materials (such as low enriched uranium and 
spent fuel) and technologies (nuclear reactors) can also be used. There also are 
a relatively limited number of countries that possess or can supply the neces-
sary technology. Moreover, although nonstate actors may be able to acquire a 
so-called dirty bomb, developing a nuclear weapon that will not only work but 
can be delivered successfully to a target is extremely challenging and costly and 
requires a dedicated national program.3
In contrast to nuclear weapons, a much wider array of materials and equip-
ment can be used to develop biological warfare agents. More than 125 “con-
ventional” pathogens and toxins and nine categories of equipment currently are 
controlled by Australia Group members because they can be used to produce 
biological warfare agents. Synthetic biology and other advances in science and 
technology are expanding the number of potential threat agents still further, 
as well as the range of practitioners, which includes not only researchers in 
academic or private laboratories but engineers and others outside the scientific 
community. Many of the materials and items of equipment used by this broader 
universe of practitioners are globally available, making the creation of modified 
or novel pathogens easier and cheaper than ever before. Yet even as the num-
ber and type of actors who could develop a dangerous pathogen has prolifer-
ated, producing a weapons-grade biological warfare agent and disseminating it 
effectively remains both technically and operationally much more difficult than 
generally is believed.
2. Vernon Ruttan, The Role of the Public Sector in Technology Development: Generalizations from 
General Purpose Technologies, Science, Technology, and Innovation Discussion Paper no. 11 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for International Development, 2001), http://
www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/biotech/papers/discussion11_ruttan.pdf.
3. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program demonstrates, however, that even a relatively back-
ward and financially strapped country can develop a nuclear capability if it is sufficiently deter-
mined and able to secure outside assistance.
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Table 5: Characteristics of Nuclear, Biological, 
and Information Technology
Nuclear Technology Biological Technology Information Technology 
Military origins Civilian origins Civilian origins
Weapons-grade materials 
difficult, costly to produce
Modified and novel patho-
gens increasingly easy and 
cheap to produce; weapon-
ization and dissemination 
difficult
Many cyber weapons very 
easy, cheap to produce;  
higher-end uses challenging
Separated plutonium, highly 
enriched uranium, low 
enriched uranium, spent fuel, 
enrichment and reprocessing 
equipment, nuclear power 
reactors
> 125 pathogens and toxins; 
9 categories of equipment; 
threat agents increasing with 
technological advances
No special materials or facil-
ities; billions of computers 
with underlying information 
technology
15 countries with enrichment 
and/or reprocessing plants;
< 10 countries supply enrich-
ment and reprocessing tech-
nology and nuclear reactors
Created, stored, and used at 
wide range of laboratories 
(government, academic, 
industry) and private facilities 
in many countries
Computers and information 
technology ubiquitous
Limited nonmilitary applica-
tions: energy, research
Extensive legitimate applica-
tions (e.g., research, medi-
cine, agriculture), including 
biodefense countermeasures
Unlimited legitimate 
applications
Can cause massive loss of 
human life and physical 
destruction
Can cause massive loss of life 
(human, animal, and plant) 
and can contaminate physical 
infrastructure
Can cause nuisance, large-
scale commercial and 
economic damage; loss of life 
indirectly
Source: Adapted in part from Jonathan B. Tucker, “Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The 
Need for Global Biosecurity Standards,” Arms Control Today 33 (5) (June 2003): 3–10.
Rather than special materials or facilities, the key technology used in cyber 
weapons is information technology. Information technology is available wher-
ever computers are available. Initially, the small number of computers was the 
determining factor in limiting hostile applications of information technology. 
Today, an estimated fifteen billion devices around the world are connected to the 
Internet, a significant portion of which are computers, and the number is grow-
ing.4 Except for high-end uses, cyber weapons also are orders of magnitude easier 
and cheaper to produce than nuclear explosive devices or biological weapons, 
as anyone with access to a computer can, in principle, develop such a weapon.
A final characteristic that has influenced the governance potential of each 
of these technologies is its destructive effects. Since the attacks on Hiroshima 
4. Rob Soderbery, “How Many Things Are Currently Connected to the ‘Internet of Things’ 
(IoT)?” Forbes, January 7, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/01/07/how-many 
-things-are-currently-connected-to-the-internet-of-things-iot/.
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and Nagasaki in 1945, it has been clear that nuclear technology can be used to 
cause massive loss of life as well as physical damage. While no comparable use of 
biological technology has occurred, the potential impact, particularly of a highly 
lethal agent that can spread from person to person, also has been recognized 
for many years. These concerns about the mass-destruction effects of nuclear 
and biological weapons have helped stimulate efforts to prevent the spread 
and use of the relevant technologies, including the negotiation of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), and many of the other governance measures discussed in 
the preceding pages.
In contrast to nuclear and biological weapons, cyber weapons have been 
used repeatedly and, in some cases, on a large scale for hostile purposes by both 
national governments and other actors. Some cyberattacks, such as the attack on 
Estonia’s government and media websites and banking services, have resulted 
in lengthy denials of service throughout the attacked country. Others, like the 
attack on the Saudi national oil company’s computers, disrupted important 
commercial activities. Still others, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s ura-
nium enrichment centrifuges, destroyed vital computer-controlled machinery. 
A number of other cyberattacks, such as the data breach at the retailer Target, 
have put tens of millions of customer records at risk. But none of these attacks 
has led to concerted efforts to control the use of cyber weapons, perhaps in part 
because no human lives were lost.
These characteristics of nuclear, biological, and information technology 
go a long way toward explaining the three technologies’ differing governance 
potential. Nuclear technology has been more amenable to governance efforts 
because its enormous destructive potential has been clear from the outset and 
because the principal actors involved have been national governments. Even 
where commercial and other private entities have a stake in nuclear policy, those 
interests generally are addressed in the internal deliberations within govern-
ment. Moreover, the dual-use nuclear items that have been the focus of gov-
ernance, the countries that can supply those items, and the dual-use activities 
in which they are used are relatively limited, all of which have facilitated gov-
ernance efforts.
By comparison, everything about cyber weapons runs counter to gover-
nance: the underlying technology and the computers on which it is used are 
deeply embedded in civilian society around the world; the production of most 
cyber weapons requires no special materials or facilities; and the range of stake-
holders—anyone with access to information technology and a computer—is 
virtually unlimited. Moreover, unlike nuclear and biological weapons, cyber 
weapons can put human lives at risk only indirectly by, for example, targeting 
critical infrastructure such as nuclear and chemical facilities, gas pipelines, transit 
systems, and water supplies.
Biological technology occupies a position between nuclear and informa-
tion technology on a governance continuum. Biological technology has far 
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more civilian applications than nuclear technology, but it is not ubiquitous, as 
is the case with information technology. The range of biological materials and 
equipment that could produce a highly dangerous pathogen is much larger than 
with nuclear technology but, even with advances in science, not as widespread 
as the computers used to launch cyber attacks. The universe of actors that 
have a stake in biological governance continues to expand well beyond those 
engaged in nuclear activities but does not include every level of society, as with 
information technology.
EXISTING DUAL-USE GOVERNANCE MEASURES
Given these differences, it is not surprising that a side-by-side comparison of the 
types of governance measures that have been adopted in these technology areas 
reveals the greatest common ground between nuclear and biological technol-
ogy. As Table 6 shows, various international and national measures have been 
adopted in an effort to prevent dual-use nuclear and biological technology from 
being used for weapons purposes. The NPT and the BWC have been central to 
these efforts, embodying both the norm against destructive applications of these 
technologies and the specific obligations that give it legal effect. At the national 
level, many countries have adopted legislation criminalizing the activities pro-
hibited by the treaties and, in the case of the NPT, authorizing International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and monitoring of their civilian 
nuclear activities.
A much wider range of international and national efforts have sought to 
control access to dual-use nuclear and biological materials, equipment, and 
information. Some, such as the export control harmonization activities of the 
Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Australia 
Group, have focused on denying other countries access to technology that could 
be used to develop nuclear and biological weapons and thus are important com-
plements to the NPT and BWC. Preventing the spread of weapons and related 
technology to other countries was also the initial aim of the U.S. Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which helped Russia and other for-
mer Soviet republics secure nuclear, biological, and other materials, dismantle 
former biological weapons facilities, and redirect former weapons scientists to 
peaceful activities.
Many other measures, particularly since September 11, have sought to deny 
terrorists access to technology that could be used to develop nuclear and bio-
logical weapons. This has been done through a variety of means. For example, 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, all UN 
member states are obligated to adopt national legislation to prevent terrorists 
from obtaining materials, equipment, and information for nuclear, biological, 
and other weapons. Other measures, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) and the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, are designed to help countries 
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track and interdict illegal shipments of dual-use materials. Even international 
industry groups have become involved, with nuclear power plant exporters 
and two synthetic biology industry associations committing to screen customer 
orders for the dual-use items they sell. On a national level, antiterrorism legis-
lation in the United States and other countries has tightened domestic controls 
on biological materials and facilities, as well as on the individuals who have 
access to them. Similar efforts have been undertaken to ensure the security and 
safety of domestic nuclear facilities and materials.
Finally, international and national measures have been developed to pro-
mote the safe and secure handling and use of dual-use nuclear and biological 
technology. This includes guidelines on nuclear security issued by the IAEA and 
guidelines on biosafety and biosecurity issued by the World Health Organization 
(WHO). It also includes the codes of ethics and conduct promulgated by various 
international and national scientific organizations to discourage destructive appli-
cations of biology. In addition to these nonbinding measures, European Union 
(EU) member states have enacted controls on the safe handling of genetically 
modified organisms, based on EU regulations and directives, and Israel and 
Denmark have enacted legislation requiring prior review and approval of certain 
categories of dual-use biological research that could raise security concerns.
G O V E R N A N C E  O F  D U A L - U S E  T E C H N O L O G I E S164
Table 6: Governance of Nuclear, Biological, 
and Information Technology
Governance Measure Nuclear 
Technology
Biological 
Technology
Information 
Technology
International Initiatives Outlawing 
Hostile/Weapons Activities
Prohibition on development and pos-
session of dual-use (DU) materials for 
weapons purposes
Partial
(NPT)
Yes
(BWC)
No
Prohibition on assisting other countries 
to acquire DU materials for weapons 
purposes
Yes
(NPT)
Yes
(BWC)
No
International oversight of national DU 
activities and materials to ensure nonuse 
for weapons purposes
Yes
(IAEA 
safeguards)
No No
Commitment to adopt national laws 
outlawing hostile/weapons activities with 
DU materials
Yes
(NPT)
Yes
(BWC)
Yes
(Budapest
Convention)
International Efforts to Control Access 
to DU Materials
Requirement to share information on ter-
rorists’ efforts to acquire DU materials
Yes
(UNSCR 
1373)
Yes
(UNSCR 
1373)
No
Requirement for national measures to 
prevent terrorists’ acquisition/use of DU 
materials and equipment
Yes
(Convention 
on Physical 
Protection 
of Nuclear 
Materials, 
amended)
Yes
(UNSCR 
1540)
No
Commitment to harmonize national 
controls on transfers of DU materials and 
equipment to other countries
Yes
(Zangger 
Committee 
and Nuclear 
Suppliers 
Group)
Yes
(Australia 
Group)
Yes
(Wassenaar
Arrangement)
Commitment to assist countries in elimi-
nating weapons, material, and facilities and 
redirecting former weapons scientists in 
former Soviet Union and other countries
Yes
(G8 Global 
Partnership)
Yes
(G8 Global 
Partnership)
No
Commitment to interdict shipments of 
DU materials to countries/terrorists
Yes
(PSI)
Yes
(PSI)
No
Assistance to countries in tracking smug-
gling of DU materials
Yes
(IAEA Illicit 
Trafficking 
Database)
No No
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Governance Measure Nuclear 
Technology
Biological 
Technology
Information 
Technology
Assistance to countries in securing 
DU materials and strengthening laws 
prohibiting acquisition/use of DU- 
based weapons
Yes
(IAEA Divi-
sion of Nucle-
ar Security
Yes
(INTERPOL 
Bioterrorism 
Prevention 
Program)
No
Commitment by industry to screen orders 
of DU materials and equipment
Yes
(Nuclear 
Power Plant 
Exporters)
Yes
(International 
Association 
Synthetic 
Biology)
No
International Initiatives on the 
Handling of DU Materials
Guidelines for safe handling and use of 
DU materials
Yes* Yes
(WHO 
manual)
No
Guidelines for security of DU materials Yes
(IAEA 
INFCIRC225)
Yes
(WHO 
manual)
No
Codes of ethics/conduct/practice Yes
(World 
Institute 
for Nuclear 
Security)
Yes
(InterAcademy
Panel)
No
National Initiatives on Hostile/
Weapons Activities
Prohibition on use of DU materials for 
hostile/weapons purposes
Yes
(IAEA 
safeguards 
implementing 
legislation)
Yes
(BWC im-
plementing 
legislation)
Yes
(U.S. Com-
puter Fraud 
and Abuse 
Act)
Review of DU R&D activities for com-
pliance with international commitments 
outlawing hostile/weapons activities
No Yes
(U.S. De-
partment of 
Defense BWC 
Compliance 
Review 
Group)
No
National Efforts to Control Access to 
DU Materials
Controls on transfers of DU materials and 
equipment to other countries
Yes
(export con-
trols by NSG 
members)
Yes
(export con-
trols by EU 
members)
Yes
(export 
controls by 
Wassenaar 
members)
Controls on domestic access to DU 
materials
Yes
(U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[NRC] licens-
ing condition)
Yes
(U.S. select 
agent rules)
No
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Governance Measure Nuclear 
Technology
Biological 
Technology
Information 
Technology
Controls on facilities that possess and use 
DU materials
Yes
(U.S. NRC 
licensing 
condition)
Yes
(UK Anti-Ter-
rorism Crime 
and Security 
Act)
No
Controls on individuals with access to DU 
materials
Yes
(U.S. NRC 
licensing 
condition)
Yes
(Canadian 
Human 
Pathogens and 
Toxin Act)
No
Commitment to eliminate weapons, ma-
terial, and facilities and to redirect former 
weapons scientists in former Soviet Union 
and other countries
Yes
(U.S. 
Nunn-Lugar)
Yes
(U.S. 
Nunn-Lugar)
No
Guidelines for industry screening of orders 
for DU materials
No Yes
(U.S. gene 
sequence 
screening)
No
National Initiatives on the Handling of 
DU Materials and Information
Controls on safe handling/use of DU 
materials
Yes* Yes
(EU geneti-
cally modified 
organism 
directives)
No
Requirements for oversight of DU research 
for security concerns
No Yes
(Danish biose-
curity act)
No
Processes for reviewing DU manuscripts 
for potential security concerns
No Yes
(American 
Society of 
Microbiology 
journals)
No
Codes of ethics/conduct/practice No Yes
(Dutch 
Academy of 
Sciences)
Yes
(U.S. ACM 
code)
Note: The measures listed in parentheses are intended to be illustrative and thus in some cases do 
not reflect all of the relevant governance measures adopted.
* An extensive body of rules and guidelines concerns nuclear safety, but unlike in the biological 
area these are entirely distinct from nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security measures.
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In contrast to nuclear and biological weapons, cyber weapons have not 
been outlawed by international treaty and are in fact being used on a daily 
basis by a wide range of actors from teenage hackers to national governments. 
Some of these uses have been highly destructive of commercial and economic 
interests but thus far have not resulted in the loss of human life. International 
legal experts have argued that the laws of war and the UN Charter apply to 
cyberspace and, as such, that some uses of cyber weapons are not permitted. 
However, even governments like the United States that share this view have 
been unwilling to forgo the option of using cyber weapons. Moreover, as the 
experience with the Stuxnet computer worm attack on Iran’s nuclear program 
shows, whether a given use of a cyber weapon is legitimate looks very different 
depending on whether one is the initiator or the target of the attack.
It is not surprising, therefore, that only a handful of governance mea-
sures have been adopted to try to prevent destructive applications of informa-
tion technology. Internationally, the forty-seven states that are parties to the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime have agreed to enact national legislation 
criminalizing certain behaviors in cyberspace, such as unauthorized access to a 
computer or illegal interception of data. Many of these countries, as participants 
in the Wassenaar Arrangement, also control the export of certain dual-use items 
that could be used in cyber weapons, such as equipment related to intrusion 
software or network surveillance systems. At the national level, legislation in 
various countries also has proscribed certain unauthorized uses of information 
technology, including to gain access to computers or to intercept electronic 
communications. In the United States, a society for computer professionals, 
ACM, also has issued a code of ethics for its members that prohibits them from 
using computing technology in ways that cause harm.
CHALLENGES TO GOVERNANCE OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
As the previous chapters have shown, governance efforts in each of the three 
technology areas have faced serious challenges. Some are a direct result of tech-
nical considerations. This is clearly the case in the cyber area, where the absence 
of choke points, such as specific weapons-related materials or activities, renders 
efforts to govern the development of cyber weapons nearly impossible. Detect-
ing work on nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons also is technically 
challenging because such activity does not have an obvious signature, unlike 
work with nuclear material, which leaves detectable traces.
Other challenges can be linked to scientific and technological advances. 
This is particularly true in the biological area, where synthetic biology is increas-
ing the number of potential threat agents, the types of equipment used in their 
development, and the range of practitioners involved, thus greatly complicating 
efforts to control the transfer of or access to biological agents and technology.
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Economic interests also have played an important role in blocking the 
adoption of governance proposals. This can be seen in the hostility of nuclear 
reactor exporting countries to tightening the conditions under which reactors 
or certain reactor components can be transferred to other countries. It also was 
apparent in the U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries’ opposition 
to on-site inspections during the failed effort to conclude a compliance protocol 
to strengthen the BWC.
Still other challenges reflect security interests. The NPT’s two-tier system of 
nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” was necessary because the five nuclear weapons 
states at the time the treaty was concluded were unwilling to forego the posses-
sion of nuclear weapons. Even today, the procurement decisions and operational 
policies of these countries demonstrate that they continue to see the possession 
of nuclear weapons as militarily necessary. Security interests also have played a 
role in the unwillingness of the United States or any other country to formally 
limit or ban the use of cyber weapons, which can be used in a variety of ways, 
often without revealing the source of the attack.
Finally, political considerations also have had a significant impact on dual-
use governance efforts. Developing countries generally do not share the West’s 
concerns about the risks posed by dual-use biological research and in some cases 
see governance efforts as little more than a veiled attempt at technology denial. 
The same is true in the nuclear area, where countries without access to enrich-
ment and reprocessing technology have refused to forego the right to acquire it 
and even some states that possess such technology have been unwilling to limit 
their ability to acquire new forms in the future. Efforts to govern cyber weap-
ons also are viewed with little sense of urgency as, unlike nuclear or biological 
weapons, cyber weapons are not considered weapons of mass destruction whose 
spread and use must be blocked both internationally and nationally.
GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS: KEY LESSONS
These factors help explain the nature of the different governance measures that 
have been adopted in these three technology areas. They also underscore why 
a common governance approach is not feasible when it comes to managing 
the risks from dual-use technologies. This does not mean that the concept of 
dual-use technology is not useful and should be abandoned. On the contrary, 
as the previous chapters show, the concept provides a valuable analytical tool 
for identifying and assessing technologies that have the potential to cause large-
scale loss of life or damage to commercial or economic interests even as they 
continue to be used for legitimate purposes. By analyzing three examples from 
this category of technologies, as the preceding pages have done, a number of 
broader lessons become apparent.
One lesson is that governments are unlikely to support restrictions on their 
use of dual-use technology unless the stakes are sufficiently high. To date, the 
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stakes that have mattered most have been the possible risks to human life. 
This helps explain the willingness of so many technological “haves” to agree 
to forego the development of nuclear and biological weapons, as well as the 
corresponding lack of interest across the international community in restricting 
the development and use of cyber weapons.
A second lesson is that in the absence of genuine and broad agreement on 
the threat, governments are unlikely to support restrictions on their acquisition 
and use of dual-use technology unless the rewards for doing so are sufficiently 
high. This is demonstrated by the insistence of the technological “have-nots” 
on access to nuclear and biological technology as a quid pro quo for foregoing 
the acquisition of nuclear and biological weapons. It is also demonstrated by the 
experience of cyber weapons, whose underlying information technology already 
is widely available around the globe, thus limiting not only the security benefits 
but also any technology benefits that might accrue from supporting restrictions 
on technology used for cyber weapons.
Finally, unless governments and other relevant stakeholders view gover-
nance of dual-use technology as a collective responsibility, efforts to manage the 
relevant risks are likely to be limited at best. This is demonstrated by the lack 
of enthusiasm for bold proposals to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime, such as former IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei’s suggestion to 
internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle. It is also demonstrated by the prefer-
ence of scientists and scientific organizations for self-governance rather than 
independent oversight and for codes of conduct and other voluntary measures 
rather than legal requirements to address concerns about certain types of dual-
use biological research. And it is demonstrated by the reluctance of national 
governments and the information technology industry to countenance mea-
sures other than export controls and codes of conduct to address the problem 
of cyber weapons.
RECENT AND FUTURE STEPS
Notwithstanding the pessimism reflected above, as this volume is being com-
pleted, there are indications of additional progress in managing the risks from 
the three dual-use technologies that are its focus. In the case of nuclear technol-
ogy, the July 2015 agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for 
the lifting of economic sanctions has been approved by the Iranian Parliament 
and is now being implemented. This agreement, which was concluded by Iran, 
the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and 
Germany), and the European Union, includes unprecedented elements, includ-
ing the application of advanced safeguards technology, transparency into Iran’s 
uranium supply chain, time-limited dispute resolution procedures for access to 
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suspect sites, and snap-back sanctions procedures.5 These elements go beyond 
the terms of existing nuclear nonproliferation measures and, as such, may serve 
as a model not only for resolving concerns about other nuclear weapons pro-
grams but also for strengthening the broader international nuclear nonprolif-
eration regime.
In the cyber area, progress has been made toward creating what Presi-
dent Barack Obama calls “an architecture to govern behavior in cyberspace 
that is enforceable and clear.”6 This is seen in the September 2015 agreement 
by Presidents Xi Jinping and Obama not to conduct or knowingly support 
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. The two leaders also welcomed the 
July 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information, Telecommuni-
cations, and International Security (GGE) report on cybersecurity that, among 
other things, recommended that states not conduct or knowingly support cyber 
activity that intentionally damages or impairs the ability of critical infrastructure 
to provide services to the public.
Differences remain on whether the two nations’ cybersecurity commitment 
applies to cybercrime or the broader problem of cyber espionage and, poten-
tially, on what is meant by critical infrastructure, which was not defined in the 
2015 GGE report. Moreover, the United States has made clear that it could still 
impose sanctions on Chinese entities if they continue hacking U.S. companies, 
as appeared to be the case in the aftermath of the U.S.-China announcement.7 
Nevertheless, China’s apparent willingness to forgo computer theft of intellec-
tual property and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure represents an important 
step. The same is true of the subsequent statement by the G20, in November 
2015, opposing cyber theft of intellectual property and affirming the role of 
the UN Charter in governing state behavior in the use of information and 
communications technologies.
In the case of biological technology, the U.S. government has taken mod-
est steps to strengthen safety and security at facilities that work with select 
agents. Like the deliberative process for gain of function (GOF) research, these 
steps were a direct result of the incidents revealed in 2014 involving the mis-
handling of dangerous pathogens at federal facilities. In late 2015, the White 
House announced that it was moving forward with the recommendations in 
the December 2014 Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) report, 
including those involving select agent deactivation procedures, laboratory inci-
dent reporting, and high-containment laboratory requirements. Determining 
the latter is especially important given the proliferation of U.S. high-contain-
5. For details on the Iran agreement, see White House, “The Historic Deal That Will Prevent Iran 
from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” n.d., https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/
iran-deal.
6. David E. Sanger, “Path Set by U.S. and China to Limit Security Breaches May Be Impossible 
to Follow,” New York Times, September 26, 2015.
7. Julie Hirschfield Davis and David E. Sanger, “U.S. and China Agree to Rein in State-Sponsored 
Computer Thefts,” New York Times, September 26, 2015; and Paul Mozur, “Cybersecurity Firm 
Says Chinese Hackers Keep Attacking U.S. Companies,” New York Times, October 19, 2015.
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ment laboratories working with dangerous pathogens over the past decade. The 
White House also outlined its plans for implementing the recommendations of 
another review panel, the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Reg-
ulations (FTAC-SAR), which had issued a report in October 2015. One of the 
committee’s most important recommendations is for international engagement 
to explore opportunities for harmonizing biosecurity standards, but it is not 
clear whether the administration agrees with this objective.
There is still much that the U.S. government should do to reduce the risks 
from biotechnology research. GOF studies of concern should be added to the 
select agent regulations. This can be done by the executive branch and does not 
require legislative action. A more robust approach to oversight of other types 
of dual-use research of concern should also be adopted. The experience of the 
past decade underscores what such an oversight process should entail. It should 
be mandatory and apply without exception to all relevant research, irrespective 
of whether the work is done in government or nongovernment institutions, or 
whether it is unclassified or classified. It should clearly define the categories of 
research that are subject to the oversight requirements, which should be coordi-
nated and overseen by an independent federal entity. And as yet another expert 
committee has now recommended, it should seek to harmonize U.S. biosecurity 
requirements internationally.  
All of this underscores a broader theme: rather than a single or best solu-
tion, measures aimed at governing dual-use technologies have been and will 
continue to evolve incrementally, focus on different aspects of the problem, 
and take various forms, as no individual measure on its own can effectively 
address the full range of potentially adverse consequences. This is clear in the 
multiplicity of measures that have been adopted over the past half century to 
manage the risks from nuclear and biological technology. Taken together, these 
measures have helped to prevent the development and use of these technologies 
for hostile purposes. They also have helped to control access to and promote 
the safe and secure handling of the materials, equipment, and information asso-
ciated with them.
More can still be done—and needs to be done—by governments and other 
stakeholders to help prevent the use of nuclear, biological, and information 
technology from causing large-scale human, economic, or commercial harm. 
This study delineates some of the technical, scientific, economic, security, and 
political challenges facing those efforts. It also has identified some of the broader 
lessons from the governance experience with these technologies, including the 
potential for further measures, albeit incremental in nature, to help ensure that 
their social benefits can and will continue to be realized.
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List of Acronyms
ABET Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
ACM Association for Computer Machinery
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AG Australia Group
ASM American Society of Microbiology
ATCSA Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
BMBL Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
BRC biological resource centers
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CAD computer-aided design
CAM computer-aided manufacturing
CBB Center for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness
CBMs confidence-building measures
CCL Commerce Control List
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CETR Centers of Excellence for Translational Research
CFAA Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
COBRAT Steering Committing on Biotechnological Research  
in an Age of Terrorism
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CRG Compliance Review Group
CTR Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
DDOS distributed denial of service
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DU dual-use
DURC dual-use research of concern
EAA Export Administration Act
EC European Commission; European Council
ECPA Electronic Communications Privacy Act
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations
FESAP Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel
FTAC-SAR Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations
FY fiscal year
GOF gain of function 
GGE Group of Governmental Experts on Information, 
Telecommunications, and International Security
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GMOs genetically modified organisms
HEU highly enriched uranium
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAP InterAcademy Panel
IBC institutional biosafety committees
ICSANT International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism
ICT information and communications technology
IRB institutional review boards
IRE institutional review entity
IT information technology
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations
KNAW Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
LEU low enriched uranium
LOAC law of armed conflict
MERS Middle East respiratory syndrome
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NIH National Institutes of Health
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSABB National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development
PI primary investigator
PSI Proliferation Security Imitative
R&D research and development
RAC Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
RCEs Regional Centers of Excellence
RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation
SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
SERCEB Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Emerging 
Infections and Biodefense
UN United Nations
UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USML United States Munitions List
WHO World Health Organization
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WOOT workshops on offensive technologies
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